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CHAPTER I
IKTRODUCTIOM
In the "Epistle to the Reader* which prefaces his
Essay Concerning HuBian Dtoders tandin^ , John Locke told of
the beginning of his inquiries into huaan knowleclgeJ
Were It fit to trouble tJiee with the history of this
essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends
meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject
very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a
stand, the difficulties that rose on every side.
After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming
any nearer a resolution of those doubts whi�^ perplexed
us, it came into thoughts that we took a wrong course,
aM that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of tfe^t
nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities,
and see \#ia.t objects our understandings were, or were
;iot fitted to deal with. . . .1
The problem #iioh Locke posed for himself has come in later
years to be called the eplstemologioal problem, and ho was
not the only one who feels or has felt timt such conside
rations must come before one can be certain of any of the
conclusions of metaphysics.
The problem has pushed itself onto the minds of men
throughout history probably because of the inconsistencies in
the answers given to the problems of reality. If there were
only one man who had ever lived, the problem of kno^edge
might never arisen; but because there were five or six men
in Locke's club and because there were seemingly unreasonable
conflicts between Heraclltus and Parmenldes, the questions
1 John Locke. Philosophical Works. Volume I, p. 118.
2conoe2?ning man's ability to know reality. In whatever form it
may exist, have arisen. Smoh ooneiderations are the beginning
of humility, though they can reach the extremes of complete
agnosticism and scepticism.
The problem becomes serious wben one mcji's answers do
not agree with another man's answers to the same problem and
yet the true answer is vital to both men. Rera is the problem
of faith, and it asks th� question, "Do I dare believe my
answer though it may be fi^igmentaryt* The problem of faith
is therefore felt to be essentially an eplstemologieal prob
lem. This Is more the case the more difficult the problem
becomos, the more vital it becomes, and tlie more rationally
fragmentary the answers seem to be. It seems that men are
never fully satisfied or intellectually secui'e with fragments;
they must have ^^loles. Even in the slEpler problems, man is
constantly filling in the gap between his certainties and his
uncertainties and between his demonstrables and his undemonr-
strables with a faith of some sort to round out the picture.
la the more difficult problems, the question of faith becomes
even more acute, for the actional certainties are reduced to
a minimum.
To return to Locke, it is evident that the problem of
faith and reason wer^ closely akiM for him. He declared Ms
purpose to be *to inquire into t^e origin, certaijity and ex
tent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees
32
of l>ellef, opinion, and assent. .
This -m-a not only a problem of Locke's day, but this
study indicates that it was also an ancient problem.
John Bennett has made a recent atteatpt to delineate
the pj^oblems which still face theology and the philosophy
of religion. JUnong these problema, he feels that tJie problem
of the relation between faith and knowledge is the major
problem still confronting religion. If there is such a re
lationship between faitJbt and knowledge, what 1e it? Are
they dire<st opposites or are tiiey identical? If they are
related, are they necessary to ea^ other? l>o they have an
ontio relationship in that one is only operative in one
Sii^ere ?^ile the other is only operative in another sphere?
Does one know some things wh3.1e he can only believe other
things? Can one know anything? Is every assertion a faith-
venture? Cte the other hajid, is reason able to grasp all
things, f?;lven time #nougJi, so that faith is a false or tem
porary invention? If fait^ exists, is it native or bestowed,
a natural activity or a si:^er- atural gift? These are merely
a few of tbs many questions that miglit be asked, but these
indicate how closely linked is the problem of faith with
the problem of knowledge. The questions mi^t be summed
g Xbi^d. . p. 128.
3 John Bennett, **The Outlook for Theology", Journal
St Religion. October, 1941, Volume XXI, Husber 4, pp. 341 ft*
Cited by Hels Ferre. F^th and Reason > p. 217,
4In short: What can we know, and when, and how? What can we
believe, and ishen, and how niuch?
I. Tm PUHPOSE OF THIS STUDX
fhe coB?3lexity of the problem is Indicated in th� few
qt]^stions ^ic^ have already been raised, but the imediate
l^zrpose of this study was not to give a constructive and un
ified answer to the problem of faith and knowledge but to
t^oe the historical attempts, in G-reek thought both explicit
m& ia^llcit, at relating iinowledge to reality and ^ere faith
fits into such a scheme.
Therefore, the first task was to find the general
theories of knowledge in "Uie history of Greek philosophy.
Following each theory of knowledge, the role of faith as it
ai^ears in that particular theory is discussed.
The paper is based on the assumption tiiat the idea of
faith is not dlvoroed from. epistemol^Sioal assertions or
assi^tions as they appear in histoi^. It is Telt that the
study whi^ follows indicates the validity of this assumption.
II. A DISCUSSIGM OF "SESm
To forestall any ambiguity which misht arise in the
use of terms in this study, this section is set aside for
a careful delineation and definition of terms both by com
parison and by contrast. Since these terms are largely
philosophical terms, easy definitions do not exist. There
fore, it will be necessary not only to define but to discuss
the terras*
Though * faith* is not necessarily a philosophical
term, yet its presence in some form, auch as * opinion",
"belief*, "aasumption" , is common. (Religious faith Iz con
sidered to be a moro exhaiistivo term than those.) Some sort
of grasp of the concept of faith is necessary in the begin
ning. Therefore, this working definition is proposed: Faith
is regarded as referring to any Intelleotual extm-ratlonal
process of assuming a thing to be true, though it is not ob
viously so, usually on the basis of #%at is regarded to be
evident truth, and of acting with certainty on the basis of
the ass^jBsption itself.
*Knowledge* has tliroe general definitions. It can
mean the cognitive aspect of consciousness in general which
sppe-ars in two forms: the knowledge of acquaintance, per-
�eptiOR, apprehension, or recognition {yVLJ\/a.U iioscere.
Keanen. conna^tre ) . and knowledge about some thing or soraeone,
understanding or coi^rehension {� L Sb-Vo.^, ^c^lro. Wissen.
eay^oy). By way of parenthesis, *� cognition* means *to b�
aware of an object*. It is an ultimate mode of consciousness
along with conation (will) and affection (eaiotic�j). la
4
alternate term for cognition is * intellection'' . In th�
A Q. F. Stout and J. II. Baldwin. "Cognition*. Dlotion-
of Philosophy and Psycholoplv> Volume I (J. M. Baldwin,
editor ), p7 102*
6second place, knowledge can be taken to mean certitude
based on adequate objective grounds in contrast to the form
of mere opinion or belief whicb may exiot without adequate
objective foundations. Lastly knowledge oim be used to
stand for -^^t Is kaaown to date. Thus one speaks of a body
5
of knowledge.
If knowledge is �cmsidered as synonyjaous ^th cognition,
as it is in the first definition, it must also fulfill three
condltioiis to be a perfect cognition; it must hold a proposi
tion to be true that is %rm; it must be completely free from
doubt; and it must be self-satisfying in such a way that it
would be logically ii^osstble for such a satisfaction to b�-
6
long to an mtrue proposition.
To assume a working definition of ^knowladge*' , th� first
general definition is proposed in this form: Knowledge is the
awareness of sm. object (cognition), eitiier by acquaintaiioe
{knowledge of ) or widerstanding (k�o^edge about) or both,
in such a way that the oo^ition is regarded as true to the
identity of the object, without a doubt, and in a self-sati?;-
5 Stout' and Baldwin, o^. clt. , pp. 602-605.
6 0. 3. Pslroe and Mrs. G; Laad-Fraiiklln. "Knowledge
(in logic)*. Dictionary of Philosophy and pgvoholo/?jr. Volume
I (J. M. Baldwin, editor), p. SOS.
7fylng way �3ilc^ would be impossible if the oognition wei^
7
untrue ,
A two*�fold problem now presents itself : How is Imow-
ledge acquired, or in other words, what is the process the
mind uses to make an external event or object a part of the
fteatal grasp? And how can one be sure that what is acquired
is trustworthy, a faithful copy of the thing-in-itself? These
a
are the two aaln probleias of any theory of knowledge.
The philosophical name given to the study of these tw�
problems is Ipistemology. A broad definition of Epistemology
Is that it is the theory of th� origin, nature and limits of
knowledge, but this definition would be more of a definition
of ?^nosiology** . Andrew Sel^ Pringle-Pattison gives the fol
lowing narrower definition of ^istemology:
The systematic analysis of the conceptions employed by
ordinary and scientific thought in Interpreting the world,
and including an investigation of the act of knowledge,
or ^e nature of knowledge as such, with a view to
determine its ontological si^Eiificanoe; otherwise knoim
as Theoiy of knowledge. 9
7 Contrast this with the previous definition of faito.
Knowle^e is oognitive certainty; faith is extra-rational eer^
tainty of a nearly d�sionstrative, rationally necessary, or
rationally permlssable type. Of. the discussion in Chapter II.
8 Warren Melson ^^Xm* SellKion Ea^erlence and
Trut^. pp. 183-155. For a fiM?ther discussion of tiifse prob-
lems, of. �compter II: Basic Considerations*.
9 Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison. *Epistemology* . Dic-
ot Phi3,o8ophy ^sycho^o^y. ^Si^^ i'.??*also J. M. Baldwin's discussion on pp, 333 and 4JL4, along with
Pringle-JPattison* s dismission on i^. 333-336.
8Douglas Clyde Macintosh gives, in a popular fom, the duty
of lpistsmol<^r
Epistemology will have vindicated its right to exist.
if it enables us to 3mow that w� know, when we do know,
and to know that we do not know, when we do not know ^10
It is important to consider some tilings Ml<M Episte
mology is not. It is distinguished from Ontolo^ or Meta-
11
physics. Philosophy is made up of two main divisions at
least, t^e theory of knowing and the theory of being, fhese
mre called lk>isteEiolo^ and Ototolog^ or MetaphyEics res )0c-
tively. These are eoEplementary inquiries and are closely
allied. Some even infuse to distinguish between them, but a
theory of knowledge cannot give all tteit must be Included
12
under ^tolo^. Thus Cfetologf gives a coherent system of
^ universe #111� Ipistes^logy tests the validity of the
system, or ^tter, the ability of the systematizer. Episte-
13
mology Is th^srefor� a tii^ory of theories.
A more difficult differentiation should be mad� between
Spistemology and Logic. Bom people identify the two^ while
some make ^istesology a branch of Logic Pringle-Pattison
"~
10 Douglas Clyde Macintosh, '^e Problems Inowled^e.
p. 10.
11 So distlnoticm is made between the terms ^(fetolOiSJ*
and *Metaphysics* .
12 Ppingle-Pattisoa. o�. ^It. . p. 336.
13 Two ijiteresting discussions of this problem appear
in Ledger Wood. .^pslrBls Qf Knowledge; p. 01, and Mevius.
OP. clt. . pp. 1S5-1S6.
9suggests that the best logical treatises contain such episte-
iBOloglcal jaaterial, yet the usage of Logic as the science of
formal thought, the principles of formal consistency in mov
ing from one statomeat to another, are firmly established.
f)b�y assume an eplstemologioal basis. Logic is the process;
Epistemology is the philosophy of the process.
Oae more distinction should be made. Epistemology
i^ould be differentiated from Psychology, fhe latter studies
psycixic factors objectively as other sciences study their
factoz�0, but SpisteiMJlogy studies the relation of these psy-
<^c factors to the actual objects of thought. Pringle-Pattl-
soa says:
la brief, psychology, although dealing in popular par
lance v/ith the subjective facts, like any natural science,
as an objective world in whidbt it traces caus^ connections,
Goncomitaaoes, or sequences, and the evolution of the more
complete fro� simpler formations. But it does not ana
lyse the subject-object relation inhich constitutes know
ledge as such, and which is the presupposition of psy^o^
logy as well as of ev^i:^ other science. To analyse this
relation and its implications is t^e specific task of epla-
As has been noted, epistemology refers to the relation
between the subject and the object. With tiiis in mind. It is
evidently necessary for a study of Q-reek theories of kiiow-
ledge to spend much time with the status of objects as well
"^15 Ibid.', p. 356.
III. THE MOTOS OP PHOOEDURE
10
ae with subjective abilities and the relation between Uxe
It has also bees pointed out that �pisteEoiosy as a
separate study is a eoj^aratively now venture* fhis means
t^t Greek philosophy for the most psopt does not spead a
great deal of separate discussion on the problem. One has
to go throu^ tJie writings of these men and distill out tJi�
statements and ideas that have epietemologioal sisnlflcanoe
Tether they be esspllcit or implicit.
Thus tins geaeral method has been a discussion of var
ious ideas of these d-reek thinkers ^d then a drawing-out of
t^e various ideas of knowledge and the places where faith
plays a prominent role.
As to specific pmcedure, tlie study has been divided
into five parts. Part One Ie a pi'olegomena i^th two chapters:
an. introduction eontalns a discussion of terms, a discussion
�f purpose, and a section on procedui'a. Part Two c^mtains a
discussion of G-reek thought from Thales to the Semi-Socratics.
It contains tm) chapters: the former contains a discussion of
tiie early 0reek thinkers, and the latter contains a disousaioa
of the Sophists, Socrates, and the seml-SoGraties Cl^e C^ics
aad the Oyrenaics). Part Three discusses Plato and is divic^d
11
Into thp�to dmpters dealing ^th Plato's eai^ller dialogues,.
his later dialogues, and oonoludUng statements res actively.
Part Four contains th� study of Aristotle. It is divided
into four ethapt^rs dealing with iiis logic, his mota'Dhysics,
hts psychology* ^d a Chapter on conclusions. Part Five con
tains only one chapter on general conclusions.
BASIC GOHSIDEHAflOliS
Eplet^moXogy as a separate study is a fairly recent
^velopment. Since the days of Descartes and Locke, however,
it has occupied a foremost position. ?/ith the abandoniDent of
seta^physics in sany quarters in recent tlssieSt l^e study of
the origin Mid nature of knowledge has even taken on more
prominence. In fact, the very study of knowledge probably
1
undermined the study �f being.
But in the age of the d-reek metaphysicians, the theory
of knowledge ma lij&t absent. In fact, wherever a man pro
poses a statement of fact or an explanation of someUiing,
there is present in his thinking a residual theory of know
ledge or at least a faith in his own abilities to know. The
same holds true prliaarily for the pre-Socratics. Inirolved in
tiieir oOite<a.ogles were implicit <so^ explicit) assurances
or convictions that Uiey had the ability to know things as
they are. The Sophists were sceptical �f the ability to
know, and from tiiat time on every serious-minded thinker
has had to make It part of his consideration to bulwark his
theory with some sort of epistemolOf?ical considerations.
I Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison. "Upisteiaology* . Pic-
13
B
Plato and Aristotle did it.
Since theories ot the origin and nature of knoirlsdg�
have always been present in some fom, and since any approach
to ancient thought aust begin at the point -^hore one lives
and thinks, some of the present insights into those episte-
^logical problems will be utilized in the approach to the
P3x>bleffi of knowledge in ^reek thought. It Is for the r'lroose
3
of lifting up these insights that this ehapter is included.
I. THE KliaWLEDdS-SITUATIOS
Philosophers and psychologists have, especially in tlie
past, attempted to classify the functions of the mind. The
usual classification seems to be the three-fold division into
4
intellect, will, and enioti<m. But an analysis of the func
tions of the mind is not of isportanee to the iaiowledge-sit
uation. Epistemol !^y is Interested in the relation of Uie
subject to a real or supposed object.
Thus an indispensable feature in the knowledge situa-
5
tion is �&at Ledger Wood calls * referential ti^scondence* ,
0 Priedrich Paulsen. Introduction ^ PhilQsoofay. pp.
339-340.
3 Pringle-Pattison. loc . clt.
4 Of. 0. F. Stout. "Classification <of the mental
iJunotions)* . Diotionai-vy of philosophy and PsycholOjgLy, Yoluise
I. (J. M. Baldwin, editorT7 p. 188*
5 Ledger Wood. Analysis of KnowledRe. p. 9,
14
fl&loh Is a Inference to soise thing beyond tJhe teower or the
knowledge. Wood descilbes this funetloa as a moat mystifying
thing t
fhe ffllnd can refer to an object, but one object properly
speakl^, never 3:^fer;s to another object, even thoi^ it
may aii^^^ify another by virtue of the inclusion of the
two in me same referential scheia�, and thus observation
of physical phanoaena affords no clue to tlie understanclin;:;
Of conscious reference. But isheaa one seeJks to exajsine
directly the referential function of conscious contsnty
one encounters the observational difficulty that the act
of reference is inscrutable at the time ^en it prevails
la oonsciousness. Any given referential act is directed
towards its proper referent arsid <mnaot be an object for
Itself, but only for some subsequent ref@�^tlal act. Re
ference, because it is intrinsic to the cognitive act, is
no more capable of self-ecrutiay t^ian is i^m eye, which
is ti^ organ of vision, capable of seeing itself .6
this may Msaa that epistemology can never becoise a pur*� sci
ence, and it may partly account for the necessary extra-
mtional elements in the theory of knowledge.
There seem to be three factors la the knowledge-sit
uation, according to the classical representative view.
These are Subject (S), the Gonteat of knowledge {GY, and
the Object of knowleage (0). Each can be differentiated
froEi the other two. Tliis can be easily seen when the thi^ee
elements appear in the ssaoz^ situation especially; the
present act of reiasfflberiag (S), lii� memory image (G), and
ti� past event resesabered (0). Bescartes, Hobbes, Locks, and
Kant are a few of the names of those wiio malatala this vie??.
6 Ib^4. . p. 12.
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This theory is not the crude * copy theory" . The difference
is plainly shown in Wood's words:
Two trees in a forest may he siiailar although in no
sens� is the one a representative of the other. On
the other hand, t^e printed word' 'tree' is symbolically
representative of the ti^e in the forest, but there is
no significant resemblance between the black shapes on
the page and the living structures to which they refer.
Thus ther^ may be a wide divergence betwe^ the object and
the content of thought.
It should be noted, as Wood points out, that there is
no pure application of this tri-partite representative theory
of knowledge. Historic theories have actually been hybrid.
Qa@ theory, for instance, might hold to a representative form
of perceptive knowledge with a intuitional or iiamediat.e theory
8
of the knowledge of universals.
Following the syufeolism previously given (S, C, and 0),
there are two alternatives to the representative theory.
The first involves the fusion of S and G; the second involves
the fusion of C and 0.
In discussing the fusion of S and G, Wood reveals that
his position is to be foimd substantially in this area. He
says that there are no legitimate psychological or epistemo-
l<^cal grounds for splitting consciousness into act and eon-
7 Ibid.', pp. 18-19. Cf . also pp. 16 ff .
X6
tent as he feels the old theory doest
Consolousness Is a process In �hich the existence of con
tent is Ipso facto the awareness of it. . ^ere is, strictly
speaking, no consciousness of content, hut merely th�
conscious presence of conscious content.
He continues later:
The telescoping of S and 0 accoi�i)lishes a great sin5>li-
flcation of the episteitologioal situation, for now a
single conscious process, considered as a fusion of
activity and content, serves both as subject and as ve
hicle of knowledge.�
He calls his theory the intentional or inferential theory and
divides the knowledge-situation into the ideational content
imiSL the cognitive object. By the latter he aeans the episte-
10
lalo object rather than any object that mi3% have ontlc status.
0. I. Lewis also divides the knowledge-situation into
two elements, but his words see� also to indicate the presence
of a laiad as a third factor:
There are, tn our co^itive essperience, two elements;
the isffifflsdiate data, such as those of sense, ^hleh are
presented or given to the mind, and a form, construction*
or interpretation, whic^ r^resents the activity of
thot^t.ii
The second alternative to th�,rep3?esentatiTe theory
Bakes a fuslem between C and 0. Most types of epistemol<^-
eal doctrine are interested In the relation betwe^ 0 and 0
9 Ib^d. . pp. 20, 21 respectively.
10 Ibid. . pp. la, and 22-24.
11 Clarence Irving Lewis. Mind and the Woria^Order.
p. 38.
17
thoiigh not all are willlns to fuse th� two. One way of fus
sing these elements involves the telescoping of 0 into C so
that 0 i^ virtually denied. The result is subjectlviss or
idealism. Leibniz wi^ ills mon^dology is one of th.e classic
representatives of this thought. HocMng says his thouf^t
Is almost liteimlly *a cosmic egoiei#. His doctrine is sum-
Bied up in the iK)rds, *The irorld is mj representation".
Hocking says that Leibniz regarded each self to be a monad,
"a completely closed universe of experience, tmrolling its
own panorama In perfect independence of , but also in perfect
12
synchronism with, that of every other monad.* However, as
Lewis suggests, it is doubtful that any theory whi�^ fuses
tl:^se elements is completely free from making some distinc
tion between them. Both Berkeley and Eant leave a link be-
15
tween the individual mind and the outer world.
The fusion of 0 and O so that 0 is practically elim^
iaated is called pan-objectivism by Wood. In other words,
tJie object is regarded as directly apprehended by the know
ing subject. The object cognized persists during inte2�-cog-
nitive periods and preserves the same properties as when
cognized. Bergson and the neo-realists, espef�i.?:ily of the
"
12 William Ernest Hooking. Types of PhilosoEfay. p. 285.
15 Lewis. �P. clt. , p. 39. Cf . Hocking, loc. clt.
and also Wood, og.. clt. . pp. 21-22. The last reference gives
a discussion of this type of fusion of C and 0.
14 Wood. o^. cit. , p. 22.
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Amerloasi variety, are exBs^lee of this featiire. Lewis re
views the position of Bergson:
The reason why Bei^son identifies the truest knowledge
with * intuition** is similarly rooted in metaphysical
theory and not in any divergent reading of our ordinary
experience. For him, the ultimate reality is life, or
the inwardly grasped "real duratioe.* For each mizia,
this is something which is U^i^iate, in his own ease,
and is to he apprehended in its other manifestation^ oalx
by empathy or eisfahlimg;. She world of science and common
sense Bergson recofflai^es to be c^Jiistruction or Interpre
tation :#]^^- the mind.-ll^oges upon the data of Im^diacy.
Also, he is explicit that this construction is dominated
by interests of action and of social cooperation. But
the space-world which results fro� such int^rpretatloEi,
he regaz^ as not an ultimate reality; hence the co^*-
nitive exp^erlenoe ^feioh includes this interpretive ele
ment is not a theoretically adequate knowledge. In short,
with Bergson as ?iith the mystics, identification of kiiot/-
ledge witht Intuitive ^prehension of the Immediate re
flects no basic difference in the analysis of Ordinary
ea^arlence but rather a difference In the denotation
given to the phrase *true knowlec^ge* because of a meta
physical tlieory ishich denies ultljsfete reality to what is
co^^zed by science and conmioa sense.
(It should be said that the intuitive philosophy of Bergson is
different from that of the neo-reallsts. fhey are mentioned
together sinee both eB^hasize the immediacy of knowledge.)
It Is not the purpose of this study to attes^t an
adequate analysis of the knowledge-situation. Howevor, it
should be pointed out that knowledge, as the awareness of aii
object supposedly real, must be re^^rded as truly knowledg�
only wiien ths object is actually real-- that is, is ^ ontlc,
as well as an spistemic object. It may not be imortaat.
15 L��ts. SZ' o3Lt. . pp. 41-42.
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as Wood stassssts, for th� eubjsot to have a real object If
he thinks it is real�that is, as far as his own actions and
reactions are concerned� , but it is very isportant that th�
object be truly i�eal if actual knowing is to take place.
Thus, in a sense, any theory of the knowledge-situation, #ie-
ther representative or othei^ise, must break down into two
elements, the knower and the known. Th� content and the ob
ject must be identical, except where the content is a sym^-
b^ic representation of the object.
^ere are two possible exceptions to this statement
that knowledge must be ai^eness of the actual object. They
are apodlotic and problematic knowledge as other than the
knowledge of actual reality which is knowi as assertoric
knowledge. These tei^ are the modlilistic terms of tradi
tional logic and they correspond to modality in ontology by
TShich is meant the modes in which all things exist, namely,
17
actuality, possibility, and necessity. Definitions of these
three modes of knowledge are as follows: Assertoric knowledge
is, "Knowledge of tih&% is actual or ocurrii^. ..." Apodlo
tic knowledge is, "Knowledge of what Mist oecur, as opposed
to Knowledge of what might occur or is capable or occuring,
1$ Wood. ^gl^. , pp� 22-24. Wood would endorse only
the first part of this statement.
17 Of. Otto F Srushaar. "Modality" , Bictionary
PhilQSOPhy. (Second �dition> (Dagobert D. Huaes, editor) ,
p. 200.
20
or of what is actual or occuring. . . .* Problematic know
ledge is, "Knowledge of ifeat might occur or is capable of
occuring as oooosed to knowledge of #mt is actual or of
18
ishat must occur. ..."
lEhere are some who are unwillihg to saj tl\at a thing
is r^al that is not acti^ and therefore there is no real
knowledge oUior tlian assertoric knowledge. Therefore, the
BK>dals aTG regarded as the two remaining tjfpes of awareness
which are something less than knowledge. For this reason it
19
was stated that these two �les^nts are possib3.e exceptions.
II. AHEAS OF KKOWI^^DGS
There are several common areas in whidi it seems to
be generally regarded that a knowledge-situation can be estab
lished. Wood suggests six areas which will be now discussed.
They are: pmremg^Xlon, perceptual memory, historical cogni
tion, introspeotive cognition, oognition of other selves,
20
and conceptual cognition.
18 A. eornelius Benjamin. "Assertoric Knowledge",
"Apodlotic Enowle%e�, and "Problematic Knowledge". The
Dictionary oi Philosophy. (Second edition) (Bagobert D. B
Runes, editor), pp. 25, 15 and 255 respectively. Of. also
Alon&o Church. "Modalit/' (second definition)", f^e Pict^on-
It Cf* Chapter VIII in which the term "�odal" refers
to the two exceptions to assertoric kno7/l�dge.
20 Cf . Wood. ��. cit. , pp. 24-28.
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It shoiild be pointed out tbat there aay be soiae
do not beliere in knowledge as existing In these various
lureas, but who belle?� that knowledge is too eomplex a thing
to be so oategoriaed. Itnowledg� starts with perception (as
with Bez^son) or with oonoeption (as vslth Flato), but beooaes
a eofflplieat^ process, Tim coEig)lesltj of fenowleage may be
�P8mted, however, without nulllfyia^ the subjeiTtive Oif-
f@rentiati<m between knowing things and knowti^ concepts,
for instance. The differentiation into ai^ss of Miowledg�
is therefore done �n the tesis of differentiaticm of epis-
temic objects.
Mth ttiese things in mind, on� must approadbk the
study of areas �f knowledge with soiae hesitancy. For one
^es not need to delve too deeply beneath the surface to
find vast coisplexities and with these complexities vast
differences of opinion. A study of a cadaver can hardly
give understandihg cf human life, but it la very difficult
to imagine ar*y understoiding of human life whi<^ neglects
the structure in whiefe that life functions. Likewise, a
study of areas of possible knowledge, on the basis of tiie
various episteiiiic objects, can hardly be axpeoted to give a
total picture of imowlsdge, but it can hardly be Uiat an
understanding of hu^ox knowledge can neglect th� various
�pistemie objects. The epistemio object aad the subjective
reference to it may not involve toowledge because the object
22
lacks ontlc status or because of lack of correct reference,
but it is not conceivable toat an ontio object and a cor^
i^ct referential intention can be involved in knowing unless
the oatic object becomos also epistemio. therefore, there
is some provocation for a brief study of the areas of pos
sible knowladge�timt is, th.e areas ^�re �pistemie objects
are to b� found and where reality is to be known if anywhere.
P�roe:;:tion is the nam� gi"^^^ to th� relatlonsliip be
tween til� knower- and th� known which is the apprehension of
phaenon^nal objects whi^ are relatively conteiporsfflte^us�
relative, in the sense that a oognitivs act, even though
involving iimedlate, or non-mediated, knowledge m&j involve
a time distinction. It is largely sensate although there
Is a distinction Ib^tween sensation said perception in that
21
perce tion has both sense Ir^redients and interpretation.
Blanshard gives the following definition and explanation;
Percepticm is that exi:5�ri0nce in which, on the warra?it
of someUiing r^slven in sensation at th� time, we unro-
fleotingly talie some object to be befoi'^ us. fh� terms
�object*, �tmreflectingly* , and �sensation* oal.l for
comment. �Object' la a wide texm here; it ra^.y mean a
certain ^> a .certain Ma4 of thing, or w!iat is not
properly a thi rig at all, but a quality or illation. V/q
are obviously perceiving, for �xa^le, when we hap., en to
recognize our typewriter or our acg, W� are also p�r~
caiving when we take something to bo a typewriter or a
dog. But we are no less perceiving wh^ we j.isteii to
music or conversation, when w# relish th� taste of a
gl Cf . Wood. Qg, cit. . p. 24 and Chapter� II and III,
pp. 29 ff - and Brand Blanshard . Ti^e llaturo of ThouN;yit. Yolums
I, pp. 52-54.
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plum pudding, when we oh^erv� one car to.be going
faster than another, or when we stop before a shiftp
window to admire the blue in a new dress. In ail
these cases we are perceiving, because, with what is
given in sense as our cue, we go on without reflection
to take some object as presented. Juad it is- evident
that perception in this sense is an experience we have
every hour of our waking lives. Unfortunately such
extreme familiarity does not make it easier to analyse.
It is so coj^letely automatic aad effortless that we
seldom have occasion to think of it, and its parts are
so cemented by habit that we are hardly able, even
ideally, to take ^em apart.22
There are, therefore, two factors in perception,
��se-data (sense ingredients) and perceptual interpretation
(perceptual judgment). As to the former. Van Steenber^en
discusses "the corporeal ^tum", which is presented to the
knowing subject under tiie following headings: (1) it is resuL;
(2) it is ooi*poreal or spatial; (3) it is temporal; (4) it
is diversified; and (5) it presents a certain structure.
But this analysis clearly presupposes that things are as
23
^ey seem. Wood, oa the other hand, characterizes sense-
data in four ways: (1) as to <iuality, such as color dif-
ferentiatloa in vision; (2) intensity, such as the bright
ness or dullness of a color; (3) extenslty, or spatiality;
and (4) protensity or duration. (The last three are aetu^ly
sub-divisions of the first.) It is felt that these are
22 Blanshard. o^. cit. . pp. 52-53,
23 Femand Van Steenberghen, Epistemology. pp, 110-
112.
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M>re ajStmqxmim <^mract�i�$.stios sine� they involve no onto-
logioal presuppositicms, fhey refer to the relation between
24
a sabjeot and an �pistemio objeet, fhey are �^featar� appre
hended by the senses of sight, sia�ll, hearing, taste, and
touch.
How these sensat� elements are apprehended is largely
a matter for psychology to explain. Th� interpreting of
t^em is an eplstemologieal problem. Wood gives four prin
ciple interpretative activities in perception; <1) "aualita-
tive disorimlnation* divides sense qualities according to
t^e hom^cnelty of th� quitLltles. {2} "Sensory correlation"
is th� Inferential aM indirect later-sensory association
of heterogi^oous ^poups of sens� cpjalities into an integrated
3|er��ptlcm. Wood says:
Th� tmifieation of heterogeneous sense qualities into
an integi^ted perception, al^iou^ performed unconscious
ly and without effort in any single act of perception,
is conditioned by t^e most elaborate and Intricate sen
sory correlations. We are abl� to bring together divers�
sense qualities into an object only becaus� of the cumu
lative effect of correlations arduously discovered in
childhood and infancy.
i^) Synthesis of thingdiood" is tto final gi^uping of sens�
elements into a perceptual object. (4) "Sxtemal projection"
is the final step. Wood says in this connection: "Exteiml-
24 Wood. ^* clt. pp. 58-44.
25 Ibid. . p. m.
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Ity Is a property of eaoh of the Individual qualities
of the thing and of the collection of qualities which
is the thing. 26
fhis analysis of the interpretative factor in percep
tion is actually an attempt at seeing the elements which are
l^olved. fhe seeming chronology is false for the whole
Juciging process is imediat�� (Wood is specific about tliis
27
as is Bertrand Russell.) But yet it is probably conditioned
28
1^ �very individual durii^ childhood and infancy. In fact,
the role of perceptual meaning may b� either a help or a
hindmne� in th� gmsp of truth. It my cause on� to he
blind to certain tilings; it may cause perceptions to vary
from pei-*son to person; It may cause error. Qa the other
hand, it may faeilltate observation; it m&y eaime p�rc�p-
tion to be faster; and it may help to maintain attention.
29
Tbla is to list but a few of both hindrances and helps.
Befor-e closing the discussion on perception, it should
be not�d that any such analytical approach to the subject is
probably very dangerous close to misapprehonslon. Such
an investigation takes into considei^tlon a singular object
26 Ibid., p. 66. Of, Gloapter III, pp. 55 ff.
27 IMd. . op. 68-69 and Bertrand Russell. Problems
31 Pl^^oso^r pp'. 177-178.
20 Wood, lo^, cit.
29 Cf. Blanshard. og. c|^., pp. 213-214. Cf. Chapters
IV, V, and VI, pp. 160 ff.
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and a slngillar Aubjeet and a single knowing act in isolation*
The least such an analysis can do is to regaM also the ex
ceedingly lagportant interaotions and interdependencles, not
necessarily l^tween object and subject, but especially be
tween the object and oti�r objects, that is referred to is
the same thing that ^oim Dewsy calls the * situation", that
is, the complexity of various objects and �vents. He says
that thei^ can be no knowledge of an object in isolation.
He says:
In actual �xperienc�, there is never any such isolated
singular object or eventj ^ object or �vent is ialways
a special part, phase, or aspect, of an environing
�xp�zd�noed world�a situation. Tl^ singular object
stands out conspicuously because of its especially
focal and erucial position at a given time in determin
ation of som� problem of us� or �njoyment ^shich the
to1:^1 coii5)lex environEteat presents. There is always a
field In which observation of this or that objeot or
ev�at occurs. Observation of th� latter is mad� for th�
sak� of fii^aing out what that field is with reference
to som� active adaptive response to be made in carrying
forwaixl a �ourse of behaviour. One has only to recur
to animal perception, oecurring by means of sense or
gans, to not� that isolation of i^t is perceived from
th� course of life-behavior would b� not only futile,
Imt obstructive, in many oases fatally so.30
In concluding this discussion of percepticm, Arthur
S. Mu2phy*s three suggestions, as to whether perceptual ob
servation is a source of reliabl� information, are suggestive.
He says, firstly, that p�ro�ption is not iafallibl�. Thii^s
may seem to b� which ar@ not. Howover, secon^y, perception
30 John Dewey. Logi,^. p. 67.
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is oorxlgiblo in that, through fm*ther and more cautious oh-
servation, those things which are reliable can be distin-
quished from those that are not. It is thus self-correcting.
^ilrdly, it is the ultimate source of information concerning
31
the external mjrld.
More discussion has been expended on peroaption than
woiad be legitimate for a survey ehapter has not the role
of perception played swdtx an li^ortsjnt i*ole in modem phil-
ost^hy. kB Blanshard says, the theory is oae of the imoor-
32
tant ti^diticmal battlegrounds of philosophy. The discu�-
sioa from liero on follows Wood* s analysis almost entirely.
Perceptiial memory is the second possible area of oog
nition. This refers to apprehension by a subject of objects
belonging to the perceptual past. Along with this cognition
must be a realisation -^bat the peroeptloa was originally a
past experience or else there will be a mere image as in an
35
hallucination, ^us there is an additional thing above the
oil.ginal perceptual situation. Such mnomonic cognition must
not be confused with introspective msmrj which is a recall
ing of a previous psychical state. In the mnemonic situation,
51 Arthur E. Mui-^y. The Usee <^f Eeasm. pp. 35 ff.
32 Blanshard. j2�. cit. , p. 52.
33 Wood. 0�. ci^. . pp. 24-25.
mthe object is episteraio entirely althot^ not without pos
sible ontological moorinss in the original object of per-
eeption. Perceptual mraory is not stlmulatsd by the sonses;
it is a time-transcending experience, ai^ because it is,
its characteristic feature is also a paradoxical feature.
Since there is a p3:H>jeetlon of the EAnd into th^ past, it
is an interpretative fiuietion. Being interpretative, it
is subject to error, �elusions are also poseiia�. When the
original percept is distorted, a memory illusion results;
Tdien a pure imagination is placed in the place of Uie cri^l-
54
nal percept, a memory hallucination results.
Historic oogniticm Is non-^eroeptual appi^heneion of
past objects. The objeets were never perceived or if they
were they were forgotteri. It includes not only history in
the limited sense but also asti^aomical, geologicai, antia?�-
I^ogloal, and archaeological rseons truetions of the past.
However, it is dependent i:^on perception of present docu-
iB^nts, BioniJBBents, ete. &r perceptual memory of them.. I^ers
is a quasi-perceptual character to historic eogaltion for
the objeets envisioned are events or things a� they appeared
or might hare s^peared to a pereipl^t whether actual or hypo-
35
thetical.
^4 Ibi,<5L. . pp. 70 ff.
55 Ib^d.. pp. S5-26. 0f. also pp. 82-87.
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IntroapectlTe �ognitlon is the apprehension hy a eub-
^eet of earlier processes of the same subject. It is neces
sarily retrospeetlTe (si^^ry) although tiie biggest share of
memories are perceptual rather than introspocti-ye. Intro-
i^ection m,f be dlreeted to specific processes of person's
life or to the total selt. However, of t^e latter, Wood says:
The self, however, considered as a psychic substance or
pure ego, can never become an object of introspective
serutiay and is posited, if at all, on the basis of in-
rexHsnoe, and construction from the empirical self ap
prehended by introspection. 56
Introspection is si^posedly a direct form of cognition, but
this can hardly be anymore direct than perception and mm-
oar^. It is teowledge ^ ^sentia.
Oo^iition of other subjectg Is %}\q next possible area
of knowledge. Wood suggests that belief in other psychic
�enters and m knowledge of their oont^ts depend on intix>-
spection of one's own conscious processes. He suggests th�
following steps: (!) somatic perception or perc�ptlon of on�'s
own body and its diserimins,tion from other perceptual objects;
(2) pex�ception of bodies other thaa onc*s own mid the discri-
i^nation of tiiese fr�^ th� iK)rld of inanimate objects; (3) in
trospection of �xsls's own eognltions and esotioas and a reali-
36 Tbi^C . 26.
^ ^Of* g^,,t. Cf. also po. Q8-l(^ and Lewis, op. cit.
Appendix DT^Mlm*'8 Eno^LeOge of ^ Pp. 412 ff.
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zation that he is #ubject of thea; (4) a oorrelation of a
subject's body with tiie z^sults of introspection; (5) the
'imaRinative Intro jeotioa of me,i^tal� states and processes
into tJij behaviour of other anigg.to bodies.�The knowing
subject reads a asdnd into the behaviour of other bodies
because of the similarity of their behaviour to observed
bdbtaviour of his own whldbi he has already oon:*clated. . .
with tliQ latrH^sTJectlvely ap'orehended pgrooess of >t1s own
38
mind,*
2Jie i^thod just described of cognizing other subjects
is an analogical method betf/een the subject and his processes
and the other subject and his processes. This is inferential
and secondary, but there is a primry aw^.reness of other sub
jects wlalch does not seem to be inferential. It is a sense
of imiaediate personal presence iihen other subjects are pre
sent. This, says Wood, is deeply rooted In social instincts
and 13 a sort of e^athy. But he insists that it is no in-
t^tional ^jprehension, as some do, for the minds of others
ai'e not public property to be cognized as a i^an cognizes his
own prooesceg. �Every Qo^i5.7,ln[z subject,* says Woods, "re
main at home with himself, and his acquaintance with other
3S
selves is solely referential.*
38 Ibid. , pp, 107-108.
39 I)3id. . p. 27, Of. pp. 26-27 and pp, 103-129,
There are two types of analogical cognition of ot^r
selves idilcii have not been mentioned. They (continued--)
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Knowledge "bj eoaoepts o^ abstraota* or conceptual
eognitlon differs from those discussed thus far in teat it
is not directed toward eoaorete objeets whether actual or
fiotional Imt tewaz^ abstaraictlons. I^ewis defines a concept
Sm an uausual waj and mstkes communitj of meaning the charac
teristic feature of it. A concept for him Is "that meaning
i^ch must be common to two Btinds idsen they understand ea^
41
ethir by the use of a subetmitiTe or its equivalent.*' Qm^
oeptual ec^nltioa is tii#refore Interpretative; it ie a con-
42
etrueticHa; of the mind itself. It is obvious that such com-
mm i^eenings, idiich ai^ hsre called i^^oepte, transcend In-
43
dividual dUTfez^nces. Aether these concepts actually esslst
or i&iether they are symbdio Inventions of the mind is not
for this paper to discuss fully, {fkm view of the dreeks
is seen in the bo^ of this paper.) Suffice it to say that
the radical realist places the universal as the literal ob-
jeet of a ooneept, as & ;:^3y%lcal or eii^posedly physieal
59 (eohiinued� ) are biographical oo^il tion, which
*$M MovM^, other p,^p.9ph8 t^,T^ ifife^oes^
with thej^^Co. 113) . and fictional knowle^e wlt^ is a varie-
ty of biographical knowledge aiicl is the description of Ikia-
^Lnative and non-existent personalities.
40 m,^. , p. 27.
41 Lewis. cit. . p. 70.
42 Ibid. . p. 67.
^ ybld. , p. 73.
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thing is object of a percept. The non-realist Is faced
with the p3?obleia of accounting for this transcendent refer
ence. There are fo\ir devices which Wood mentions i (1) to
regard the object of a concept as a class or aggregation of
particulars; (2) to regard the object of a con<sept as a re
lation of i^aemblance or similarity between particulars;
(3) to regard the concept as having a hypothetical or supo-
sititious object; or <4) to regard the object of a concept
44
as resident in the partieulars.
C^e type of conceptual cognition is catj^gorial <a
posterlorjL) knowledge. Dewey says: "Svery conception fimc-
tlons as representative of a possible mode of operation may
be called a category.* Hbwever, he quicl0.y adds:
Although in the history of philosophy, the word has been
used to a l&r&s extent to designate only the conceptions
that were taken to be ultimate (even so with little re
gard to their opemticaal natiire), yet ordinary language
uses the word more widely. 45
Wood defines a categoi^ in the following way: It is "ap,
ultimate and irreducible universal. ^ universal which can
neither be resolved into nor subsumed under ^ higher uni
versal." But he reveals his unrealistic approach by saving
44 Wood. 0�. cit. . pp. 130-132. Gf. pp. 130-143.
45 Xtewey. 0�. cit. , p. 273.
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�ymt oonoeptually, it tl^en ^ eonoept of hi^ gerierality
and wide application." Wood continues later by listing the
eategories; Aristotle's list of catf^ories oan be seen in
Ohapter VTJX, and there are others. Wood's listg however,
is a a^epresentative one; (1) existence; {2) non-existence |
(3) possibllityj (4) iB^osslbllity; {&} necessity; (S) qual
ity; (7) relation; <8) resemblance; (9) qualitative differ
ence; (10) qualitative identity; (11) nimerical identity;
(12) numerical distlactaiess; (13) structure or organization;
(14) individuality or individual identity. All of these are
fi^ poeteriori universals in that they are abstracted from the
particular objeets and therefore are contingent on t^e exis
tence of the pai^tieulars. In short, they are ea?>irically de-
47
iived.
Foi^aal knowledge or ^ tyrLevi. knowledge is conceptixal
knowledge which is non-factual knowledge. If there is no
isowledge without interpretatioa�in all of these areas there
are interpretative elem�:its� , and interpretation is always
subject to the check ef further experience, how is i^owledge
possible at all? It seems to be possible only if some know
ledge is ^ priori ; " there must be some propositions the
truth of which is necessary and is Independent of the parti-
46 Wood. 0�. cit. , p. 145 and p. 148 respectively.
47 Cf. ibid., pp. 144-183.
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eULar ohai^cter of future �sperience** Wood defines fonaal
knowledge as "a n^on-faotual piH^position. basio to a systeia
of orooositions either because it serves a,8 a. first pre-
Eaiee of the system ^ ^ rule conformable %o which the_
gystem 1^ e3^aborated� ** Howver, the modem view of the
^ is somei^t different Umn the traditional view.
It is un^rived in the following sense: ^fhe conception of
Ifc principle as orimua ii^ter pares has x^laced t&e concep-
60
ti^ of the priaeiple as la abeolute legloal prius.* Thus,
they are either first premises in the sense of the actual
eonstituents of a system (construetive premises) or basic
assuB^ticmB as governing a system without being a part of
the eystea (regeaatlve premises). A priori knowledge is non-
�|^Uial in that it is neither "a deeeription of a conor�t�
factual situation aor an inductive generallzaticaa from a
51
Bumber of �onorete deseriptione.* The four general theoriea
ef the a priori are as follows: (1) the intrinsic ^ pnori
theory i^^i maintains that a priori principles are self-
evident trutesj (2) the affia?mation by atteapted denial
48 Lewis. cit.. p. 196.
49 Wood. 0�� ^Lk'* P*
50 Ibid. . p. 185.
SL Ibi,d. , p. 187.
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tlieory; (3) the presi^gjpositional theory which maintains that
a priori prinoiples are truths prest;c^osed hy the possibili
ty of experienee; and (4) the theory already mntioaed, the
EK>dem posviilational theoi^.
One last type of conceptual cognition is not ordinari
ly included in eplstemologieal discussions probably because
it does not include �egnitlon of an object so much as judg-
mffittt as to 'siiether a thing already oc^ized is true or false,
good or bad, beautiful or ugly, etc. However, it is an ab-
53
stract interpretative function.
In concluding this discussion of the areas of know
ledge, it sl^i0.d be pointed out that no cognizance has been
^ven to suc^ supposed mental apprehensions of reality as the
immediate experience of i^stiolsm and intuiticailsm. Such ex
perience must always, be questioned l^cause tiio^;^ its reali
ty to the participant may b� certaisa yet it carries no tes
table and eagylaa&bls factors whereby it can be checked and
54
imde known to others.
52 ibld77 P� 191. Ot, pp. 191 ff .
53 Gf. Wood. S^*, pp. 211 ff.
54 F. R. Tennant, |>hilosophical fheolopLV. Volume I,
pp. 311 ff .
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III. THE QBiam MD OF KmWMTXm
A consideration ot the various areas in which episte-
mXo awareness exists and in which there is actual Isnowledlge
if anywhere leaves one unsure as to the relati<ai between tlie
pistemie object and the caitic object. This section is given
over to a broad and unentailed discussion of the various
ways in the epieteiaol�^ieal problems are solved.
These problems, which have to do with the relation
between the subject and the object and the reality of un
reality of that object, are two: How is knowledge aequired?
and Hew is it known to be trustworthy? The first has to do
with origins or modes of knowledge; the second, with the na
ture or vali&ty of knowledge. The first is answered in terias
of rationalism or empiricism largely; the second is largely
answered in terns of realism osr idealism.
William Pepperell Montague lists and discusses six
lathods of attaining knowledge in the history of thouglit;
(1) authoritarianism depends on testimony; (2) i^sticism
depends on intuition; (3) rationalism depends on reason;
(4) emoiricism depends on sense-perception; (5) prmgmatism
56
depends on practice; and (6) scspticism depends on doubt.
'
55 William Pepperell Montagi-e. Ways og Knowing.
p. 233. Cf. pp. 39 ff. for discusgion. His plan Is to
unite all of these Iji one omnibus method.
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3fe�r� la a sense In ell of these re4aee to either an
& pylon ai:^roaoii (lai^ely rationalism) or an ^ poster!oi^
a^ro&oh Clsrgely e^iriclsm). Authoritartaniam is dependent
upon testimcsiy, hut testimony is never an iimaedlate litowledse;
it mmt he interpreted by th& mind in a way firailar to tlie
Q^^gnition of other selves. Mysticism claims Immediate know-
lecis� ^t as soon as intuition claims imowledge-status it
beeomes interpretative and thus & rationalistic problem.
Fr^smatism Is obviously dependent upon an inteipretative oer-
tedUnty as to wimt workableness consists of and is also depen-
4!^t upon sense-awarer�e�#, at; least, gf -.when _a , thing is �arork-lng
i�i!0i*dlag to the previously defined <^teria of workableness*
Sc^tle^is� is a different type of problem since it is anti-
kra^wiedse. He^wever, it is an interpretative function and
thus in $L si^se is a rational istlo ju^^nt a^^nst all pos
sibility of knowledge. (More will be said later about sceo-
tieiem. )
Tnere is, �f course, a sense in whl<^ empiricism It
self reduces to a rationalie� i&e& it becomes interpreted
<Ke>eriene@. Sut the pi^bles is not so imeh i^ether a ttiing
1� known by the reasofi or by the senses as Aether all
knoiaedge ^eag^ns with sense-perception or whether^
knewledge does aot cora^' "by the way o'f the 'Sjsnses.
Bationalism grants that sensation is ^e primary m&
inesoapable �ediuBi of �ommunlcation between the subject and
3S
the external world. Sensation provides the raw mterial fvm
whioh knowledge is htiilt hut true knowle%e is not derived
throu^ easperieno� alcaie; it ooaes to fruition thrQvt^ reason.
Bational priiioiples and. oateGories are used to oorrolate and
organize the sense-data. These prinoiples are universal
m
i^as which have real and prior existence.
Paulsen says that rationalism has the st^p of orthp-
^ycgjcy heeause the great systems of ancient and modem thought
have been for the most part rationalistic, (l2^e�4t philosophy
iB its great systems, as is se^ in the body of this study,
differed as to th� nature of things but was unanimous in
aaintaining that truth does not Q2:^lginat� with the senses.
Heraclltus refuted the testiaoisy of the sense; the Eleatics
j^futed it even more so. Bemocritus and Plato were far a-
part in their ontology tmt agreed at this eplstemologieal
point. Aristotl� modified the earlier theories soaeidmt,
but he was mtionalistie in his insistmoe on rational
truth, lai^ of the great systems of ^jdern thought inclu
ding the systems of D@s�art�s, Bobbes, %>lnoia iMXimXz
were rationalistle also. Therefore, rationalism has the
reputation of being traditional orthodoxy.
m Warren Nelson Hevius. RslirJ.on as E^erisnce ^4
Truth, pp. 157-158. Gf. also the discussion in John G-rier
HibSn. Th� Problems si PhilosoTDhy. pp. 95-97 and Tennant.
Sa� Qi,t. . pp. 194 ff . for a critique of rationalism,
57 ndedrioh Paulsen. latroduotloa M Piilcsophy.
I^. 378-379.
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There are thj:�e fundamental forms of rational!smi
{!) metaphysieal rationalism as exemplified in Plato;
(2) mathematical rationalism as exesplified in Spinoza; and
(3) foitaal rationalism ae exeaplified in Sant. A brief dis
cussion of each type is worthwhile.
Metaphysical, rationalism rests tm th� assumption that
reality-in-ltself ^s Uiought and tlius one must truly kno-^
reality by pure thought. The soul is in its orlgLnal essence
hoffioseneous with reality. Sensuous elements and desire cor
net the process of pur� thought.
Mathematical rationalism, in its Tarious forms, agrees
in insisting on the primacy of matheiiatioal process for all
of scisnce. In otltor" words, each science should proceed
from axioms T^ch are self-evident and improved by �3?p�r-
59
ienoe.
ForEmHstic rationalism is largely a Eaatian product.
Kant emphasiaed the power of mind in cresting objects and
their propositions ? fhis happens in mathematics, for its
objeets ar� pure intuitions. The geometrician describe
the properties of his object because he creates th� object.
This holds true for piiyslcs and the natural world also, for
in a sense,, the subject ecaaditions his concepts of natural
59 Ibid pp. 581-384.
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phenomena. If nature is absolutely apart from the kno-?er,
there is no ^ oriori knowledge, nor is their ^ posterioi^
incwled,';^;o , for In either case the natural world must enter
into consciousness and become phenomena first. Ttxm know
ledge of things^ln-themselves apart from the subject is im-
possibile; knowledge of things, that enter consciousness is
60
known by the ^ prlor^ concepts ^lioh build that phenomena*
The whole problem lx>lls down to this question, Boss
one have any j. priori (ration^) knowledge of objeets?
Rationalism asafwers in the affirmative: By pure thought
we reach an absolute knowledge of things timt cannot be
acqtiired through the senses. Ef^iricisa denies the state
ment: We sisln a knowledge of object� solely by percep- 61
tion, ^ence it follows that we have no absolute knowledge.
Smplrleism, or sensationalism, therefore, declares tliat
knowleage ean only be found through the instruments of th�
senses. It Is literally a feeling aroused by tiie stimulation
of the senses, which feeling is knowledge in that it is a col-
62
lation and systematizing of these experiences.
Ea5)irici3m, as here discussed, was IbtsqIj an English
reaction to the mathematical rationalism of the seventeenth
60 IblA. . pp. 390-592.
61 Ibid. , pp. 389-390.
62 Hevius. jit., pp. 156-157.
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centua�y. It was an assertion that there are two Jdlnds of
sciences whldi differ In nature and method. Purely concep
tual soien^, like mathematics, may he fashioned after the
patteam of rationalism, hut there are objsctiYe sciences
lilte physics and psychology i?hioh differ in content and meth
od and deal with actual objects which exist apart from one's
notions. KnoiQ.edge of these latter sci3nces must be derived
from experience, Paulsen notes ^tiat Hume said that not even
the most perfect intellect could have deduced that if one
should faH into the mter he would sink and suffocate. Such
S3
knowledge arises from experience.
fhese em>li^cal reflections began with Loc^. He at
tested to prove that all notions are derived from experience
and that none are innate. All concepts concerning mattei'i
of fact are only provisional notions Tstiioh must constantly
change in order to fit facts yielded by further observe.-
64
tion, Hume, of course, carried this out to an agiiostio posi
tion by indlcatii^ that there is no fact the noi^existence
of which could not be conceived as logically possible. There
is no approach i^ioh is closer than probability. The Im of
65 Pa�laea. ^E* oit. . pp. 334-535.
S4 ,|bi,^. , pp. 386-387,
causality is no exception although the principles of aathe-
65
matios are necessarily universal.
The next problem which epistemology attei^ts to solve
is the problem of the validity or nature of knowledge. The
terms realism and idealism have both bean introduced alrea<3y
in this connection. However, there are two more terms i^iich
require consi^ration. These are cpistemological monisa
arwi epistemologieai dualism, fhese terms indicate some vital
distinctiono though they seem on tiie Bm*ts.Qe only to be slight
ly different from rea3,isa and idealism. Macintosh ^Ives the
fellowlng definitions of all four terns:
l^,pi^teaoloigloal monism is the doctrine that the exper
ienced object and the I'eai object are, at the moment of
perception, nus^rioally one. Kpi stQHiQlQp:,ical dual ism
is the doctrine that th� e^qjeri'enoed object and the real
object are, at the moment of perception, numerically two.
Spi steiiiolQ�d.oal realism is the doctrine timt tiie real
object csni exist at other moments t!ian the moi^nt of
perception, or of any other conscious experience, and
independently of any such ejsperience. Bpi s teaQ;ipfiical
idealism Is the doctrine that ttie a:^al object cannot
exist at other moments than the m^nt of p�ro:eption, or
of som� other conscious escpericaoe, nor indei-iandantlj of
such experience.66
65 lliia. . pp. 587-SS9. Of. Tenriant. �Qit.* *
justification of a broad e^iricism ^iiidh is not limited to
the sense-e3t-*eri�nee but includes tiie total e2si->2!ri�nc8 of a
man, pp. 215 ff. For a review of eiKsiricism in the sense hei�a
discussed, cf. Hiboon. �o. Qit. . pp. 07 it. AaoUier type of
en^iricism is the peeittvism of Ck>mte, cf. i:i"^n. o�, fiit. .
pp. 100 f .
66 Macintosh, o^. Q^t. , p. IS.
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Thus there is the possibility of a four-fold eoifijinatlon of
theories, for both ^^lisrn and dualia� laay be ( tl^oretically,
at least) eitlier realistio or idealistic. The possi^^e coa-
binations are as followsj (1) realistio monism with 0 equal
to 0 but 0 existing outside the mind; <2) realistic dualism
with C not equal to O but 0 existing outside the mind; (3)
Idealistic monism with 0 equal to 0 but 0 existing in the
aind; and (4) idealistic dualism with 0 not equal to 0 but
0 existing in th� mind. It should be also noted that there
is the possibility of a oc^inatioa of monistic and dualis-
tic features In the s&m General theory. Wood su^ests, foi'
Instance, the possibility of a eomblnation of an intuitxoj:-
al (monistic) Umory of conceptual iaaowledge with a repre
ss
sentative (dualistic) theory of perception.
For all practical purposes there are only three usable
theories. An idealistic dualism is difficult to imagine since
both the object and the content would exist in the Blind and
yet not be identical. However, realistio mohism (objeoti-
visa) is a rei^ctable historical theory as is idealistic mon
ism (subjectivism). Mso, especially in modern days, realij-
f
^ _
67 "CfTLedger ?/ood. "3Spist�mQlogical Idealism*,
^Eplstemologioal Realism?* , **Splste^l^5ical Monisrf, aad
"Dualism in Qpistefflology�. t!^,^ Motibmry of^ Fhi,XosoT>hy.
(Bagobert D. Runes, editor), pp. S4 and 93.
68 Ledger Wood. The Analysis of Knowledge, p. 22.
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tic dually (oriti^l i�ealis�) is an outetsnding theory.
There is one i^re epistemologlcal attitude (if not
a method) that merits discussion. Soepticism asserts that
a person cannot Iznom* Paulsen suggestc that very few oom^
plete sceptics exist, fhere is less comvjlete denial tiiaa
70
an erapliasizing of the limits and areas of uaeertainty. Even
Hu�B never embraced a complete Bo�ptiQS.sm but a aoopticism
of unlversals cnly. If pure scepticism were carried out. It
would lead to ^at HocldLng calls *an ideal poise, indiffer
ence, and practical uselessness nw^ as no living mpsi has
71
ever attained* . He says further toat a complete scepticism
Is impossible.
The effort to doubt everytMug^ thus, leads' to 'Ahe xiia-
oovery that there is sometiiting which cannot be doubted:
a perfectly imiversal scepticism is imraosslble. The cri
ticism of reas(Hi imxat reoogaize a sphere in whidi reason
is msecsssful, ana max^ It off from other spheres in
which it works badly, or perhaps necessarily fails. 72
69 Of. Montague, c}�^p. , 2^. 235 ff ? and Hibben.
m, cit* . pp. lOi ttm A strict idealistic sonistlo view
reisuSTa in the absolut.� idealism of Fic^te, for instance,
but Kant held a half-way |K>sition vrlUi liis phrniomenology.
He said that objects exist outside the lalnd but they �nly
are known when they enter oonaoioiJLsness and only knom
relatively since tSe mind creatively interprets what enters
ocasciousness. Gf. Teiuiant* op. c^t. . p.j. 219 ff. and
Paulsen. ol^. . pp. 344^^X7
70 Paulsen, s^, o^t>, . j^. 342-343.
71 HcN^dJls. c3it*. p. 128.
72 Ibj^.. p. 131. Of. Montague, o^. c2^., pp. 173 ff.
(m Scepticism..
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IV. KNOmJIDGS AHD FAITH
AooordjUng to the definition of knowledge in Chapter
I, there is more than an awareness of an ohjeot involved in
ICBowing. There are also certain tests for indicating the
validity of Imowledg� ijaoorporated in the definition* Thus,
there is a constant calculation process involved in any
serious attest at Imowing. Basically resO. knowledge is
truth.
Truth is defined by G. S. Peiroe, says Dewey, as:
"The opinion iritiieh is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
aU who investigate is wtiat we mean by truth, and the ob-
73
ject represented by ^ais opinion is the real.* This is ob
viously a pra^mtic approach but it is at least indicative.
There are several tests for ti*uth such as authority,
iGBiystio insight, correspondence, self-evidence, and coher
ence. There is not time to discuss all of these. It is
felt, along with Blanshard, that coherenoe is tiie best
74
test of truth and that the other five borrow from it.
Brightman*s discussion of verification by coherence is
especially helpful:
Oc^erenoe is essentially the method of verification
described earlier in this chapter. To restate it: ac-
eording to the criterion of coherence, a piMsposition is
to be treated as true if (l) it is self-consistent,
73 Cf. Dewey. 2Z' S^k* > P* '545, footnote 6.
74 Blanshard. �i^. , p^ 259. Gf. pp. 212 ff.
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(2) it Is consistent with all of the known facts of
experience, (3) it is consistent with all other pro
positions held as true hy the mind that is aj^lying
this criterion, (4) it establishes e^lanatory and
interpretative relations between various parts of ex
perience, (5) these relations include all known as
pects of ej^rlence and all knoim problems about ex
perience in its details and as a whole. It is to be
noted that coherence is more than mere consistency;
the latter is absense of contradiction, whereas the
fomer requires the presence of the empirical rela
tions mentioned under points {4) aijd (5); thus con
sistency is necessary to coherence, but consistency
is not sufficient. 75
It is evident that a vast valuational problem is in-
involved in relating one's epistemie objects to reality.
Practically, it is no large problem at all, but epistemo-
logically it is nearly tmsolvable. It is a M&Qt that, prac-
tioally, men live on assuming that they are constantly in
contact with reality and are forced by the exegenoies of
life itself to do so. fhis fact undoubtedly gives rise to
the existential philosophies which are so prevalent today,
eepecially on the continent. There seems, therefore, to
prevail a certainty nhich is not always complete knowledge.
It is these exti^-rational certainties whi<^ are called, in
this paper, faith-ventures. Belief or faith is a form of
certainty which is not absolute la the sense of being com
pletely coercive but requires a total movement of the person
ality to a position Tsfeich is felt to be secure on th� basis.
7S Edgar Sheffield Brightm^. 4 Philosophical of He-
ligion. p. 128.
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of what �vldeno� is available althoa^ this oertainty is not
tomonstrably knowledge-certainty- It la the contention of
this p@p&r that 0reek philosophy, at least, is Tmdsrgirded
with such a fsdth-ventare and that such a venture is to be
found at some of the most crucial places in these philoso-
1^0 systems*
Hooking gives an interesting definition of philosophy
as tSam sum �f a man's iMHiefs and then goes on to define
^i&t he means by belief!
W� mean by a man's beliefs all those Judgaents, from
certainties or convictions at on� extrei^ to mere
lBiprej||ions at the other, upon which he eustomarilyaets**^
Such a definition fits what is maintained by this paper,
namely, that philosophic systems, at least th� systems of
the tJreeks, are set into a faith smtrix*
!rher� are several levels of Is^lief , as is indicated
also in Hocking's definitlcm. Faith is the prime movement
of philosophy. It is an extra-rational grasp of the univer
sal patteim and the establishment of a man's world-view.
For instance, "Ho one believes and no one can believe that
reality is wholly indifferent or even hostile to that whi<^
77
seems to be tlie highest goal �ind the good.*
76 Hocking, ojj, cit. . p. 1.
77 Paiasen. 0�. p. ^1. Of. pp. 513 ff. Gf.
also Tennant. 0�. cit. � p. 299.
48
Bot caily �o, but as has been IncLloated, knowledge Is
largely a matter of truth, and thus Involves valuational
judgment* Belief is an essential aspect of Judgment. Cun
ningham points out that reascm is always entertaining beliefs
aiid is always trying these out. ^e presence of certain be
liefs leads reason out into new areas of possible oognition.
78
*Riey point tJie w^ to possible solutions. Macintosh also
indicates the role of belief in Judgaents:
In addition to our verified scientific knowledge of
the j^sieal world, there is 1*0om for Jud^i^ts es-
bodyi^ reasonable beliefs about reality. Within rea
sonable beliefs -�aay degrees of reasonableness may be
distij^piished, varying from (a) #iat is almost demon
stratively certain knowledge, and (b) belief which is
rationally i^eessary in the sense of being li^^cally
involved in ^at may be regained, on adequately critical
grounds, not only as theoretically permlssable but as
practically necessai^ to (o) what is merely rationally
permlssable, as not contradicting any known fact or
aaytl-itng ^lich may be reasonably regarded as practical
ly necessary.79
Belief or faith in the 3?ole of Judgment also includes
the setting of hypotheses. A hypothesis is a live, real
possibility #iich a man establishes by a faith-venture on
80
the basis of not fully coercive evidence. In fact, William
James says that there are times when faith must precede fact
78 Cr. Watts Cwinin^ham. Froblerns P,hilosoPhy, p. 135.
79 Douglas Clyde Macintosh. !^ Problem of Relifd-ous
Kaowlea^.e. pp. e-7.
SO Cf . William James. W^ll Believe, Etc. , p. 2.
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before fact oan ooiae at all. There is, therefore, a function
of will as well as of intellect in the establishing of hypo
theses or th� Imowing of a new faet.
As both Kroner and Ferre insist, in their splendid
beoks on faith, there raust be a cooperate function of faith
and reason. Ttm on� cannot ftmction without the other.
la oonoluding, it my be iiaportaat to attempt to
justify th� use of -^e tana � faith* instead of *belief* in
the title of -this paper and as the dominant of the two words
throughout the paper. Ttoe reason is that * faith* is taken,
in a broader sense than siere belief or opinion, to specify
extra-rational foundations under, and �xtra-rr:tional ventures
throughout, a man's philosophical system. As tb^ theory of
knowledge is largely implicit in many of the Q-reeks, so are
tiiese faith-elements. The use of th� t�rm * faith* in relation
to epistemology is justified by no less a thinker t^ian F- R.
fennant who says:
There is need for the woM 'faith* in addition to
the word 'belief, thou^ they are often used as syn
onyms. 'Belief serves to emphasise the cognitive,
and 'faith' to lay stress on the conative, sid� of
experience involving venture. . . .
'Faith' is thus not a word to be confined to the
^eolbgieal vooabulary. Epistemology that would go to
thij root of its matter, cannot dispenv^e with it. So-
called knowledge, our working substitute for 'eertain'
81 IHdT. p. 25.
82 Of. Richard Kroner. Primacy �f Faith, p. viii
and pp. 198 ff. and Mels Ferre, Faith and Reason, Appendix Aj
pp. 217 ff.
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knowle�3^Se that is not forthoojaia^, prosupposes beliof
that ooiffiiiands only oertitud�, thou^ callsd practical
or moral certainty] and the belief that underlies kiiov/-
ledge, is the outcome of faith which ventures beyond.
apprehension of data to oreativo ideation or supposai,
and Justifies its venture by practical actualisation.
Analytical and genetic investisations botii yield this
conclusion. Theoretical propositions were preceded by
practical maxims, and le:^,ming has issued out of doliiG:
when scrutinised, these propositions are found to in
volve faith^presuppositions. This does not merely mean
tJiat * there is mor� in life than logic*; it meaiis that
there is more in 'knowledge* than lor^io, pjtid more in
reason and r^scHmbleness than ratiocination and ration
ality. Conation is genetically a eo^u"oe of all j-mowle<age
higher than involuntary sense-knowledge. Analytically,
induction is found to contain postulation or faith-vGii-
ture, creative imagination, pursuit of end; and its veri
fication is discovery of applicability, not logical csrti-
fioation of photographic colore spondence iTith ilo; lity. . �
We now see that th� category of end enters into the very
foundations of th� edifice of 'knowledge*, as much as do
th� mathematical and the dynajaie categories of Kant. S3
83 Tenn^t. op. cit., pp. 298-299.
PART TWO
mm THAUSS TO THE SSMX-S0CRATIC6
OHAPtER III
EARLX OmEK THIHKS2=IS
It Is not the purpose of this paper to traoe the In
fluences effecting philosophy, but a few observe tlons by way
of introduction are l^ortant. By the time G-reek eosaologi-
cal philosophy had begun to appear, especially with Thales
and the e&il.ler lonians, 0reek culture and civilization had
started to expwnA* The city-state eysten had spread into a
�ionizing venture. The tyrants wex^ ruling in Ionia where
Thales and iiis followers did their m>rfc. Athene had not as
yet developed her strong political culture under Solon. !nxe
fajnous Oreek dosasoracy had act yet been developed, and the
1
Persinii Wars had not yet been fought.
However, Q-reeoe had already seen a great literary
period. Both Hosier, the aristocrat, and Hesiod, the peasant,
had given their literary contributions embodying the basic
�phases of nobility of man and the right to individual
ity, which came later into philosoj^oal e:^ression. Ionia
already had its famous poets also, su<^ as Archiloehus, th�
1 For coa^lete discuss i�ng of the politick movement
in the Grefek states at this time, ef. J. B. Bury. History of
Greece, pp. 1-S18, and especially the chronologioal chart,
pp. 857-839; (1. W. Botsford and 0. A. Hoblnson, Jr. Hellenic
Hletory. pp. l-lll, and especially the chapter <m *fhe Civill-
zaiion of Archaic aree<�� (Chapter WII), pp. 90-111; and
M. L. W. Lalstner. A Survey of Aacient History, pp. 118-155.
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Satirist, Sesonides, M^amermus; aiid Aeolls to the north
2
had the lyric poets Sappho and Aloaeus.
It is to be noted that the literary meirei^nt from Ho
mer to the Ionian and Aeolian poets reveals a c^iang� of mood.
fhilly says concerning this?
The Homeric cheerfulness mud, �bjectivity, ^amctea^istic
of tlie naivete of chlldlaood, gradually disappear; the po
ets become less optimistic, more critical and subjective.^
E^ly Qveek reHgioai reveels this change of mood also. Gilbert
tovay feels this jperiod of mythology, which has seemed to be
*one of the wes^st spots in the armour of those 0.smtB of the
ca.d world,* ms actually almost on a par with llreek literature
4
and pliilosophy. Eeligioa in early Greece reveals ji movement
toimrd subjectivism, ^^aloh was characteristic of ^reek thoii^t
as well. Edwax^ Oaird feels that Orsek anthi^oiphisms were
a mediating stage between objective rellgioxis and subjective
religieiis. He says that tbsre were two ways in ifiiich tliis
ms done; (l) there was a tomaalsing of the Hature-Powers and
(2) there was a substituting of ^e relatioai of tiie deities
t� nature. He also sees a i^notheistic trend in th� way ar�ek
art set Fate even over the ^ds. The monotheistic idea was
^ Of. temer Jaeger. PaidQla. ?oli�a� I, pp.
and especially Chapter 7, pp. 115-135.
3 Frank Thtiiy. 4 History ^ ^'hilosophy. p. 9.
4 Gilbert Murray. |2i2t StaRca q^reel^ ^^IX^osi. p. 1.
54
5
inta:�oauoea 1:^ th� (kreeKe, Herodotus and the Tragedians. It
ahould be said that Caird bases his study on an evolutionary
hypothesis which may or may not be adequate, yet ttm movement
toward subjectivism is distinotly seen in Sreek litsratuj!:'�
and religion, ^ch a movement <^eaed the avenues of criti-
elsm, ^icih came to fruition in 0reek philosophy.
fhe theogonies, #iich held suoh ii^ortant place in t^e
early Qre@X religion, i^re Ihe forenmners of philosophy.
^Ebtsy w�re not merely proposed for the purposes of \?orship,
but they were actually attempts to ezplain tl^ origin of
things, not in a soientifio way, but with the aid of imagi
nation. Thus, the my^i^e^cal characters of the dreels. pan
theon became objects of scrutiny, fheir origins wore in
qtjestion. Thersfore, the early theogonies, such as the
l^eofionv of Hesiod, are itni^ortant links with early Greek
6
philosophy, fhe theogonies booame cosmogonies and cosmolo
gies, whici in twm developed into anthropologies, '-^he move-
i^nt was tomrd subjectivism and was to result in criticism,
until even the ability to know, rhl^ was assumed by the
earlier thinkers, came under qi^^sticsi.
5 Edward Oaird. EvolutlQn M Relir^ta^. Volume I,
Lecture Tenths *�Th� Relliion of (lree�e% pp. 260-285.
6 Thllly. op. pp. 9-11; also Theodor OomperK.
Greek Thj^^ers. VoIukbT, pp. 57-4S.
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I. THE IC^IANB
A histoid ot ancient philosophy would spend such time
dealing with the theories of the basal stuff of the world and
the theories of relation, change, and peinasnonce, wJiich mark
the early coemological speculations, and little consideration
would be glren to any eplstemologieal deTel<^�ents. There is
geod reason tor tills: the i^arller Ionian Uiinkers, TImles,
Hippo, Anaximandor, Anaximenes, an^ Uiogenes of Apollonia,
as well as later eosmologlsts, had tlieir Indiyldual ooncep-
tlons of th� ARXH (beglnnins). fhis dominated their tJilr^idng;
toe foeus of attention was the objectiT� natural world,
ThjBOuea of Miletus (e. �D0 B. C.) was tl^ father of the
Ionian school. For him, mter is tlie first principle, acco3>.
7
ding to Aristotl�. (Thales did no writing hiJSMtelf.) Ifirpo of
Samos, a later phllosoioher, also regarefed water as a first
8
prlnelple. Anaxisander, a fellei^eountrymaa of Thales, vro%*
On gature* in li^ch he proposed that th� AHXH is not water,
but the atmosphere Cfo 2o"Tr� l^^oV) , or ^tho boundless". Air,
or breath {kfy^^ t-^^^juioJ^ ^X^^ ^� gensratlYt prinei-
8 Friedrioli tfeberweg. 4 ^istory^ ^hi;i�s,o.ph.-?;. "^^olum I,
p. 32.
9 Charles M. Bakewell, Source Bopik, i|i Aacient ghilQsoghg.
pp, 3-6; Alfred Weber. History Qf Pli^ilosoriii, pp. 9-107
10
pies of all things for Anasdmenes (o. 550 Bi G.)� Biogeaes
�f :Mpf�llG�i^t llTlag in the fifth century, agreed In general
11
with Anaxlrp^nes^.
Tq �iy that the Iani,aa oossiologlgti dereloped no epls-
^aologieal systems, is not to say timt there mm no Taluable
latent epist^iaslogical assu^tions, the contrary, thei^
was an iii>^ptant assertlcai of dependence upon knowledge as be
ing adequate to find th� souroe of everythi^, Biis was not
<|@�sti�^d* ftm faet Is that fhales* iJiportant contribution
is not his mt�r�phli#8^^, but, as fMlly says, his i^or^
tance lies *ln hts haTiag put the philes^hical question
squarely ai^ Xn hsring mmmm4. it without reference to siyth-
13
leal beings^. \iiIhelM Wlndelband says:
fhe question, iftiat things reej4iy ^s^t is the
intrinsio nature of tilings, liiich Is already contained
in the Milesian conception of the o^PXlj � presupposes that
to� cun'ont, original and naive mod� of tliinkln^i of tlie
world has been j^akm, although tois presupposition has
not com� to clear r0CQ�iitioii in oonsciousness. fhe ques
tion proves that refleeti^� thoi;^t is no longer satisfii^
with tk� ideas wiiich it finds current, and that it seeks
trmto t^hind or above them.iS
fhis assertion of philosophic freed^ wiped out mioh of
X6 'iakewsll, o^- FP� "^-^J Weber, o^' P- l^-
11 Ueberwog. jgg,. oit. , pp. 37-38.''
12 !milly. o�. cjLt.� p. 16.
13 Wii^elm Windelband. A ,^stor.y^ gl^Qso,plj,y. p. 58.
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tia� sis^rstltious beliefs of that 4aj. {loi|>er2 oonsiders
this as �me of the two effects �f this philosophy: "fhe con*-
�eptioji of the imiverse as a playgrouM of iimiiaembl� ca^jri-
eious and �omteraotias manifestations of Will was mors and
14
iBore undermined** fhe attention was turned to nature alone;
f^smogony began freeing itself from theogony. fhX^ fact indl-
<^tes th� �pisteiaaiogical direction of the lonians* The fact
that the ?forld did not^ need the gods to es^laln it, thou/^sh
the gods were k�pt ajraund, means that there was a trust in
the power of man to �:xplain it without external help, fhis,
it is noted, is a faith-venture. It probably was some sort
of reaction from the stark superstition of t^e earlier period
an answr to the quest for mor� certainty thaa these super
stitions allowed.
IpistemolQgieally, this trust in the ability of man to
find the basio prinoiple of all things existed in th� fom of
meritical rational realism (or sensatlonalisffi), which ?/as as
advance over tli� uncritioal en^irlcal realism of the previotis
^^ught. However, as drote points out, there was a realiza^
tion of the great disparity between questions to be solved
aM means of solution, which arose even amox^ tiie lonians,
and li^ildh became a characteristic of Greek philosophy in gen-
15
eral. He calls it �th� antagonistic force of suspensive scep-
14 aonperz, jga* � P* ^*
15 B. F, Cocker. Ghriatianit.v mM. fW^ospphy^,
pp. 280-282; George Grote. ^ Hletor? o^ Greece. Yolu^ T,
p. 91,
mThe point of f&tth In the Ionian speoiilation was the
16
atssumptlon timt there Is a unity to all things. Along with
this was the feeling that th� natural world, as seen "by the
senses and interpreted by reason, would give th� indication
uliere that -unity lay. fhus, thoi^gh things are as toey sseia,
the origin of Uiose thii^ is not obvious to the m&nmB with
out speculation.
II. Tm PrFMGOBMMS
fhe ipestion soon arose, and was investigated through
out Greek tho^^ght, conoeraing ths reliability of the senses.
The Pythagoreans moved away frosi this uneritleal rational
r^lsm to a aathematieal type of r&tional realis�, which is
17
821 abstraction fro� sense-experience.
Pythagoras is said to hav� been a pupil of Aaaxlmand^
and a contesporary with Aaaximenes. In general, he seems to
have built t^on the philosophy of Anaxiiaander. (It is diffi
cult to find l^yto^eras* phllosoi^ as distinct from tte riill-
�sophy of his fcaiowers, nor is it important, for tills sti^,-
16 G-oe^Ders. oit. � p. 4G.
17 Cocker. ci^. , p. Oocker's us� of tJie term.
�idealisa* to d�sorib�~Pythagoreanim does not seom to have
th� same eplstemologieal content as the tena as it is used in
this paper. It refers to ^ oriori oosicepts as ^jainst ^ pQ%-
terlorl perceptions (sensationalism) instead of th& smmlnQ
given for the term in this study. Cf. Chapter II.
tliat it should l� done. ) ISh� Pythagoreans seem to have adop
ted the doctrine of the Itelimited or Boundless from Anaximan-,
dsr but placed with it another Eternal principle, the Liinited,
Hez�e was a definite dualism. As Fuller says, in e:splainin3
this:
It is only throi^gh th� action of this I'rinGiple upon the
Unlimited that the Intermii^bl� vacancy and monotony of
the latter can be broken up, and mapped, and plotted, and
specified out into a world of separate, distinct, indivi
dual things, each fenced within the boimds of its particu
lar and spe<^flc self. The world, then, is the result of
the interaction of tJ^se two factors. In a word, the Uni-
vorse is a meas-oring out of off of the Unlisted by the
I4.siite4.13
Sverything is sade up of differ^t proportions of these two
el�B�nts harmoniously mixed, fher� are other �leaients #ii^
have their c^josites are mixed in also, but ihs two men
tioned ai?� eternal principles. It is easy to see how th� Py-
Hia&oreans got toelr niffi&>�r-philosophy from this arrangement.
f&dir Kathemtics enabled them to see relationships in terms
of muBbers. I^hese relations were given ontlc signifioaae�
19
in the fom of nuaber. It laay be that the most devastlng
eriticisa of the Pythagoreans say ooBie at this point, that
they identified fersi and essence. At least, they postulated
aui^r, aatheaatieal definiteness, as the prinoiple of all
18 B. A. 0-. Fuller. History of g-recK l^hilosophy,
Thales to PeMoorltus. pp. lOS-107.
19 Thllly. j2�. cit. . pp. 18-19.
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SO
tilings.
It should also b� noted that much Important scientific,
mathematical, and astronomical activity oan he foimd among the
Pythagoreans, which were all mixed in with a curious type of
religious B^tlcism, akin to and perhaps drawing from 03:phisa,
21
including a doctrine of transmigration of the soul. As Jaeger
subsets, this laystioisffl ^d Orphism seem to have been mere
22
li^ortations farom outside the field of philosophy.
In all of this highly eoi^lioated system of the Pytha
goreans, there a earrying on of the assumption, ^ioh Windel-
band says is ehai^oteristic of Fre-S^hist Greek thought, that
S3
rationalism pi^vldes an adequate theory cf knowledge. It is,
however, clear that there was a departure from the physical
realism of tiie earlier Ionian speculations. There was the
sai^ fundamental faith "that beneath the fleeting fonqs and
successive changes of tjlie universe there ^g, some permanent
principle of unit?* , but uhereas the lonians had sought for
20 For a complete discussion of the Pythagoreans, cf .
Burnet. oit. .(^taoter li, pp. 37-56 j (Jo^erz. o�. oit.
Chapters III-T, pp. 99-152. For two shorter reviews, cf �
W. T. Stace. A Critical History of greek Philosophy. Chapter
in, pp. 31-59J and Arthur KenvonRogters. A Student's History
of Philosophy, pp. 14-22.
21 Cf. aojBperz. clt. . Chapter V, pp. 123-152,
22 Jaeger, o^, oit, . pp. 165-166.
23 Wlndelband. ja�. cit. . p. 60.
24 Cocker, og,* cit. . p. 296.
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this unity In some oomioon ijhysioal element, the Pythago2�eans
sou^t It in aathematical relations. This was abstraction on
a higher level than was found among Uie lonians, Albert
Sehwegler says:
The Ionic philosophy, as we have seen, developed a
tendency to abstract from the isaiediately give, indivi
dual quality of matter. We ^ve the same abstraction,
but cm a higher stage, ^en the sensuous concretion of
matter Jjn j^j^ei^eral is looked away from; when attention is
turned no longer to the qualitative oharacter of matter,
as water, air, etc., but to Its quantitative character,
its quantitative measure and relations; i^en reflection
is directed, not to the material, but to the form and
order of things as tliey exist in space. But the specific
nature of quantity is i4K)lly escpressed In numbers, or, as
we may term it, in the cipher. How this is the principle
and the position of tlie PyUiagoreans.35
Therefore, this seems to b� a mathematical rational
realism, (looker lists it as a mathematical mtionalism as
well as being idealistic, Imt as pointed out earlier, his
term �idealism?' has a different meaning than the opposite of
26
realism. At least, it was a more adv^aaoed rationalism.
Whereas the lonians assumed a naive type of i^tionalissi, not
eswapletely unmixed with en^irical elements, the Pytl^oreans
had a purer type of rationalism. Turner suggests that this
abstraction from sense-experience made way for a hi^er ab
straction, which found its egression in terms of Being.
2b AHjert Sehwegler ^ Handbook M History �f Phil-
26 Cooker. cit., p. 2^. Cf. footnote 17 of this
chapter
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These theories of Being yergii^ Beooalng, Permanenoo versus
Change, are now dlsoussed.
III. HEMCLIfUS Am TBE El^flCS
Keraolitus of Ephesus (635-475 B. C, aecording to
^KiUly) passed an interesting ju'^onant upon Pythagoms. In
one of his fragiaents, he said:
Pytiiagoms the son of Maesarokus pox^sued his investi
gations further than all other men. . . he made himself
a wisdom of his own,�such learning, had science.
Smi *true seienee*, for Heraclltus, was the philosophy that
msdntained �camnge* or *Becoming** as th� basic principle of
the universe. A clmpaeteristio expression, thoi^i it cannot
be proved to be his om, is: "All things flow; nothing abides*.
Another easpresslon, whleto is probably his, indicates his phil-
30
esop^: "Cue cannot step twice into the same rivei* . This
ceaseless chaise is illustrated by fire.
Xet is the aidst of this change there is one thing
which persists, and that is the reason, or lofios. in all
thills. Fx^nent 31 says:
The transformations of fir� j are, first of all, sea; and
one-half of the sea is earth and half th� stormy wind. . �
27 William Turner. History og Pft^osophy. p. 44. For
a discussion of Mathematical or Pythagorean Hationalisa, cf .
Willlaffi Pepperell ^atague. ,fayg 2�, Kno^uR. pp. 115-117.
28 Thllly* SB." Mk'* P*
29 Bakewell. �it., p. 35.
30 paid., p. 33
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The sea Is dispersed and keeps its measure seeording to th�
same Word Logos that prevailed before it became earth.31
grajaiment 41 uses the tern "Wisdom" for "Word": "Wisdom is one
thing. It is to know the thought by which all things througti
32
all are guided.* This reason is superior to sense-experience.
Th� senses cannot be trusted; what seems to b� peman�nt is
not, �iSiat is, pero�ptlon without reflection does not reveal
33
to us �yie hidden truth, which can b� found only by reason.*
This seems to be a reversion from metaphysical dualism
l%ck to th& monism of the lonisai thinkers. There are not two
world-principles, but one. fhis c^tange is not of the nature
ef two intez^a^d prinoiples at work in all things, for nothing
can be sub-dl^lded to the point 'gEhere one particular thing can
be called one thing and another thing be called something else.
(Slang� does not mean a succession of different occurences or
tilings, but a continmtion of th� new from Um old. Thus
posltes are really identical, and a sti*ict d\mlism collapses
34
in Heraclltus* system.
The fact that Hera<^itus postulated tixe basis of ttie
universe as the rational prinoiple of change b2:dngs tc light
his basic faith that there is an ultiiaate priaeiple and that
31 � P� 30.
32 ^^0, o3,t.
33 Thilly. ^^k- � P*
34 for^ good discussions of Heraclltus' philosophy, cf.
Pull�r. on. �it.. Chapter V, pp. 118-142; Burnet. SE* MJk'
Chapter 1X1 via part), pp. 57-63; Stace. o�. cit. . Chapter �,
pp. 72-a); CrOHperz. o^. cit. . pp. 59-79.
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that principle is change itself. Ck>ntintial becoming follows
a reasonable pattern. Thus th� problem of th� Ctee and the
Many becoi^s i^solved to tiie point where the (M� is the Many
and tli3 Many the One, This philosophy was carried to its fijr-
�yier �xti^omos Gmtylua of Athens, the diselol� of Heracli-
tus a teac^r of Plato*
HerasoLitus* philosophy reveals his faltli that the imi-
?ersal principle ie Immanent in tlx� world of iiidividnality eM
ehaztge. That there was si3�h an ^ prioil principle in his
'WiinJcliig.S.medlately shows Heraclltiis to have been a ration-
^ist. The qmstion now is, was he a rational realist, as
the early Ionian and Pyth^oi^aa philosophers seem to have
been, or was he a rational idealist? Fi^m Cooi:er*s discus
sion, he seems to be willing to classify him in th� former
36
group, yet his evident distrust of sense-experience would
eause a doubt. It is true that on� oan see germs of pheno
menally here, yet it should h� pointed out that it was not
a complete distrust of th� senses that Heraoliti:^ maintain�d.
It was a distrust of the �%>erien�e whic^ the senses give
without any rational interpi^tation, but there was no dis
trust of th� senses as being abl� to give a one-to-oa� re
port of the sensate object. The problem is explained in the
faet that Heraclltus was here �xpresalng his faith in ration
alism. ThiiS it seems to be correct to call Heraclltus a
35 IJeberweg, jg�. cit. , p, 39.
36 Cocker, ��, <^t,f pp, 282 ff.
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rational realist.
Cms moj^ thing should be noted briefly oonceming the
^isteawlogical assuaptions of Heraolitus: within his philo-
soiphy were the seeds of a later ei^iricism and phenomenalism.
His theories alrea<3y implied the concept that thii^s cannot
be toiown except as tiiey are known in the Eiind, as can be seen
in his distaramt of the sense-experi^oes. fhis was later to
come Into full fruition in th� Idealism (Phenomenalism) of
Kmt, Heraolitus � absolute evolutlc^iisffl also i^olied an
mpinLoXwSt, whicrfa, though not esqpllcit in his own philosophy,
was later to become explicit in the if?ritings of the British
SHplricists, Pertoaps this latter trend was not as prominent
as th� foi^sr one, for Wlndelband considers all of the rre-
Bc^^hists to be rationalists.
With tiie apeculations of the Eleatic school in southern
Italy, there was a reaction to Pythagorean and Heraclitian
thinking. Pour men made v^p the main thinkers of this sdt^ol;
Xenophanes, t&e probsble founder, was the theolo^an of tt�
groi^; Parmenldes, perhaps the moat prominent of the four,
was the metaphysician; and Zeno an^ Melissus were th� dialec-
Msdans* JD�K^ha^s presented the fimdamental thoughts but
37 Wlydelbaad, jgo, clt.. p. 60, For discussions con
cerning these elements in Heraclltus* thoii^ght, cf � Go�>erf ,
SSL' ^Lk'� PP� 78-79; and FemsJid Van Steenberghen. Episte-
ml9FJ> p, 55.
66
in th8i,aoslcal form wiwm ho attacked the pi'^evaillng polytheism
ndth its aathi�opomoiphisms. He procO-aimed th� imity and ohan^^-
lessness of God, Parmenldes developed this into a systeia, ii'hile
38
Zeno and Mellsstis defended the dootrine.
In Paa^Benidea' poem ^ Nat'^i^ there is this clear state
ment of the doctrine of being, whidi was proposed against the
doctrine of Heraolitus:
Listen, and I will instruct tiiee�and thou, i^en thou
hearest, shalt ponder�
V/hat are the sole two paths of research that are open to
thinking*
One path is: That Being doth be, and Hon^Being is not:
This is the way of Ocwictlon, for Truth follows hard in
her footsteps.
Th�other path is: That Being Is not, and Non-Being must
be;
This one, I tell thee in truth, is an all-ln<sp�dible patl>-
way.
For thou never canst know what is not (for none can
conceive it),
Hor oanst thou give it expression, for one thing are
Thinking aiid Being.39
Thus Parmenldes assearted that Heraelituo* law of the identity
of the oiDposites was a flouting of logical law. A thing either
exists or it does not; there is no half-way idea of becoming;
As Puller esEpre^ses itr "i^stence r^s such has no degrees or
variety" . A thing eitiisr is or is not as the Principle of Hon-
Oontradiction indicates. Parmenldes carried his argument to
the place i^ere he said that both time ana change or variety
38 Thilly. cit., pp. 29-30.
39 Bakewell. 0�. cit., p. 13^.
40 Fuller. o�. clt. , p. 148.
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are not real. Thus, all objects are the saiae to th.� point
that they exist and are real. One oan actually sneak of a
sphere of Being � Fuller, again, bp.z^^-^
Reality is for him a globe of absolutely solid, contin
uous, homogeneous, transparent stuff, iSiolXy devoid of
ar5*/rl-s and flaws or iridescont play of quelitieB. And
we might represent t^e dream world of our experienns, of
variety and multiplicity, change and motion, as optical
illuslcxi we have of something flickering and stiri'linj,
and reflecting rainbow lights in its rigid, colorless,
and motionless depths.41
Being oan t� considered a sphei^ becaus� of tii� equal, even,
and undiffer^tlated chaimcter that it has.
The swm general metaphysics was defended by Zeno
8@ftinst the Pytlaagorean argi^ment that reality is mad� \3p of
a number of units. Melissus also agreed with Paraienidss ex
cept that he made the real as infinite instead of a fiaita
42
sphere, but even he maintained the coiporeallty of tiae real.
It is clear that tiiis philosopliy was a movement into a
high�r abstract metaphysics, and tlie result was a strict mon-
ism, but whereas Heiuclitus did not truet the sensss because
they give th� illusory ap >aarane� of tlie peroianeno� of things,
Pai^enides did not trust tiiem becaus� t^ey wojild persujide one
that there is truth la c^iange and motion. Both men v;sr@ con-
41 Ibid., p. 150.
40 Burnet, jga- PP* 82-86. ^or a more collet�
review of the doctrines of these men, cf. (^ompera. 0�. cj.t. .
Chapters I-III of Book II, pp. 156-207; Fullor. o^.
Ch^ter VI, pp. 143-179| Stace. 0�. Se^'� ^^P^3C� 1^, p . 40-71.
43 Sehwegler. j2�. �it. . p. 15.
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froMted with what they regarded as real and what they regarded
as illusion. It is not diffiisult to fit such an idea into
Reselltus* philosoj^, for a metaphysics of change imkes it
possible for false ideas to arise, but th� dlff?.oLLlty whit-^
Parmenldes faces lies in trying to account fur the r.ource of
Illusion if a cme-world setw>. Winaelband says: '�The search
could be only among individual things and their chaj^ing acti-
vities, wliidi were themselves declared to be illusion. noiT-
44
existent^ . According to Ueberweg, the exLstenc� of a realm
of i^re appearance is #iolly inea^atil]!� with Parmenidss
4d
fundamental princii^le*
�S^ius, the world, for the Heaties, is a maze of oontra-
dietions. Ctoly in reason can the unity be found that ms so
desired by toe Grreeks. Parmenldes was the first on� to sepa
rate Being from Becoming, the One from the Many, the �".'^'lerM^e
from the Form. ThlB was to �oae to full fruition in Plato,
bat til� beginning of abstract metaohysios lies with Parmenldes,
primarily. It was an abstraction beyond that of th� Pytha
goreans with their matliematioal metaphysica, and it was oer-
tainly an abstraction beycaid th� Ionian thinkers and Haracli-
44 ';/l:icIj_V>ei:ud. Qj^* oit.. P� ^�
45 UoborwOG. ^� cit. , p. 57�
46 Of . Horatio W. Dresser. History oX, Axicloat. a^xd i-ea-
levari Philosophy, p. 46.
tus, who tovmA the unlTdrsal principle |^ tbe world of tilings.
nth tlie Eleatios, there was an ei^hasls on pure thought.
Ja^er says, *She e^spmlsicm of pur� thought is th� great d3,e-
oovery on whi<^ th� i^losophy of Parsealdes is centred.*
Jigaln, he says, "Every lino he wrote pulsates with his ardent
faith in the newly discovered powers of pure reason*, l^his
was certainly rationalisia and th� cc^let� distrust of finding
the world of sens� with an efiK>hasis on the ^ priori ideas of
mity or Being sight indioat� an ideaHsM. fooker calls it
48
Idealism, hwt his use of tim term has been qu�stic�ied. In
his emphasis on toe ^ priori concepts of logic and reason,
Pai'menides was certainly idealistic as Oocleer deaoainates
him, bat ia his trust in th� concepts of toe mind as giving
genuine jmowledge of toe true objective world, Famenides was
clearly a realist of toe same type as was Plato. 'Dius as far
as epistemology goes, the Eleaties �an correetly be called
rational realists ^
I?. 'ME PLUMLIS'fS
It is dear, from to� opposing theories sslready dis
cussed toat the problem was far from solved* 1?he toinkera
that followed atteJipted a balanee between toe ideas of per-
47 4^a^r. o^. c^t. . pp. 175 and 177 a^espectively. Of.
also Johann Edoard'^rdiaan. ^ history of Philosophy. Tolum� I,
p. 41.
48 Cocker, o^. (^t.. p. 2^ and pp. 305 ff.
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manence and change. Boto Ideas seemed to be obvious. Thus
EBi)edocles, Anaxagoras and others agreed with Leucippus and
Democritus, the Atomists, that absolute change is in^ossible,
49
but toat toere is such a thing as relative change, fhere was
soBK difference among them as to toe nature and action of
reality, fhey agreed that if ehange be admitted toen reality
must be plural,
Es?>edooles agreed wito toe Kleatles that things can
not oidginate and decay, but change comes by ncLngling and
separating toe basio ele^^nts. These basic elements are
earto, air, fire, and water, Kiey are underlved and unchange
able and fill all things, postulated two mythical beings.
Love and Hate (or Strife), as eauslng this mixing or separa-
thing of toe elements. Love causes a mixing; Hate causes a
50
separating. Thus toe hylozolsm of tl^ earlier natui^ philo
sophers was superceded by a prlnci le #iich divides the mov-
51
lag cause fz^m the matter*
Anaaagoras differed slightly from Ei^edooles by saying
that Instead of four ulticMites there are an Infinite number
of toem, and instead of a two-fold principle of Love and Hate,
which initiates change, he postiilated a single intelligent
"
49 Thilly. jsU^., I^. 30-31.
50 Ibid, , pp, 31-53,
61 Ueberweg. ss* oA* * P* ^0, Gf, also Bakewell.
oft, , pp. 43-46,
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prtnciple, a lalnd {v<^u^) and divided matter from mind.
Much of tlie evidence concerning these thinkers comes
from Aristotle* He drew the distinctions between Kagsedocles
and Anaxagoras, whloh have been made above, bat fe� made no
distinction between the thoughts of Leucippus and Bemocritus*
53
They explained things ti^ same way and by the same argments.
]^tli agreed that absolute change is i^ossible; tlwy accepted
the idea of origin^ and changeless particles of reality. They
ddaled, however, the qualities ascribed to them by Smpe^ocles
and Anaxagoras aad rejected the idea that they move from with
out by the action of gods or mind. Reality is mads of sim^
pie invisible and indivisible spatial iinits (atoms). These
differ only as to size, weight and form, and they have an in-
herent motion of their own*
The problem now is to find the theories of knowledge
52 Thilly. 0�. oit. . pp. 33-36; and S. S. Frost, Jr.
l^lp TeaehinRS of the <^rea.t Philosophers, p. 258. This
is probably the first introduction of this term into (Jreek
thought as a distinct feature of a formal philosoidiy*
53 Aristotle. Oa G-ei^eratipn siad farruotion. 314al ff.
(Richard MoKeon. The Basic Works of Aristotle, pp. 470 ff.) .
fhs references from Aristotle are only a close approximaticm
throughout this paper.
54 Thilly. �2.. clt. . pp. 36-40; Edward Zeller. Outlines
St ^ History o;^ ShE^eOkilosophy. pp. 79-80. Fea? more com
plete reviews of the B�taphysics of Espedocles, Anaxagoras,
and the Atomists, cf. Fiaier. 0�. cSJ^., Chapter m, pp. 180-
264; aoii5>erz. Cit.. Book Il7 Ch^ters IV-V, pp. 208-254;
Book III, (Tnapter Il7 PP- 316-369.
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that ^r� li^llolt or expHoXt In tim thinking of thos� men
nho olo��d til� �os^logici?! period of 0reek philosophy. Em-
pedocles* ^isteaology aaist be found In �onneetion with his
theory of tl:^ elements. Man is made of th� same �lements as
idle rest of the universe Is and he knows the mlverse bsoaus�
like knows like . This knowing is sensate in that the i^ter in
the eye, for iastanee, is attraeted by th� water in th� objeot
pereeived* He said?
For with earih we pereeive �arth, with water, water,
with air, the air divine, and witii fire, the devouring
fire, and love fe pereeive by means of love, hate by
means of dismal |hate
Qtowperz suggest tJiat here Is an attempt to explain perception
by latei^dlate processes. It was crude and fanciftil enougti,
but the subjective factor her� recognized was to come to fuller
m
consideration. Sudbi a mechanical arrangement between subject
and object could hardly be interpreted in any other terms than
that of a realism, for tiiere seems to be a one-to-one contact
whieh would seem to admit no room for error. It is clear that
EE^edodes mai*italaed the necessity for a rational intea^pr�-
tation of the perceptual �i^erienc�. His tiieory of th� four
elements, wito the two controlling principles, ladieates tliis.
Therefore, one is undoil^ta&ly Justified in considering Ei^ed-
"
' '"'fe&t Bakewell. p^t. . p. 46. Of. also Q-oi^erz.
eft. . pp. S34-236, and Frost. �js^., p. 278.
56 Ckw^erz. 0�. clt. . pp. 235-236.
73
odes as hayjUng ea^hasized a rational reallsa of a more meohan-
Ical type, as set over against tlie i^tional resjlism of the
earlier lonians and Heraclltus, ^Idh was s, dynasiic type. The
difference between the latter and th� former Is tliat the uni
verse was oonsldered to be alive In the latter, while the mxl-
verse Is moved by some outside power or by som� Inherent mu-
57
tual affinity Im the foiHoer theox^.
Another mechanical view was held by toe Atomists. They
can also be considei^d as i^tional realists. Leucjppus, accor
ding to (ro^erz, bridged to� gap between to� world of sub
stances and toe world of phenoiaena. tous r�j@cted the idea
that toe world of j^enomena is a delusion. This was his dis-
tinotlve contnbutioii and it was based on his philosophy that
aH toings are made up of atoms, including man wito his per-
o^tual powers. However, he went about to prove this by means
58
�^ & P^^'lci^ reasoning.
Dsmooritus was probably toe author of toe detailed
ato^st theory of knowledge, itoieh gave a purely mechanical
account of sensat1^. (It was, however, probably �n enlarging
of the views of Leucippiis.) The soul is coE^osed of atoms
and, tous, sensation must be toe iB|)act of to� atoms from
"^"-^
57 Uooker distinquishes betweoa toes� two priaelples
in OP. ci^t>. . p. 281.
68 Soa^erz. cl.t. . pp. 348-353.
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without upon the atoms t/ithia. However, the phenomena pro
duced by this iEi?act may net be exactly like the object as it
exists in itself. The air -Uirou^ which the atoms pass can
distort the image. Thus oae cannot knot/ anything for sure
torough the senses. One person's sense of taste might declare
a certain thing to be s^Tcet, i^le another person's taste
might declare it to be bitter. By such an assertion, it could
be tliou^it that Democritus swept out the testlm^my of sense-
sjcperiance and resorted to the realm of pur� Being with Par-
menldas. Tiiis was not the case. In arguing against Prota-
69
goras, Democritus rejected the scepticism of his opponent by
urging that there are two types of knowledge, true knowledge
and obscure kno?;lsdge. To the latter belong sense-*^:!:r>t?rience.
"^et with its obscurities, the latter is of the same nature as
the former, which sees within the true nature of things.
(Jomperz saysi
The reproach that he levelled at th� senses collectively
was that their �vld�nce did not extend far enough; that
they Asserted us at the point where th� minutest bodies
and the mo�t delicate processes wei^ to be got at, from
which the material masses and the processes obtaining ia
them are con^osed*^"
This statement can be substantiated by a frag^nt from Demo
critus himself:
59 For a discussion of Protago3?s-S , cf. Ssction III of
tJ^ds chapter.
60 Ooiiiperz. 0�. cit. . pp. 361-362.
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1|tei?8 are two forms of Imowledge, (>a genuine, one
obscure To the obscure belong all of the following:
sight, hearing, smell, tasts, feeling. The other form
is the genuine, and is quite distinct from this.
Re then continued by showing what that distinction Is.
IheneTer the obscure has reached the iqinlHym sonsibile
of hearing, smell, taste, and touch, and ^tmfx the inves-
tigation must be cspr'rled farther into that which is still
finer, then arises the genuine way of kiioxrlriQ,, which hae
a finer organ of thoui^t.^^
It is no-v? clear that what seemed to be a resorting to idealism,
idiich could have tmdermined his own materialistic system, was
not a rejection of realism but a firm assertion of rationalism.
One is thus justified in oallins Democritus a rational realist,
along with Leucippus.
Anaxagoras has been pia�posely left to this point, for
he marked a tradition between cosmologioal thought and the
thought of the later period. He was the first Athenian phil
osopher and, though a pluralist, he seems to have been the first
to maintain the independont significance of mind as a factor
63
in the orcer of nature. Wrom tills point, tha eiaphasis changed
from an investigation of the basis of th� universe to mor� of
64
an investigation of th� purpose in the universe. Anaxagoras
was not, however, an idealist. &omperz says th&thhe probably
61 BiAewell. o^. ai.t. . PP. 59-60
62 Gf. Cocker. o�. cit., pp. 291~294; Buriiet. cj^. ,
pp. 196-199; Gomperz. o�. cit., r>p. 361-365; Frost. 0�. c|J^. ,
p. 278; John M. Warbeke. The Se.arcliint^. Illnd of Greece, p. 108.
63 ^beke. og*. c^^., pp. 109-110.
64 Loc. cit.
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6�
regarded the senses as truthful but weak, Anaxagoras himself
said In one of his frag^nts: "Because of the ?/eakness of our
66
senses we are unable to disoeim the truth* However, he main
tained a theory of sense-perception similar to Eapedocles ex
cept that he felt that the relation between subject and object
67
was more of an attraction of unlike rather than of like for like,
68
IKierefore, it seems correot to call Anaxagoras a rational realist.
COHCLUSIOMS
In conclusion, it can be seen that the most obvious epls
temologieal attittide running through all of these thinkers was
the insistence ihet there is a contrast between ej^erience and
Inflection, bet^^en perceiving and thinking, between opinion
and reason. The main toing which distinguished these men from
eosmaon men was the malntalnanee �f a critical rational view
of the world in contrast to the common naive empirical view
of the world. Tixas the rationalism of these men was distinc
tive. This was largely assumed and can be seen, for the most
part, only as it shone through their metaphysics.
However, this rationalism, which was assuj^d by tl^se
thinkers, was based in turn on another three-fold assus^Jtion,
or faith. This faith shone through all of their thinking.
65 Oomperz. 0�. cit. . p. 223.
66 Bakewell. o^. cit. . p� 53.
67 Ibid. . p. 54, relates Theophrastus' judgment.
68 Cocker. cit.. pp. 295 and 311-314.
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It was the belief (1) that there is a unity to the universe,
(2) that this unity of the universe is aiaintalnd by fixed laws,
and \$} thst this unity �an be Imown by aan*3 reason without
tim help of the �ods.
That man can know tbm laaity of the universe by reason
was basic to all of the thinkins of these men, but there was
some divergence as to whether reason alone could kiK>w tliis
unity, Th� lonians, Heraclltus, fe5>�docles, Anaxagoran,
and the Atomists all agreed in stance that sense-data is
the basal stuff of th� knowling process. Ho??ever, they nil
insisted that sense-data must be intezpreted by reason.
Cleiur di^ferentiatiofi between the tvo, sense� data and reasim.
Is not alwsgre found in these thinkers. Windelband calls
these early philosophies "crass seasationalism* in their
peychologio/il assumptions. The Pythagoreans ar� called math
ematical rationalists because of a movement to^sard abatmotion
and arraj from concrete sense-data; this movement is sesn in
their emphasis on mathosatical relations rather than on sense
objects. 'Hi� Eleatics are called met^hyslcal mtionallsts
because of the further movei^nt toward abstraction in their
doctrine of Beiiig, which rejected sense-data as being reliable
In interpreting the world.
69 Windelband. dt. , p. 65. Democritus is not
included in this summary but ho dlstiusses him It i�
obvious tliat h�^ need not be exempted from this assertion,
however.
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It is maintained that all of these men were rational
realists. Epistomologloal idealism by no means can be as
sociated with the abstract philosophers of this period, nor
can it be associated witli the less abstract philosophers.
fhese men were realists in that there was constantly assumed
(at least) an approximate relation between reality and the
faaCwlng process, whether that process be sense-data interpreted
by reason or reason alone.
One more consideration is important: it is maintained
that the oosmologists were realists, but it is difflcxilt, in
the light of the discussion, to feel that Wlndelband is
Justified ia calling all of them sensationalists In their
psycholc^. He asserts this even of the metaphysical ration
alists. He says that both Heraclltus and Parmenldes did not
70
know how to distinguish between perceiving and thinking.
It is granted that Parmenldes expressed the necessity of de-
pendeaoe upon bodily relations in which thinking is involved.
It is also granted that he maintained with Eispedocles toat
71
like is always perceived by like. fhis may be called a
sensationalism in psycholt^, but epistemologically, one
cannot get away from the fact that Painaenides maintained that
his perceptions indicated change while his logic said It was
iB?)ossible. His whole philosophy indicated that he followed
his loglo to toe rejection of the validity of his perc^tions.
70 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
71 Loc. oit.
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TIIE SOPHISTS, SOOHATKS, AHD TIiBS SEMl-S^^BATICS
The fifth oentiiry was tlie age of ftreefc enXightensisat.
Athena had oon^ of age aiid as a result of the Farslaa Wars
(SOO-449 B. C), bec^^ a v/orld powr* Silie also was tii^
intelleotual ai^ artlstle oenter of Greece, spirit of
free inquiry had begun to permeate other fields of ^ught
beside philosophy* fhe dramatic poetrj of dac^eee beo^e
deepeoeid. and broadened by th� Influeao� of rofleotion and
critiois�. This was the period of Aesohyltis, Sophocles and
Euripides. Superstition and old l^snds were lui.4 aside for
aoi^ eepltleal historioal writing in the hands of Hearodotus
��d Thyoydldes* Hippoerates was prominent in th� progi'&ss
of medicine tom!?d a more soientifio attitude.
Interestingly enou^, the period of the sijread of th�
new erltlelsffi Is also the period of tlie �lose of th� early
grea,t philosophloal systems. This was a period of great
individual opinion la philosophy and, as a result, philosophy
tended to d^^erat� Into subjectivism. I^s� Innumerable
private philosophical attitudes bred seepUcism. IHioydidas
perhaps exaggerated, but at least his words are indicative:
Words had to ohaH^e tlislr ordinary meaali^ and to take
that vi&ildli waa aoW i^X^m Ui&m, Bookless audaoity oaa�
to be oonsldered th� courage of a loyal ally; pmidmt
hesitation, soecious oowardlcej mderatioa was held to
80
lae oloak for wm&nlimBs; ablHty to so@ all sldas of
sides of a question, Inaptness to aet oa any.X
!Kj1s new aoTemeat of free-tlilaiklas individualism ims
represented by the Sophists a� against th� ooaservativ� �?>�
2
posors of the new thought* ISiese Soi^sts were professional
teaohsrs ^lo traveled arotmd giving Ijistrueticax, for pay^ in
thinking and speaking ayad prepamtlon for political life*
�lere was a gei^ral deprecdatioa of metaphysical i^eeulatloa
aM a general seeptlolsm i^th regard to knowledge, sad, tlosre-
fore, the attention was tiimed toward moral and political eon-
O
�lderati<�is along v;ith di�l�otieal matters.
fhe extrem� suhjeotivism with its aoeos^anyiag so�- -
tioism was a chief characterlstio of th� Sophists. Protagoras,
the earliest known Sophist, i^vealed this characteristic. His
famous expression z^gaz^lng this seems to have been recorded
esrefully W ^to la the Theae^tet^t "Man is tiie measure of
1 Baioydldes. PQ?,oo-Q^�sian War. Book III, m,
iS!l^ m^Ma^^SESSr^^e^ Library, pp.
2 Cf. Thilly. , PP� an intwduetioa
to this new thought.
5 Ibid. . pp. 44*48. ^or mor� oosplet� reviews of th�
Sophi.^ts S^lieir plaoe in culture, of. ^ffS^m* Mk'^^^
pp. 280-331; CMtewrjB. Mk'* 413-43?; Burnet.
pp. 105-3.26; aad Staoe. o^. ali^* ' 106-126.
all ttilngs. . . &S the �xlsteno� of tilings tha^ are, anSi ef
4
the aon-existeae� of things toat ar� not. . * .* �lis, says
Turner, is a relative kaowledg� toties ail objectlv�
5
truto and reduces knowledge to iadnridual oplaioa. mm <^e-
tiniition between obieatlve truto aad siafejectiv� ii^sression
is broken dom. Jks Staoe says, *lhat it m&m% was that toere
Is no objeetlve tn^h, no truth ind^^ia�nt of tot� individual
'I^Jeat* Whatever smm to th� individual true Is true for
6
toat individual*^
fhis would see� to hair� led to soeptioisM and it did;
it Is not certain, however^ that Frotagoras meant toat it
should be carried that far. If Plato *& - ^,i^,^�fi0�^a^ ia a �or-
reot piature of toe Siqslilst*� views, wisdom and knowledge are
7
hiad la hl^ esteem by Protagoras. Oos^ers suggest that, by
making isaa toe measure of all things, Protagoras i^ant generic
Baa to be toe staadards
Man or immn aature is to� stera3&rd for to� ezlstenc� of
to� toings. Xn otoer i^rds, only itat is real can be per-
oelved b^ us. ?h� mreal cannot supply ma^ object to our
pereepti^m. So mmh for the leadlag thought of ProtasoraSt
the proof of idildSs has ant, been �^�^K'red for us. .
-e^}^sls laid <ae to� �ecsiception of man "was doiibtlosa r�8�
poaslMe for his seoondary toought that we mu caiinot break
through the limit� of our owa aattire; that th� truto at-
'4 Piatb.' ^'^,^tti^_^ 182. , (B^Jamla ^owett, tmislator.
Mxs&smmMuST^^'^^ If* p* im.)*
5 Turaer. ^� " PP* 72-75.
6 9ti�^. o^t*. p. 1X0*
7 Plato. ProtsRorae. (Jowett. jgj^., p. 121.)*
%8dM8iSJle �a mst 11� within toos� llmlts| If w�
r�j0�t th� �vldenc� of our pei^ooptlv� faculties, we have
no idght to confide in our reEupLining faculties; and, above
all, that in smh oircuinBifmoQS there would he no laatsrial
for oogjiltian left over for us. Ma^^, hoTi �)i.o\iLd we seek
for ci criterion of tnith and what sisnifioai�je could we
as*^rlbQ to th� ^ 'ords *true* end " imtruc* , If we ropu-^a-
ted i^t and branctK, h^mm trutzx, tiao ec\lo truth ^7it.:.iiri
our roadhtS
S0ffls>er2 realizes ti view goes a^lnst th� portraits of
Protasoras in r''j.atu�s writing; Burnet prefers to agree wito
Plato*
Whatever Prot�s<*3t^ meant hy lils teac^ixiSj^ the eiaohasls
�mM decidedly subjective and Isnowledg� was considered as rel&*
tiv�* iucfe a moveiseat followed mturally m. tiie heels of th�
distrust of toe senses ^^ilch appeared in Hei^clitus, in toe
ISlfatlcs, even in Beiaosritus.
Prot�s<^^&s have been 'utswllling to bocoiae aco-.'oical
about objective truto h^t was aerely plaolns his attention oa
toe knowing stabjeot; however, he pat into saotion a tyoe of
toln:....Ap v/}iJ.oh in the hai^ of Q^r^am beoame a thorough-s�-
IHS- s^ptloissi. fh� latter declared Beings Xfiowled^^Sj and
CoEsaunloatlon of Knowledg� to b� i^ossibie. making nan
to� measure of all toings, Protasoras had limited to� entire
psy^o life to sensations only th� ^Inicms wiileh arise
from these, but perceptioii rests upon motion, in the minds of
B 'Goiapers. o^. qg^t. . pp^. 45S-454.
9 Bamet. i^Jfe*? PP* IIS-IIG,
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these early* thlnlcers. (fe)�d��les> Mm:msoraM mA the Ati�*
Ists were agreed on this.) IFor im*��Ftlon to take place, there
Hiust be motion boto in toe objoot and in the subjeet*
the subjeot and the objee^ oondition eseh otoer. KiiD-^?insj
therefore > oaHi^ to tee sore of a personal, thins miiirersal
10
�^ralidity Yaalshed.
Om the basis of a si�bJ�otlTismj, it oo^ild be
easily ^silntalned toat �Terytoiiis is false or toat eYes^hifts
is true. ProtPS03?as had ehosen toe latterj #o?^ias ohose ths
fom^r. Watng toe dialeotieal t^pe of reasoning introduoed
by %i$nc, ^rslas attested to refate too very position #iioh
Zem m$. to� other Heatlos \w&m trying to raalntaia. ^�j^as
adopted three pjpopoeitlons ^^n^ he attainted to proires (1)
that t^re Is nothing; that even if toere is one cc^iinot
know it; {3} g^d if If� did Jrnow it we miild not eoiar;nmioate
11
It. Tim seeond proposition is toe one tlwX desc^es oonsi^r-
ati<m in U>Xb iittiiy. Go^rperz s?�aris�� ^orgi"^"'"-' �xe?3mnt
in tola t?ays
If Being is to be ^..lovm^ there ^ast mm^im^ be a trar^
rm% of to� oorrectoess of to� alls�*^ jm�wS-e%s, biit
w� com� to look for that wirrant-, we mireelves
disa^tjointed. It Is not to be disoovered in se^e-pers-
oeptlbn, the infalliMlity of istoioh has been so v^^nt-
ly dispttted, nor yet in oiir too^a^t or ^^a^smtion, for
'16 ^ncl^l^nd* r^* ^-$5.
11 ^nmet. �A^'-* ^� 119-lSO.
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Otherwise we shotUd not he able to ifflaglne #iat Is known
to be false�a clmnot*rac� on the sea, for �xaiisle. And
If the oonoordanee of mny witnesses affords no valid
proof of the eorreotaess of our sense-perosptions, their
eride^ioe must also be rejeeted in the sphere of thought
and Isnagla^ition. It might be valid if w� lost our facul
ty of liaaslalhg the um^al, but the iastanoe that has jt^t
be^ given eoarpletely demonstrates the oontrary.13
She fflove^nt toward soepticism has been delineated. What was
at least iaplielt lit Protagoras beoa^ eaplieit in GN^rglas
with his inetaphysioal nihilissi and epistemologiaal seeptieism.
Wllliaai Imest Uo^kUt^ says that seeptieism is not ne�
oessarily an laualtl^ted evil, fhe faet that a man uses rea-
om to a0U$}t rsason helps to reinstate th� role of rsason.
TtkQ effort to doubt everythins thus leads to the ais-
oovaj^ that there Is soi^thlas i^i<^ cannot b@ doubted?
a pex^eotly laaiversal seeptieism ie iapossible. %� �rl*
tieisffi of reason Kust v^oom^m a sphere in which reason
is suooessful, m& laarJt it off froia other sphere in whloh
it worlkas badly, or perhaps necessarily fails.
Bvxh a reaeticm to the scepticism of the %phi�ts appeared In
the person eiid toought ot Socrates.
IS iioffijp'erz. ^* S^.p PP� 484^-485.
IS Cf . ^lX�r. i^. �it. , pp. 92-95. This tendency has
been assoolated with the ^hlsts In s��&^al. fh� two So
phists �^o hav� not been discussed. Hlpplas Prodleus,
showed little Interest in phllosopay sM, therefore, need not
be dlseussed. Cf . Tmm^p M' JSli* � PR* 25*^*1 B^et. m,
dt.. p. 118; Seberw^. m,* S^** PP' 77-?a. It Is likely
toat toere were many Sophists ifeo tooK little interest In
phllosopMoal considerations. Fca* a review that Is mor� syp^-
patoetle wito to� Sophists, of. mom* &rote. 4 ^^st.gia -SS
Greece. VoltSB� VIII, pp. 312-369.
14 WUllasi Ernest Hocking^. XlEM i^^mM* P-
Ho<dclng"ha6 an Interestlns discussion of scseptlcism on pp.
126-131.*
II. SOCRAfES
On� Ot to� probless� Taolng one who atteiKJts a study 9t
3&oz*ates Is toe questions of toe reliability of the souroe� �
Socrates wrote aothins himself, or if he did, it has not been
pi^erred* Ctoe-nmst turn to toe matins� of his pi;?>ils.
fhere are two sain sources, Flato and Xenophoa. These two
along wito toe fragi^its of the dialogues written by Antle-
toenes and AesdbdneSp hav� somewhat different pictures. Pla->
to presented Soei^tes as a philosopher; Kmrnpirni^ as a r.or~
allst. Ueberweg says:
Xen<^hon appears to attribute too uneondltionally to
Senates the tenf^noy, i^tural to himself, to connect
all soientifio aetlvlty wito a praotlcal purpose, and fee
tous gives too small a place to the dialectic of Soora^^*
tess as ooiipared wito his ethical teaohinss.l6
However, Uebemeg feels toat boto Plate's and Xenophoa'?i
aoeounts az*e reliable.
In their aecotmt of toe life of Soorates, to� two
principle a^toorlties^ X�noph<m and Plato, si^st^tially
asree, although to� Flatonlc picture Is s&etehed wito t^
more dell�wite hand. As to toelr reports of Ms doctrine.
It Is, first of all, msiuestlcaaably true that Plato In
his dialogues generally pressaats lila own thoijghts throu^
toe iQouto of Socrates. But In a certain sens� his dia~
Ic^ues caa, nevertoelesB, serve as autoorltles for the
SoQZ^tlo teaohlnSi bemuse of the groundwork of to� p*hll�
t& Arlsiot>hanes' ^jl^oMf gives a mere satire of Socrates
that oar^ias little If any historical ^mlght. 0f. Hogsrs.
clt. , pt>. 53-54. For a review r*t toe Olouds. cf. Lewis Lea^
Suag TOnoan. "Argumant of tiie C:feoud8*' In Aristophanes. C^^oyt^,.
pp. 7�-77.
10 Ueberweg. clt. . p� 85.
mOflopliy of Plato is oontained in toat of Sooratos, and
bsoause it is posslblOt in gsneral, toou^ not in all
oases in detail, to dtsoriminate l>etween toe Platonic
and Soeratic elements � Plato took care not to be led
by bis love of Ideallaaticm too far fro� Mstorio truth;
In some of his cospoaltlons <ln toe MStoS� 1� fel^-
and In part also In the Protagoras. |�^Qh�37 eto.TlS^
remains aliffiost entirely faithful to it, and in others
puts tliose dootrines tdiioh Socrates could not^have pro-
fassed Into toe aK>uto of other philosophers*^^
Edward Zell^ agrees trith toe assertion of toe reliability
of toe account of Plato and, for the most part, the reliabil
ity of toe amount of Senc^hon# At least, he feels that
18
Dlssen and 9sM.elersiach�r sixspeot toe latter aecomt too
Ja^er aays toiat these ac^unts were probably not publleftted
daring Soorates* llfetliM and thought they differ yet toey
all agree In their chief aim, *to re-create th� Inoo^ara uc
19
personality of toe mmtmr isit^ had transformed their lives* .
fhus toe difficulty lies in the datei^nlng of toe hiietorl-
dty of toes� apoXogles* Even the form In ^lioh Plat� wrote
ms aet Into toe style isbls^ Socmtes used for his teachings ^
m
naiaely, toe dialogu�. Shere Is also doubt torowi on to� early
Sating of X�nophon�g writing, and even If It wrs early, his
ploture shows no oaus� for to� suspleKm whloh lad to Socrates'
18 Zeller. o^t� . pp. 103-104.
19 Werner Jaeger. Paidela. Yolisae II, pp. 17-ia.
20 Ihi^*' P�
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deato* Therefore, It oeems that doubt has beem oast ti^on Urn
reHaldUty of both sources* Sotolelenaaoher feels that p.ei-
ther Xwiophm nor Plato oaa be accepted ^xolwsXml^ but that
toey mst be plsyed e^dnst each ot^r In this -m^ft
^fh&t derates have been In addition to all l^nophon
says he ms, without oontradiotins toe cshaiwterlstlo
quailtl�i and rule &i life toat JSmophm di�flnitely d��
dares to have Sooratio�sjsd mist mg^^ h^' have been^
to givft Plato tha l^ulse and the Juatifieation to por�
tray hiia as he does In toe ^L^�^ues*^
There is one other available source that holds tl^
valtxe of t^l{^ neai* �uoug^n in %lm fA-' ioco'ates aiiu yet of
being a more disinterested review, fhis source Is Jkristotl�,
whose historied, state^iits oarry even sore value because
toey s@p� liadted to the pvM^m of toe relation between Soc
rates and Plato over toe dootrln� of Ideas. Aristotle did
not accep:. to� dootrin� and was, toereforO;, less subjeotlv�
In dlsoussing It. ^mkai^B toe most collet� iMx^ Aristotle
said on tills mtter Is found in his J
But when Socrates ms ooci;i>ylns hiisself -^/ito to� eicoel-
Mnmm of diaraoter, and In mmmAm wito toem h^mm tote
first to raise to� problem of unl's/-�rs�5l definition (for
of toe phs'sldsts INwao�grlti:ys only tou<^�d on toe sn^lN^t
to a seSpl a2et�ait, and defli^, BStar a fasiiioa, tlMs ^t
and tha cold; i&lle tha Pythas^x^saas had before tole
treritoa of a few toinss-, dsflnltlous�e.g. tiiose
of opportunity, justice, or �arrla�e�^toey eoimeoted with
nuiabera; lm% It was nitural toat ^orataa should b� e��j�-
iMQ to� �as^oe, for he wr*� seelslisg to syHiiglze, and
" "
21 mefeloh Sohl�l�rmaohei% l^^r ^^1^^ ^i^"
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'what a thing 1b' Is th� starting-point of syllogisms|
for th�r@ was as yst none of th� dialsotical power which
�rallies p#^l� �von without Imowladg� of the easenoe to
speculate atiout cor1t3^al'^.e� bzi6l inquire whether the b-bm�
soienee deals ?rlth contraries | for two tJiingg Biay b� fair--
ly ^qribed to 3oorates�indi�ti�� arguiBonts and univer
sal definition, both of which are conoemed with th-s
start ir^*<l>olnt of science) J�^but So<a�at�s did not Eia,k�
the universala or the definitions aadat apart: .ijl^^v,
however, gave them si^arate exisi^nce, and tiiis was th�
kind of thii)$ they eaUed Idea�****^
fhis seems to be strong authority, but in recent years there
has been a dleparaglns of the Aristotelian evidence on
basis that *lt made Soorates into a thin ana. usoonvinclng
flg^xra, and his <3�3n��ptual philosopiscf into a aier� triviality^.
Ag a result of the a^^emM&wmnt of tliis evidence, toe ground
ia Xtttoertaln, as can be seen by to� differences between th�
various portraits &t SO�M?at�B* Heinrich Maier main^tains that
Soemtes was not merely a theoretical piiilosopher tsit that
h� was the cliiaax of a long struggle towards huaan freedom
aBd toe self-aufficiami^ of aio3^ c^iaraeter* Ae sueh Socra
tes was toe ttv^ni^m antitype of C&irist and the religion �f
radSB^tlon. Flat� was m entirely different person who
#K>uld not be cosipared wito Soor^.tes5 only his early dir^-
logues reve-sl. the true Socrates. A. E. Taylor and J"ohn Burw
32 Aristotle. Met^uhveios. Book XII (M>, Chapter 4,
107�bl9-32. (MciCeon. ^p* S^f,* . P* rh& ar^ferenoes fron
Aristotl� In each case are only dose approjdiae.ti<ms*
25 Jaeger, ftp* o^t. . p. 24.
34 Helnrl�^ Maier. So^ateg. pp. 104 f., cited by Jae
ger. SjI* SA^^p PP^ 34-S5.
net, on th# other haM� feel that all ot Fl&to*a Sooratio
dlal(^;ae3 give a s3rsi?ath@tlo ploture of Socrates. Plato's
Qim distinct tea#ilnsa t&ma mm� ia the dialo�,i�s ishero oo-
orates is m loiter Um leadins fis-ir'e. fhat bei.ig the oai^,
Socrates was wbtat Flato desoribed aad ms Urn mm #10- oreated
the doo-^riae of the Id^s*
-Jaeser isaliiitains that timm opposing ideas ^ ^icii
have i^aarad in later years regaa^ng Soorates ar� r@-state-
Bi^ts of the ideas separated Socrates' l@�diate disci-
l^as lato %wo ofpposins goho43a.-S# that being the ease, the his-
torieui wiist z^g^ard Somtitos as havins ^ personality @E*eat
ioough to inoomoratSf this duality. His very indefinlteneas
aaSa Taxdot;^ InterpretatioTM poasibla� Tiils aakaa hXm morm
Q&BB^l&x and harder to isiderstandji but the true Socrates lauat
be foitsd in that area.
QBt. this baala, the historioal appr&a^ to t^ problem
imat be, as SQhXaifla?i^�^er has pi^poaad, a oafupi^alse be
tween the 3^n(^hanea souroe and toe Flato sour�^. Aristotl�
a�st also be eoneld�r�d, for toe growids for ruHrvg hi� out
do not seem to be eonolufldLVN�*
fey Jse^r* y
SiS^p Shatter toX* p
aloha on t.t>� 14M.oO*
tion of the S0<a�atlc px^biwai, pp.
27 Of. previoualy In this psp&t*
A urnvXe-s �f Soos?at�s* lifo prol^ly wovild not be to�
luportant S&p tliis study* Flat� ^vb in the Fhaedo a roTlew
�f Sooiutss' philosopfcl:iSal #5i?Qlop�at, ^riilcli shows Ms eio��-�
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sent of interest froa te^iXm speeulations to crltioism. tt
Is dlfflouXt to Imow. ^feow moh of tois is really a reTlew of
I*lato's omi a^velopHMsnt. It seems olear �noufSh that ^�mtes
^d have an interest in t^ naturstl philosophers during th�
easier part of his life. JSenoph^ mm IndioatM that Bo^s^
tes perused tiie writings of the;^� pIillaso::)h�rs in ills latar
years. H. D. 0. Bobbiris ss^s Uiat Icaj of ^IjIob, a contes^or^
ary witness,, res�rked toat Soorates was for a tii^ a -ouoil.-ef
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toe physical pMlosojpher Arehelatis- It seuas he was at one
tiae interested in th� rjhiloso;ohy of toaxsgoras \?ito its doo-
rln� of min^ but he soon was disappointed In too philoecoher's
l^sleal interpretatloi^
Like tote Sophists, Soorates felt that th� ^lysioal
apeoulations that had pT&md�d him were Irrelevant and, toere-
28 jPXato. ghafflgfo. 96-101. (Benjamin Jowett. ^Jr
J59 Xenonii^jios. feaprablli^ of %|p|Pat,�a . I,
C^ter tX* 14. (J. S.' Watsoari, tr^lator.
'
^ ^1^,3^,^,,
SatBed^tion ^ �s[^, ^ jem-P^;^^ jggf^^t^ff., p.^SS).
^-R. X5. 0.. -Bobbins. *Introduoti(m" . XenopJKmfs ..^^
31 ?latO. m� 98-99. (JoHPStt. m� 2>P�
40S)| and Xienophon. J^., I^� C. (Watson, o^. j^.,
p. S05}.
tmP9, he o�ate3?�d his interest on laan. Slie Sophists, he f^lt,
had &onm -aetraaf In isaii^hB&idLalng truth as subjeetiire apposronco*
Staoe sayss
to^^tes 0Oii*eeted this hy admlttins that Uie tnjith Mist
h& ay trsttkp b^ �3ji� in my capaoltj as a i^^ticnal balngt
iiii<^ a^ssfis, #lnee reason Is th@ urdirersal, ..tliat it is not
priTate ti^ith| t�it miversiti %mUi which is shared
and valid for .ali rational, feeliigs*^
Soorates was� therefore.^ not so nush �loosed to Iguoranoe as
33
te emfuai^ of tho\:^t. fhis Jndioates his fwltti In uai/exw
sal truth* Plato and Xonoph.on -seem to have aigreed at this
pSiMt and Aristotle's us� of the %&mM *miiT@rsal definition**
34
mmM alto to have referred to this* Sinoe Aristotle irpaoifi*-
cally states that ^^^atea did not Ha^e these universali* eaj-
ist s^art and;, slne# ^anophois does not cJiseuss tlds tlieoreti-
cal developi^t in Soeratc^iii, th^ doctrine of Idoas is left to
m
he disoussed ats prismrily a Flatonle dootrine*
Sven If tim doctririe of Ideas is regarded as prifija:.'\lly
a Platonic doctrine � it IM cleaz' tliat Soorates m'^maph.a^lzB^i
"
^""�taoe� o^t* . p* 153.
34 Plato. QXk'� ff. {Jo^^ett. ^ pp.
4S4 ff. Jl Xenophaaea*. -.Sjsl* 5. ^^"^^ Chapter �/!, 15,
Clatam. OP. clt. . P� Aristotle. g^.. Book Xll
C^ler trX07fhl9-32. (Ecleon. p. 804).
33 Aristotle. J^Ji*
36 Gf . neieb <rfia|>ter.
mthis prinoipl� i� lijalted to praottoal aoral considepa-
tlons. Friedrl^ He^rweg aays: *ffea fmto^ntal �onoaption
of Soorates wae . . . fe^ep^ml^g. of
py^,^;^.^ mA. ^VmUmm.* it ts not the pur
pose ^ this paper to IniPestisstte toe ethloa of Boorates.
It stiffl^s to say that hie eiaphasis ms that niDit*?. rations^
psmffiof Gives his action etMoal signlfieaace. It is thei^-
fore ethl^tl for Mm to do ^at h3.� reascai sa^s 13 best, fw
reason is matins giiide. Plato r^orts ioex-atas as sayingi
lal he is te l>e dmmti& omts^eous 's^iose -^:>lrit re
tains in pleasure and in pain toe oommands of 3:^ason
a^ut v^t he ou^t or oti^t not to fear. , * . Md
hiffi m c^tll vise idm has in hXm ttiat little part whi^
niXsSj and whi^ proolaiais toese eofiam^dsj: that part
t^ being supposed to have a too�de<36@ of #iat is for
toe interest of ea<$h of the three parts and of toe whole.
. , � iy^d would not sa^ that he Is tesperate whxf
has t^m mm elements ta ^ifleaaiy harmony. In ^Smm toe
one ruli3:ig pxinoipl� of vmaMm^ smk tfc� ttio si&Jeet ones
of spint and desire are e^tsally agj^ed toat raason oi;^^
te rule, and do not ralael?���
-Aristotl� and Xenc^hOiB i^r�e that iosispates taught tols prin
ts
olplft tfc^t reason is a reHahle giiida to oondnot.
$B Plat�* E^piibllo� If, 4#3. CJowstt. oo.
p. 706)*
2^ An�tftl8. ^^^i^p^mm^ �2Wter
2. 114Sl^5-2S. (McKeon. . p* lOI^I ; Xmiophim. ^J^.
Boole 1?, Oh��>ter ?I, 6. Imtson* j�. ,p4^,t. � p. 4tB). ef7
also Miles M. Dawson, fb^e .^^i,f^ M goorat.Qg,,. pp.
Sinoe It 1@ by reason t^t a man ^ould be s^^^d^ it
follows that ignoraaoe or imreason is wlokedtiess. If that be
true, then Jcnowledge, espeeially of oneself^ Is vitally la-
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portant. Soorates regarded his mission to be the onltivaticm
of this Imoi^edge that is virtue. Bumet says:
We Imom in a g^eral way idiat the stlssim of Soerates was*
It was to oonviot his fello�-�en ot their Ignoranee aad
sii^ulness iwhic^ for Soorates was the sane thing) $ and
his i^thod was that of sear^ing qt�9stlons*41
f�� questions aaist now be di3�;tssed{ lhat aid Socrates
s^an by *teowlease*, and was his metliod for finding it?
A dlsotisslon of th� latter question leads us to an understands
lag of the tovmr. It has already been asserted that Soora
tes believed that tmitli had some sort of objeotive status,
ifelle at the sa^ time it was avallaMe to the reasoning
pofrer of sien* Bile truth was llaiited to th� pmotloal realm
of aoral e^mduet priaarlly* TMs, as Frost says, is a depen^
dsnoe on ideas as over against sens@*-ej�p#n^oe. Ho wor^^ed
out a ae^od of induetlon on the basis of this falt^ ^ whli^
40 :i^nophQn* o,i^* * Book III, Chapter IX, 6. Here
Soorates regards actlag in ignorance as being dose to
nftsa* Sf* also Book I?, ^^ter XI, M end Ghanter VI, 11.
(Watson* OD* Pit* . pp* 481-452, 4?7, and 500 rittpeotively) j
Plato* Pii^oma* sm.U&mtt. m- PP* WMM}.
41 ^(Am Burnet* "So^ates^. .^y^l^A^^^ Si i^Mm
afi4 E|liiof* CJaa�s Hastings, editor), Tolu^ MV P* ivO*
42 Frost. S^*^ P*
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lie felt true knoia.ease oeiald be clearly delineated. Turner
dlTldes 3o<srates* method Into two dlffeir^nt atagee* fhe first
stage was th� aegatlre stage in whloh Soa?ates himself ap-
proaobdtd the proKLem as one �ho seelcs for ^nowled^. % ques--
tionlng he foroed his vioti� to oonitess l^orsnoe. (l?h� pre
tended deference #iloh Soorates paid to the person or per
sons he questi<med oam to be oaHed the So<^atio irony.) �n
tl^ seoond stagej, the positive stage, Soomtes proceeded in
ductively from the ground of ooiajaon assent, by another series
of questi^s, to a conoept ishidi was re^rded as una!terable�
this stetl:^ ms named i^entlo by Socrates, isho x^garded hiio^
i^lf as a mld^wife brlngli^ Into consolousness ths truth al-
43
ready in the Kind of the p�^ll. By fo3Lloi^ng this method,
Soorates revealed his belief that sense-is^ressions and un-
44
critical gi^ierallzatlons need to be orltioally tested.
to' s ^pioiffi Is a good exaQ|)le of ^e use of this method by
Soorates.
fhe iftiole force of this iwthod is ^sed on the cono^t
�f the loiOTaedg� so^i^t for as authoritative for all* In op-
pesitlOA to the a^lativism of the Ssphlsts. Wind^band says
that Soct^tes ms Urn first to grasp ^le essential worth of
43 ^twmm^. m*^M^f PP* 8��1. St. also Plat�.
fheaetetug. X49-15fr (B^jsffiln O^owett. Ml
SJgTTqSUase H, p^^^ 150-153).
44 Tuamer. ^� Sj^** P* ^*
4S Of. Plato. Ubxis* (Benjaialn Jowett. l^ialQ^ues
^t^ P^ato. Volua� I, pp. 549-380).
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ei2oh 3snowl�^� �hioii eomes by season and %o oaxry out its
raffitfioations paycholosically and logically. It had to he
mr9 than tho sensuous aode of ippr^umdlng the world or Um
method of traditional <^lni<m. Windelband sayas
fhe idea that is to be siore tisan opinion, that Is to serve
as knowledge for all, mst be lehat Is ooiiiiion in all the
particular ideas i^J.cii have forced themselves upon indi
viduals in individual relations: subjeetlve tmiversal
validity is to be expeoted only for the objeetively imi
versal. Henoe* if tim�e is t>� lcnowle%e, it Is to be
found ^ly In that in ishioh aH partloular ideas a^^e.
� � � fhe universal validity vAiltM is daisied for know*
leage is ^ily possible on oonditiQa that the soientlfie
concept brings out into relief the common eleiaent itiiiaii
is contained In all individual perceptions and opinions.46
AH of this, it must be refflsmbei^d, is limited to the praeti-
eal areas of Hfe and oondeust.
fherefore, Soi^tes* oonoeption of knowleOge and Ms
inductive *ethod of attaining it give the bounds to his theory
Of knowle^a. fhis theory asserted that there is suoh a thing
as objective reality #ii^i oan be M.&m by all i-on sinee it 1�
�OBBnon to aH laen, posslliLy Mo^se Urn souls of men have pre-
�3clstence In the reals of Ideas, fhns truth is lla&ted to
Stan's praotioal life s^ad conduct. It Is fomd by olmxtm
asmy opinions and prooeMing by rational inductive t^oug^t
fros fihat is oo^KEaonly agreed up^m the geneml ooncepts wMc^
are unalteraM.� and show tlieisselves in the olear lli^t of
pure reascm to be so.
46 tedelband. p.
47 Cf. Wlndelband* a review, MMrf PP* ^'^^Q.
ThlB Is sot th� pur� rationalism it ssbisb to be, for
in oonneotica -Ith this ms Soerates' faith in Provid@noe
#iere un^lerstandins �eases. His confidence in su�d^ a teleo*
ln<3y Is seen in the limits wiiioh he r*ava to etliioal science
4S
bg^ his reliance upon Urn inner voices the .ilg^^iK^Q^. ll�^
perz says that it is aiffioult to understand ajsaotly #mt
Soojpates ise-ant by the %^,i^tm^,c^* At tiiaeSs, ho see^d to
1^ �sins ths terra in a hal.f*-|�sting mnner, nfoile at otiia-
tiiass Iio sesfaed to be wry serious in hi� use of it. Q-oiiv.
pers sayss
Ifee state^nt Uiat the c$?<^ov/o i/ Mid him bai& ffeenever
he felt any inolina^on to tafce an active part in politics,
aay 1^ taken to indicate that he was here guided by a spe-
oiea of Instiaott a dim but truthful estlmte of his omi
capabilities �s^a?!gins ^� sub-conscious t!nder-our�
rents ef psydtiio Hfe.^
Later (m, it&wmesp, ^ow^mfz says that we are in no position
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even to form a ooniecture as to liaat Soorates meant, Windel-
baad indicates the role of the ,^^Bion in �w>pllB^tins
reasons
The aore he pressM toward oleajmess of comeptions mA
coM>let@ knowledse of ethical relations, and the more true
44 or. i^ato. totex, �1. (4'oimtt. ^^-^ p� 414) i
Mnophon. jg^k' * Book If , Ohapter Till, �7 Cfetson.
p. S06}.
49 Cf. Plato. ^3^. C^owett. Mk''^*
50 (S02:|>�r�. jj^. P� ^�
SI |<0O* ^it.
%o lUmmM h� was 4a tMs, th� less could Im hid� i'l-ofo
himself that man in his llMtation does not ooi^ifetely
succeed la ta^, that ther� ai*@ ijaoadltions in which
^oi^edgei^ is not sufficient for certain decision, and
^aher� feeling enters i^on its rights.. Under such condi
tions Sonatas believed that he heard with3,n himself tlie
diaiaoi^^i^on* a counselling and for the most p-a^^t vjamit^
voice. a� thought that in this way the f^od.? warned from
evil la difficult cases, where Ids kiowledgi- ceased^ the
man otherwise served thea.
So t^e -^se mm of AUmm set faith aM feelint^ beside
ethical science. ^
XII. Tm ^ro-socHiia'io muocs^
Brief Bsiention should be made of Um Sesi-Socratic
schools. !a�fre are foar of these; the Megarian or Eristic
School with Suolid, the Hean School with Fhaedo, tiie Oynics
with Aatis^enes, and the C^yrenales or Hedonists with Aris-
tippus. the first tv?o mjored in ^o^^tio dialectics mixed
with an ^ean element; the seecmd two majored in Socratic
ethics mijeed with Sophist ele^nts.
luolid of Megara extesided So<apatio thought into
reals of met^Jhysios by a ooabinatlon with -yie Slsatic ele-
isen^t of Being. Fai^^ides iiad nade Bsdi^ a priiaor^al enti
ty filling space and �ndowed witli thought. Melissus had, ac
cording; to diSip^E^, added the element of feelirig go that
Wlndelband. o�^;^|24., p. 9S. ^�r a ooBrjlete review
of Socrates* piiiXosopiiy, ofTtleorE� �rote. A M,- -^MSSM.�
Volume IX, CSiapter Lmil, pp.
55 iTMer. gg* S^'� P*
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Being was conscious of its bllssfiil 3ucd^� SaeXid seeias,
tlnercfor>e, to have added will by idmtifyii^ Uie Socratic
#ood wi.th the ^leatio B^i-.r:. Aa a results Iticlid pss^-^-'u
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the Hot-Godd as non-existent. S^wgl^^r savs that Stiliio.^ a
la^r Mftgarlaaa, carried this to th� point T^iar-s roas<m and
knowledge are^ the onl^^ end, and anytMng '/^rilch has iiotMii^^ in
eomon with Isiowledse of tl^s Cfio<l la to be i^i^^rded wit^ in*
different, fo defei^ tlieir views 1^ Megarlans used the
taotlcs of Zeno, the l�ristic laethod* fliey argued by refuting
the ars'UKents of their opponents 8Xi& tlms Inaiisectly establijshed
tlffilr own thesljs. Wm&wm?^ later the follower*� of Euclid
bogged dom. into quibbling and strife aad, as Sch\^gler says,
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their eristic method fonaed a transition into soepticiism*
Hebers^ snd fxmmr regard Phaedo and th� Elean soixool
as having held doctrines laisely lifee the Megarians, there-
fowr, no separate discussion is made of them.
Tim cMil^ ^ Mtis^uBi^s and indisded sut^
persons as S^c^enes of Itt-nope, Crates, Msnedesus, and Menip-
pns. Biey re^Ji?d#d virtue as Ui� proMn^t problem cf philc^
" '"� ' 54' "Qtmp^z. ^* e^,^. . PP* 1?4-1?5.
5� Sehwegler. jg^. Qit. � p.
m ftimer. glt^,. . p. SSj aohi7onlsi^. t^. ,214;.
&7 Turner. , i^. ^-87| tJeberweg.
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mv^l ^�poas Soosmtea had resgardod virtus as the highfj^t
good, tliey rssardad it as fMB 0:iiLly good, ?}ie essano� of
?IrtiiS' is saXf-oontr�X� En.Jo;^Jit, as an eM in itS53lfs is
53
an evil, a^iaplo of S8lf�cmti�ol for t^ie Jljfnioa miz So-
^^to-s hiffisslf* However, tiiey say only part, of the m& Sb�-
<�?ate3 as well as ha.ving grasped ^ily a part of hla tMnit ins,
Srdcaan ss.j'jt
Sae So�i?ates of i^oa tetisthsiief wishess t� fee a dls*
oipl�,. Is m3^ the i^a ifeo deified all haaidships, #10
stood in tT^% of sllve^rsmlth^ 8 ^ops in order tc re-
.joioe he did not mant s^o mm^ tMiigs, liio i!?ore no
shoes, ste. tlie ioo3mt#a, on tk^� otliar hand^ ifeo could
give himself over to ^ijoys^t so safely, at foast
of J^ttoi,, fee haa. never seen, �ad hence he tMf&s toat
^orat^ alleys did things tm fo^nd irfcsoiae,^
Jt is till a esphasi-^ Milci^ oamt oitt at a later ti�� in tise
60
Stoics,
^3dJ^ In the tsijJectivisBi and diaXe^etlcal aathod of
the S^T^tolsts, <%tlst2>.^e3 developed his theory tJmt tJ^ lnai�-
n^sx&l alone is real and tfeat all prepositions ai^ eqi^ally
61
true or that contrndi^yim is- impas-sihle* fMs tl^ry he
09 Er^an. jig^, fl^t. , p, ^* 6f . ale� te^esis. jg,,
iS^., pp* 143 ft.
'
m Of. Joseph A. I�elghton. ^ ^ l^^o?op|iy^.
<lUi^ter IX�- pp.~ 111 ft.
�X A*�istotle. ISEl^ the 9?mmm\> J� Ghi^
t�r 11. 1041^<M?1. (IoSot.. o^* .^"^ P� lf7)| ^t^ysl^,s.
BooJt y. Chapter 2^. qK^4ljS2-S47 lloseon. ^bl^. , p* vWJ.
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m% over ^ssln-st Plato's theory of Ideas. It is a ^taphysl-
mCL nosiBallem asd an epietemologieal mib lectlvlsBi! borderlm
vpmk sceptici8ii,^ If not cospletely eoeptleal.
In direet opposition to the ethieg of the OjmioSj tth$
Oyrsnaioa, led by Artstlppt^, eB^^&asizsed h^^ai�tio doo
trine that nifliagui*� i6 a good in itself ^nd tiip.t ylrt.ne is
�ood oisly as a mean� to tixe eiid of pleagare. Sooratie
eleseRt entared as tfee prtoelple of ** s^sl^f^ateii^frntlrOn dire;^-
p;j ^gg^ea^ . pleasure was to he oontrolled by teoisw-
l^lge. Ueb^mes saysi
^e %3iiG0 sot^ht for independeBoe Uirois^ abetinenee fam
enjoyment, Ariatipptis throia^^ the ooatrol of enjoyment la
the aidst of tmS^^iS^* � . � fo e�Joy the present, aays
the 0yr^^e, is true btteiaess of mm; only ths pre
sent is ia mr poptr*^
As to the th^^ of toowle^Sf foi:^ an^ns t�hfi Cyr-enaios,
the ^lidonio oharacter of their ethics correspmids to Mi apis-
t^iologi^ restriction of Isnowlease to the senses. Thsj ais-
tii^uifiiied Ifotweea ^thiag-iii-itself* and the phenoi^noa
�blj^ ^sts in the ooasoiomsneee. ^thi^ omj be lmo�B of
"
'm Wf'%Een�r, eg. Mt . � p. Ifebenreg. on. M^**
fbe tei^ *aoi!dJW3llS" and *r�alim* Ciiot to Me<ai-
fiased with �oiateEiolo|^iii3i, rea3Jl�s) , coia� into r^mater nm
%^0r. dlatincticai is tha^ nosdnallm reg^ds the parti-
c^ars alone m J'cal ^hUe realisBi i^ai^s tSm imivereals as
real. Tti^ao toraa coiae Into s^^^s^ter use in th� elereath
century. Of. U^mrwm* op* P*
^4 ^4., FP. t6-9?.
tine forjaer hut tli&t it �xiiSts. Mer& is the esjasistejat ooa-
pXetiOB �f Pretas^^x^' siifejeetiviaffi. tt a s<j?3pticisa ae
to th� outsid� world, \mt It asao-oiated the ethical good Tdth
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the plo^asiiraliLfj seiisatlons viiiQh ozlat in tlie oonsoiounaegs.
1x1 eoaolmBioR, ths Sophists idtii their stijJeotiTe
ptiasis hrots^t ais Interest is epistes^lo^ aad ai.itiu'Oi.>ology.
fli�lr eplet^^logy beoajie a aoQptloisa or a neai^-soeoticism*
l^th %orates, rationalism reasserted Imt limited lap�;el3r
ts ethios.* He laid the hagdte for epigtemol<^ hy his in^jtal--
66
ry iistd the emditlons of ?&no\�ledge. ?lls oonelusloas T/ere
that there is an objeotlTe trut^ that oan be reached by induo�
tlVQ etiady* It la oo^aon to all mm* By hie earphagis on
sjj^Jeetive attairt^nt of Imowleds� tlvie tnith., Im ii^lied
a dist3?^t of tM^s as they ^em, that Is, of 35aae-ej;;p0i'-
l�SKce. Ihether or not he developed tie dootrijie of Ideas as
sucSi is doiibtf'al* He was a ratiovialist md by Implica'Cdoa
at leaat a re^alist* Hie rationalism wm B&t abaolut� bec^ise
of hi� e^hasis on Urn inner Toice, tJie J^y^ai^.
�' � �"
6b
�
�fumar. ,02* .qil* , PP� 90-^1; Uebsrweg. lo^. o^^�
66 l^timer. ,git*� > p. ^54,
al3^ wltih Ms faith in unity #f the uiiivcra�-, eonstltut�
the �laasmt �f fal.th la Ms thtory cf kno;?le<!^o. %@ nsrai-
Soca^^o� aijmd Soaratio elements tltii Sic--:.,t.io ani."! S*3pliict
alemente, isdiieii rasulted larseXj in c:^-loter!iolo.f,:lcal soepti-
c^0^� iyieoi;^ins to Sish^glea*, tk� Ig^ariaa soIjooI led aire^t*
iy to Se@i-^tiolau, ^dle O^nlclsa led to Gtoioism aJiit C^jrm?.-.
ieissj led to Si>ionriani0m.
In giffiaer^^ the iaoY8�ent hs^j hem fros eoumleo' to
�sthrop�lc]^ rmd fi^om a'�oi^ or amlir� xntioixsl reallEm
to a abatraot aritiG.al x-^ationai realisia. With the
iBfDvement tewaid, anthropolo^ fito*� issaa a moveimnt toimrd
�tthleetlvisa a�d sceptii^am^ wriidi ms stopped to sose 33:-
t^t by S&@rate�. ^km fait^ of this period centers In th�
aaauB^tlQTi that there is a imity to tlie unlverge snd that it
can \m tooisi by reason* Bren tlie store scoptioal ^thinltere
�LS0Uiaed t^ie ability of re&ion to show that uiowiecl^so does
sot e:;d.3t�
PAHT fHHSiS
PIATO
CH4PTSH V
PhktQ*S mELim DIALOGUES
Because of their imperfect grasp of the doctrines
of Socrates y the men who have heen discussed in the latter
part of the preceding chapter, are callea Semi-Socratics.
Pollwiing the sa^s c^fmrison, Sehwegler calls Plato the com
plete Socratic s
fhe attempts which we have seen hitherto to build fur
ther on the the pie,^ main pillars of the Socratic
doctrine J being rr� th& very beginning without any
thriving germ of life, ended fruitless, resultless.
The complete Socrates was understood and represented by
only om of his disciples, Plato. Proceeding from the
Socx^tic idea of knowledge, i:^ collected into a single
focus all the elements rays of truth which lay scat
tered, not only in his master, but in t^e philosophers
before him, and made of philosophy a whole, a system.
Hot only did Plato extend and rouM oaX the thought
be^n by Socrates, he adopted for his mode of writing the
2
actual mode which was used by Socrates, the dialogue. His
philosophical thought mst be distilled from this series
of dialogues almost cc^letely. The aiethod this stuc^y fol
lows is an investigation of the lEost pri�insnt dialogues and
a sufflmry of relevant ideas in each. Dialogues which are
questioned as to authorship are not discussed. The order of
"
~i Albert Sehwegler. Handbook of �ie History of Philo
sophy, p. 57.
2 Werner Jaeger. Paideia. Volua� II, p. IP.
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the dialogues discussed follows the general order which Con-
stantin Sitter follows in his book The Essence of Plato's
Philosophy. He divides the dialogues into earlier and later
3
writings, and this study follows the same method. Ho brief
is held for the order since it is not felt to be important
for an over-all- view, but the general division into early
and late dialogues is important.
I. THE PM^> THS SYMPOSItm. THS CRATyLUSy AHD THS MBHO
Phaedo seems to have more to do with immortality
than with anything else, but it gives a glimpse into the phil
osopher's concept of ideas. Socrates faces death for his con-
irictions, but he regards it as a release from the senses and
an opening into a world where he can grasp Being, the very
4
essence of things, itself. Paul Elmer More includes this in
5
his biographical group of dialogues, but it is clear that
even here the doctrine of ideas emerges. Socrates in contem
plating death relates his philosophical development. He had
turned from the physical philosophers to Anaxagoras* doctrine
of Mind only to find it unsatisfactory. He had finally found
3 Constantin Hitter � The Essence of Fiaxo^s rnirosophy.
pp. 16-17. The Platonic epistles are not discussed in this
paper, fheir validity is not at present fulljr substantiated.
4 Plato. Phaedo . (Benjamin Jowett. The dialogues of
Pl&tOy Volume I, pp. 441-501).
6 Paul Slmer More. Platonism, pp. 310-3dLl,
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satisfaction by seeking the truth of things in their con
cepts, for above the ccjnfusing ccmcrete he had found the
sis^le and plain absolute concept and had called these
"ideas" (e<.doS )� It is on this basis that he bases his con
viction that the soul is is^Qortal. (It is not necessary to
6
go into his proofs for Itmortality ) . The i�>rd "idea" evi
dently does not designate a concept whieh is n^rely subjective
but one that wholly transcends the subjective realm. It pos
sesses objective reality, for the attributes of the concrete
7
are derived from participation in general ideas. The indi
cation is that tills was not a new doctrine which Plato intro
duced in this dialogue but that these -Oiou^ts had been di.i-
8
cussed previously. It pays one, therefore, to look into
other dialogues, where the same thoughts occur which are,
in this dialogae, associated with "ideas**.
More says that the Symposium brings these thoughts in
to reistion with the life as an ethical force �by exhibiting
the love and desire they excite in the soil by the attrac-
9
tion of their beauty The lover proceeds upward from the
"TUf fheodor Gompers. Greek Thinkers. Volume III,
pp. 41-44 aiti Alfred gdward Taylor. Plato? The Man and His
Work. Chapter VIII, pp. 174 ff.
7 Plato. 0�. cit., 100 ff. (Jowett. o^. cii-� PP-
484 ff. ). See also Hitter, o^. cit., pp. 87-96.
8 Plato. 0�. cil., 100b. (Jowett, 0�.d^., p. 484).
9 More. 0�, crt., p. 311.
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concrete to the abstract through various levels until he at
last sees absolute beauty "pure and clear and unalloyed, not
clogged with the pollutions of sortality and all the colours
and vanities of human life. . . the true beauty simple and
divine". In all of this the term "idea" is not used, but
absolute beauty in this dialogue is pr<^ably the same abso
lute beauty that is associated with ideas in the Phaedo.
Such absolute beauty exists objectively and is always the
same tc all men who behold it. Gomperz suggests that this
11
is a delineating of Plato's erotic mysticism.
The Gratylus deals primarily with the theory of lan
guage, but it is also listed by More in his grouping of meta
physical dialogues. The argument is that language is no key
to the nature of things, for language changes while things do
not. If, as Heraclltus maintained, everything is in fXspif
then things cannot be known. To be known, a thing amst re
tain a definite form or idea, and thus it must be known
12
without words.
10 Plato. Symposium. 212a. (Jowett. og. cit., p. 335).
and Hitter. o�. cit., pp. 96-97.
11 Ibid. 211. (Jowett. og. cU., Pp. 334-336). Cf.
Theodor Gomperz. Greek Thinkers, Volume II, p. 396 and Taylor.
og. clt., Chapter IX, pp. 209 ^f. and especially pp. 230-232.
12 Plato. Gratylus. (Jowett. 0�. c^., pp. 173-229);
Ritter. op. clt., pp. 97-100} Theodor Goaipferz. Greek Thinkers.
Volume III, especially pp. 164-166; l^ylor. 0�. ci^., pp. 75 ff.
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There are broad hints of the doctrine of ideas in the
Laches . the Protagoras . the Suthyphro. the Greater Hippies.
13
and the ajUi^hj^demjis, according to Hitter, but the next impor-
that dialogue, as far as eplstemologieal and ontological con
tent is concerned, is the Meno. More gives the following
brief review of its
The mno resumes the old question whether virtue is a
form of knowledge vidtiich C�ui be imparted by instruction.
It connects Ideas with the things of eternity by the ar
gument of reminiscence. Our knowledge of them, and our
impulse to virtue, is a memory of our vision of absolute
Justice and goodness in some foxier existence . I-^
Benjamin Jowett says that the Meno gives the simplest and
16
clearest account of the Platonic ideas. The course of the
argument in the Meno centers around whether virtue can be
taoght or not. During the conversation, Socrates elicits
from a Greek slave of Meno certain mathematical conclusions
which he has never learned. Since that is the case, Socrates
deduces that either this knowledge was acquired in a former
state of existence or else was always known to the slave and
16
had to be mrely drawn into consciousness. It is clear in
13 Ritter. op. eit., pp. 100-101.
14 More. �g. cit . , p. 311.
15 Benjamin Jwowatt. the Ideas of Plato�. The
Dialo^^ues of Plato, Translated into gnglish. Volume II, p. 16.
16 Plato. Meno. especially 82 ff. (Benjamin Jowett.
dialogues of P|ato, Volume I, pp. 349-380, especially
p. 361 ff.).
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this dialogue that Plato asserted the existence of ob
jective, universally valid facts which can be comprehended,
and whose comprehension constitutes knowledge. This means
that the objective reality existed before it becatiie a logical
conception, and that every properly formed idea has a basis
17
in ths objective world. However, it must be remembered that
what Socrates looks for, in this dialogue, is universal vir
tus. As Jaeger says, this is the first expression of the
logical idea of the universal, iK(lQaAot^)f but it is limited
18
to good as a whole and must not be pressed beyond that.
Moreover, it is a hypothetical thought. In the Phaedo. this
a priori element of knowledge is treated as a fact on which
19
the immortality of the soul is based. Also, Hitter says
that the Phaedo emphasizes the indepaEident existence of this
a priori element whereas it is not sure that this independence
"
20
is assumed in the earlier dialogues. This independenop refers
to the existence of the objective reality of this element
apart from the concept of it, but it does not necessarily
mean the independence of the universal from the particular.
�
17 Ritter. o^. cit., pp. 102-105. Hitter feels that
this summarizes the thinking concerning ontology and epis
temology in the dialogues already discussed. Cf . also
Taylor. 0�. cit. , pp. 129 ff. and especially pp. 137 ff.
18 Jaeger. o�, cit.i.p. 163.
19 Hitter, og. cit., pp. 103-104.
20 Ibid., p. 104.
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Jaeger suggests that it is in the later dialogues that the
relation of the universal idea to the concrete particular
21
becomes a problem.
II. THS EgPUBLIG
Before reviewing the relevant ideas which emerge from
the Reoublic. it is well to get an overall view of what Plato
was doing in this ten-book dialogue. More gives the follow
ing paragraph in summationi
Here the arguments of the earlier groups are developed
and woven together into a single cord. Justice is the
moral sense, and the other virtues are the specific appli
cations of it. The just man, as he is just, has his re
ward in happiness now and here, and to that extent there
is no need to appeal to future rewaz^s and punishments.
Justice and happiness are the effect of the Idea of the
Gtood as the supreme cause. The philosopher is he ^^hose
life is governed by this cause. The knowledge of ourselves
as happy in justice is an immediate certain intuition
(the spiritual affirmation) | above the practical knowledge,
or opinion, which, working m the sphere of the specific
virtues, is always subject to confimation by the future.
The constitution of the ideal State is expounded as a
counterpart of the perfect philosopher. At the end of the
Dialogue the religious sanctions of divine Providence are
added to the deductions of philosophy .22
Of the ten books. Books V, VI, VII, and X have elements which
are associated with the problem at hand.
After mapping the ideal state in the earlier books of
the Republic, Plato faced the problem of whether this sort of
21 Jaeger, og. cit. , p. 164.
22 More. 0�. cit.. p. 312.
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state could be realised. It is in this connection in Book V�
that he asserted that it can only be realized when philosophers
23
become rulers. A philosopher is a lover of knowledge according
to Plato's definition, and, therefore, the next problem is the
nature of true knowledge. The dialogue between Socrates and
aiaucon reveals Plato's conclusion in this books
The lovers of wounds and sights, I replied, are, as I
conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and
all the artificial products that are made out of them,
but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute
beauty.
Tcue^ he replied.
Few are they who are able to attain to ths sight of this.
Very true.
And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no
sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to
a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow�of such
an one I ask. Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflects
is not the dreamer, sleepiagSer:-wtj|$lff4'e|ae'fwI�iJtik^^�iM
dissimilar things, who puts the copy in the place of the
real object?
I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.
But take the case of the other ^ who recognizes the
existence of absolute beauty and is able to distin>j:uish
the Idea^from^the objeets which participate in the idea,
neither putting the objects in the place oi the idea nor
the idea in the place of the objects� is he a dreamer,
or is he awake?
He is Hide awake.
And may we not say that the mind of the one who knows
has knowledge, and that the mind of the other, who opines
only, has opinion? 24
Plato continued by asserting that opinion is something other
than this, beeauae opinion (sense-perception) can be wrong
23 Plato. Republic. Book V, 473. (Jowett. op. cit. ,
pp. 736-737).
24 Ibid. . 476 in part. (Jowett. 0�. cij^. , pp. 739-
740). Italics are the author's.
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t^ile knowledge is unerring. The former has to do with the
25
many? the latter, with the one in which the many participate.
In Book VI, Plato continued his discussion by giving
specific characteristics of the philosopher- leader* He is
to follow the road of knowledge which leads finally to the
idea of the good which is the higjhest knowledge. 3ach know
ledge begins with sense -perception of the "many**, for it is
the perception of the many, which partake of the nature of
the one, which leads to knowledge of the one, a knowledge
which is more than perceptual. With all of this Plato was
dearly emphasizing a rationalistic forming of concepts.
These concepts were clearly regarded as unerring knowledge
of actual reality, that is, they have an ontological cor-
26
relation.
Book VII contains the famous allegory of the cave.
Gomperz gives a concise review of the allegory as follows s
The doctrine of ideas is introduced by a brilliant
metaphor, in which earthly existence is compared to a
sojourn in a subterranean dwelling. In thi?^ cavern
men pass their whole life, prevented by chaihs from
moving their necks or legs. Behind them there are per
sons passing to and fro on a raised platform, holding
up all kinds of objects, wooden and stone images of
animals, plants, and so on, above a breastwork or screen.
55 Ibid. . 477-4a0. (Jowett. 0�. pp. 740-744).
Cf. alsoJaeger. og. cit., pp. 268-278, and Richard Lewis
Nettleship. Lectures ^ the Eepublic of Plato, Chapter IX,
pp. 184.211.
26 Plato. o�. cit.. Book VI. (Jowett. o^. cit., pp.
744 ff.).
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Over and behind them a flame burns. Thus the shadows
thrown by the images are all that the cave-dwellers can
see. For them this world of shadows is the only reality.If one of them were to have his chains loosed, and be
allowed to turn his head and see the light, or walk to
wards it, he would suffer pain; he would hardly be able
to bear the brightness of the flame, and he would think
the scene before his eyes less real than that to which
he had been accustomed. But suppose him dragged forcibly
up the steep path which leads out of the cave into the
sunlight. He would be indignant, and the dazzling glare
would prevent him from seeing anything of what could now
be offered him as truth. Only by degrees would his eye
become accustomed to the light of the upper world. At
first he would be able to see shadows, then reflexions
in water, afterwards things theaiselves; in time he would
learn to look upon the moon and stars, last of all upon
the light of the Sun himself. Should he ever return to
the cave, and attempt to free the others from their
imprisonment and lead them up to the light they would be
furious with him, aad, if they could, put him to death. 27
The rest of the book contains the explanation of this
and the application of it to the state. The world of exper
ience is made to be distinct from the world of concepts, yet,
as has been seen in Boo^ VI, that which is known by experience
participates in that which is known by concept. The distiiiC-
tion comes between the perception and the concept themselves.
28
The latter is attained without the help of the senses. Plato
continued by distinguishing between intellect and opinion in
l^is ways
27 Gomperz. og. cit. % pp. 86-87. Cf. Plato, og. cit.,
Book VII, 814-517a tJowett. og. cit. , pp. 773-776).
28 Plato. 0�. cit., Book VII, 617b ff. (Jowett. og. clj,.,
pp. 776 ff. ).
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At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four
divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to
call the first division science, the secoM understanding,
the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows,
opinion being concerned with becoming, aad the intellect
with being. ... 29
It is clearly evident from the last words of this quo
tation that these distinctions in his theory of knowledge
correspond with distinctions between Being and Becoming in
his theory of Caitology. Plato discussed his theory of on
tology more fully before the above statement �as given in the
dialogue. In reviewing these points, Turner lists ''Sensible
objeets" (6f>^To^ ^i^O'?^ with the two subdivisions, "Real
bodies'* {'2,u//JoCX(^ "Semblances of bodies'* (FcK^/^^), as
correspondents respectively of "Opinion: sense-knowledge**
(Ao'�^) with the two subdivisions ^'Sense-perception** (TTl^TiS)
and **Imagination*� (t ( K He also lists "Sjapersensible
objects � it^o^'P^ y with the two subdivisions "Ideas'*
(^(ftVc) and "Mathematical entities" C/Va^)^ ^aT/ /Ta^)* as
correspondents repeetively of "Superseiisibls knowledge"
ifjS-L^^lS ) with the two subdivisions of "Intellect" (1^ S )'
, 30
"Reasc^" (Zl<a./(ylH. Perhaps a batter word for Sense -
perception would be Opinion, as Jaeger suggests, or Conviction
or Belief, as Gomperz suggests. Also the term Reason might
29 Ibid. S34a, p. 793.
30 William Turner. Eistoiy of Philosophy, p. 113.
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better be . Unders-^andisg accordiag to Jaeger's suggestion.
thus it is that the vsorld of being, known by concepts, was
set off from the wcrld of becoming, known by ea^erience.
The former is changeless and thus admits of no error in the
knowledge of it; while the latter is ever changing and thus
admits of possible error in the perceiving of it. However,
the dialectic which reaches the world of being must bei?in
32
with the world of becc^ing.
As Kettleship notes, the dialectical search is for a
unity of knowledge* This complete unity is perfect knowledge.
It can be found .only in the Idea of Good, which he described
in the allegory of the cave as the sun, but the dialectic
33
begins by noting the unity between the sciences. Such unity
however is not the inductive hypothesis of modem science;
it seems to be somewhat inductive but it does not bear the
stamp of hypothesis, Plato's ti^ory of the concepts banishes
all hypotheses; this is the perfect knowing of the perfect
reality. Tha reality exists in its most unadulterated form
in the abstract idea not in the concrete particular, but the
unity among the particulars starts the dialectician toward
34
the perfect and actual unity of the idea.
32 Plato. 0�. cit., 533. (Jowett. 0�. �it. , pp.
792-793).
33 Ibid. 631. (Jowett. op. cit., pp. 790-791). Qf.
Kettleship. 0�. cit. � pp, 257-258.
34 Gomperz. sq, cit � � PP* 88-89. For a discussion of
the allegory, cf. John ?/ild. Plato *3 Theory of Man, pp. 174 ff.
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Hitter gives the following review of the eplstemologieal
and ontological elements in Book X. They are actually set
in a context which is a digression, according to isttleship,
35
into the field of the arts, Ritter says, in reviews
In order to have a firm basis for judging the production
of the arts and crafts, we mnat investigate tha nature of
imitation. In doing so we "may take our departure from
our ustml me'Uiod. In *very case we have assumed one
Idea for all the particular things to which we apply the
same name, . . e.g., there are many beds and mr-jiy tables,
but only two Ideas of these household articles, one of
the bed and one of the table. . . , Vie have also said
that the producer of each of these articles looks at the
Idea while he makes the individual bed or table for our
use. . . since no craftsman produces the Idea." And
iHBaediately following, "The master carpenter, as we have
Just found, does not construct the Idea, which we consider
to be the essential bed, but only a particular bed.
And if he does not produce the Idea, then that vjhich he
produces ia not real.** And again, "Whether God did not
wish to make, or whether ne'::es3ity prevented him from
makinfr, more than one bed in nature, the fact is that he
made only one essential bed. Under no conditions will
God permit two or more such beds to come into being.
For if God were to make only two beds, a single bed would
have to make its appearance whose essential character
istic (c?c S. ) or form the other two beds would have to
share; and this one bed would be the essential bed.'* 36
Plato seems, in this book, to have made a distinction
between philosophy on one hand and the arts and crafts on the
other. His criticism seems to have been that the arts and
crafts grasp only the external or particular things, while
philosophy grasps the inner laws and real facts of ths world.
36 Hettleship. og. cit., pp. 340-341.
36 Ritter. �2* git. � pp. 108-109. Cf. Plato* og* cit.,
596 ff. (fowett. 0�. clt., pp. 852 ff, ).
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namely, the ideas. At least, he seems to have carried on
his argument, which is more succinct in Book VII, in Book
X by expanding the concept of the idea of the good to the
ideas which lie behind simple things as beds and tables.
In concluding the study of the Republic, it seems
that Jowett is correct in affirming that Plato regarded the
ideas as being both one and many, as being causes arij as
having a unity in the idea of the good which is ihs cause of
the other ideas. However, it does not seem the Joi^ett is
quite correct in affirming that the ideas seem to have lost
their earlier aspect of universals under which iiidiviiiuals
are contained. The dialectic which Plato clearly Outllhed
indicates his insistence on the studying of the particulars
as primary to the course of dialectics. This must be because
the particular, which is perceived, participates in tkat which
can only be known by concept . The dialectic begins at the
former and ends at the latter. Jowett also says tliat the
ideas seem to take on the aspects of hypotheses or principles.
It is admitted -Uiat they are found by indaction, but, as has
been noted, they are regarded as far from hypothetical. If
38
they are principles, they are real not hypothetical.
"
37 Nettleship, og, cit., pp. 353-354.
38 Benjamin Jowett. "CM the Ideas of Plato." ^he
Dialogues of Plato, Translated into English, Volume 11, p. 17.
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HI. THE PHAEDRUS AND TH3 THBAgTSlTUS
In the Pbaedrus, Plato has eaade Socrates give a refu
tation of Lysias, the orator, by counteractting his claim that
the non-lover is more desirable than the lover. Socrates does
this by showing that the lover, whicb Lysias talked about
and Phaedrus reported, is not the lover of the highest type.
The human soul is characterized by a dual striving as a
charioteer with two different types of horses, fhere is the
noble striving and the ignoble striving�the call of true
love and the call of wild sensuality. While the latter drags
down, the former lifts to hei^^ts. In beautiful language,
Plato described the celestial heights of pure Being to which
man can attain. It is frm. this realm he came, and it is by
39
recollection that he realizes it again. By this, he asserted
again the ability of a man to know pure Being, but he has not
yet decided completely on the nature of knowledge. It is to
this problem that our study turns.
Jaeger calls the l^eaetetus a purely scientific work,
which, along with the Parmenides, contains "dry methodical
investigations of one definite problem*. The problem is pre-
39 Plato. Phaedrus., especially 246 ff. (Jowett. ogi.
cit., pp. 250 ff.).
40 Jaeger. 0�. cit. , p. 176.
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sented in summary form by Mores
The gbeaetetus debates the question, Miat is kiiow ledge?
Protagoras had argued that knowledge is obtained only b^r
perception, that there is therefore no distinction be
tween kinds of knowledge, and that the sensation� of the
individual are the only measure of truth. Socrates re
buts these theses, but comes to no satisfactory conclu
sion as to the nature of knowledge, that is of knowledge
as a relation between subject and object. But he also
strongly reaffirms the spiritual fact that we know it is
best for a man to live in the world of Ideas, and to
imitate in his conduct, so far as this is possible, the
justice of the divine nature. 41
The problem is. Is perception knowledge? If man is
the measure of all things, it might be that perception is
knowledge, but Socrates says that if that be so, no man has a
claim on superior wisdom even over the beast which has sen
sations. Not only so but opinions sometimes clash. There
fore, he considers the Protagorean doctrine to be inadequate.
Heraclltus* theory of perception is not adequate either, for
in his tiieory everything is moving and changing so that
perceiving might just as well be called not perceiving.
There are no senses by which general ideas are perceived.
They must be perceived by the mind alone without the senses.
Taylor regards this as the moat important contribution this
dialogue has yet made to the problem of whether knowledge
is perception or not. He sayss
41 More, ogi- cit., p. 313.
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He (^ocrateak-calls attention to the, so far neglected,
distinction between sensation and thought, or judgment.
We can point out the bodily instruments which a man uses
in seeing, hearing, touching. He sees with his eyes,
hears with his ears, and so forth. Or to be still more
accurate, since it is always the mair, that is his
t^uY^ ^ which aess and hears, we should do well to say
ratner that he sees and hears through his eyes and ears.
... But if a man is thinking about two such sensibles
of different senses, comparing and discriminating them,
or counting them as "two**, pronouncing them like or un**
lil^, asserting that they are "really th^rej^, toe soul
is considering the matter "by herself** {o/uT-^ ao(i^s)
without the employment of a bodily "implem^i** (185|g).
� . , How we cannot ^ve knowledge 'without apprehension
6f a "reality" (^ocrio^) which is known. Hence it follows
that "knowledge" is not to be sought for in the affections
of our sensibility (ro?^ 'r^A^^a<^Q, but in the mind's^
reflection upon them Ct^ TTCf*^ Q.ku\/u^ ^^hKo^ kPjjiJ ,
186d). And this finally proves that knowledge is not
the"'same thing as sensation. 42
The second attempt to answer the question. What is
knowledge?, in the Theaetetus , is that, knowledge is true
opinion. Socrates, however, questions whether there is such
a thing as false opinion. In the sphere of knowledge, a
thing is either known or not known; and in the sphere of
being, a thing either exists or does not exists what ground
can there be for error? False opinion can arise from the
erroneous mixture of sensation and thought. Plato has given
some concrete illustrations of what he meant. The main one
is a picture of the mind as a tablet of wax oik which sense-
impressions are written. The new impressions may become
42 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 338-339. Plato. Xbeaetetus.
142-186. (Benjamin Jowett, The Dialos^ 9l PilLto, Volume II,
pp. 143-190).
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mixed with the older impressions, and error may arise.
But not only in the realm of sense -perception but in the realm
of pure thought, error can arise. This comes about, says So
crates, by the fact that in the mind there are old thoughts
retained which can be mixed with the nsw ones. The example is
the mathematician who mi^t select the wrong number for the
sum of two other numbers. Socrates however drops the argument
because the problem as to why the answer given is able to be
regarded as right even when it is wrong persists. True knoy-
ledge must be ascertained before the origin of error can be
44
known.
The third attempt at an answer is made by Theaetetus,
who merely rehearses another man's opinion. Knowledge is said
to be true opinion accompanied by an explanation or a reason
(^oY<)i>)> but there are three meanings to the term "explanation."
It may mean the communication by speech of the thoughts which
a man has, but this is not peculiar to knowledge as such. It
may mean the enumeration of the parts of a thing, but this is
not knowledge, for the parts may be dealt with without kiiow-
ledge of the meaning of them. It say mean the true opinion of
43 Ritter. 0�. cit., p. 139, footnote 1.
44 Plato, ofi. cit., 187-201. (Jowett. 02. cit.,
pp. 190-206). Cf. also Taylor. 0�. cit., pp. 339-344.
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a thing along with knowing the distinquishing features that
divide the thing from other things, but right opinion al
ready implies that. The dialogue ends without a conclusion
except that the conversers know that they know nothing and
45
are therefore better and more humble men.
It is clear from this dialogue that Plg|to regarded
true knowledge as being knowledge of what is real. Such
knowledge cannot be in-^error. perception will not satisfy
the demands of knew ledge nor will true opinion even with an
explanation, fhis dialogue is not ccmpletely negative in
its discussion of the probism. It is true that what knowledge
is not , is carefully given, and that what knowledge is , is
reserved for later discussion. But , as liitter says, there
is no pessimism regarding the possibility of answering the
problem. Also Taylor points out, pure relativism has been
mde untehabie both in metaphysics and epistemology. More
over, Va&re is the strong suggestion that the proposed solu
tions have been inadequate because they have made the same
error, namely, the erecting of a psychological criterion
of knowledge when no such criterion is possible. There is
also the appearance of a series of important technical terms:
"quality � (ffor cpfj S), "organ� of perception (op y^i^()v),
"�criterion* (Kf �T'^'^piov/ ), "differentia* iii,<K^a.fo! ^i^fopnjs).
"45 IbidT 201-210. (Jowett. og. cit., pp. 206-217}. Cf.
Gomperz. op. cit., pp. 155-16^, aitter. og. ra^. , pp. 135-
140, arid Taylor, op. dt. , pp. 344-347.
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The introduction of fundamental problems is important 'Uiought
no solution is found. But T^lor says that the most important
positive contribution is probably �*the recognition that the
discovery of the great categories both of existence and value
is the work of thought, *the soul by herself witlK>ut an in-
46
strument. *" Plato's dispussions of the problem were carried
on in later dialogues.
It should be noted that there is no clear-cut expression
of, or even allusion to, the theory of ideas in this dialogue.
Professor Cornford feels that the absense is a deliberate de
vice to indicate the inability to know what knowledge and err
or are without them.
The Theaetetus formulates and examines the claim of
the senses to yield knowledge. The discussion moves in
the world of appearance and proves that, if we try to
leave out of account the world of true being, we cannot
extract knowledge from sensible experience. 47
He continues later s
The Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we
can get on without themj and the negative conclusion
of the whole discussion means that, as Plato had taught
ever since the discovery of Forms, without them there is
no knois/ ledge at all. ^8
Robinson heartily disapproves of Cornford 's position. He
feels that the reason why the Forms are absent is that they
46 Taylor, og. cit. , pp. 347-348. Ritter. og. �i:k- j
p. 142. For a discussion, cf. Wild. og. cit., pp. 242 ff.
47 Francis Cornford. Plato's Theory oT knowledge,
p. 7. Cited by Richard Robinson. "Form and ^ror in Plato's
Theaetetus Philoso phical Review, January, 1350^ p. 6.
48 Ibid. , p. 28. Cited by Robinson. 0�. cit., p. 6.
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are as irrelevant to a discussion of knowledge as the dis
cussion of what direction a gun is pointing is irrelevant to
the nature of the gun. It is also possiole that by this late
date Plato had moved beyond the doctrine of Forms. Concernii^
this last assertion, the author of this paper feels that there
is no adequate support of this view as will be indicated later.
A modification has taken place in the later dialogues but no
denial of the earlier doctrine. Hot only so, in rejecting
Cornford 's conclusions Robinson seems to do so on the basis
of his own interpretation that a theory of knowledge is not
dependent upon a theory of laetaphysics. This may be true for
Robinson but it certainly does not seem to be true for Plato.
The interpretaticii which Cornford offers seems to fit better
49
into the general tenor of Plato's philosophy.
49 Robinson, og. cit., pp. 3-30
CHAPTER VI
PLATO'S LAT^ DIALOGUES
Five prominent dialogues of the later years of Plato's
life must yet be discussed. They are the Parmenldes, the
Sophist, the Statesman^ the Philebus. and the Timaeus.
(The Laws have no specific value for the theory of knowledge},
I. THS PAHMgNIDES'. THS SOPHIST, AKD THE 3TATS3gAH
In the Parmenldes, Plato did two things, according to
More. He first showed the difficulties which inhere in any
rational explanation of the doctidne of ideas and of the
moral certainty which depends on this doctrine; he then af
firmed the necessity of keeping the doctrine while he main
tained the inadequacy of any use of reason either to prove or
disprove the doctrine metaphysically,
Plato, in criticizing his own doctrine of ideas, raised
five or six difficulties, which he had Barmenides expound
against Socrates* theory of the participation of sensible
things in the ideas or forms. The first objection centers
around the fact that there must be some difference between
the absolute idea and the particular which partakes of the
idea. The whole idea cannot exist in different objects at
the same moment without becoming separate. On the other
1 More. og. cit,, p. 313.
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hand, things cannot contain only parts of ideas for this would
also result in absurdity. This is as yet an unanswered dif
ficulty.
The next difficulty iss Granted ths ideas an objective
existence, the concept which embraces both a generality (idea)
and its participatiiag particulars must have in tuim an idea
above the previously mentioned generality. The concept that
contains both of these ideas must have another idea corres
ponding to it to explain these, ad infinitum. To give the
ideas conceptual status only is rejected since every thought
must be of something that exists.
The third difficulty wMch is raised in connection
with the doctrine of ideas concerns the problem of ideas as
patterns with particulars as resemblances. This involves the
notion that the individual must to soae extent be like the
idea and the idea in turn to some extent like the individual.
To be alike, both the idea and the particular or individual
must partake of another idea, �d infinitum. This also remains
unanswered and participation by resemblance is given up.
The next argument begins with the assertion that the
ideas cannot exist in men, for then the ideas would not be
abso2iUte; and thus the problem resolves into whether
one can know the ideas even though their existence is granted.
If the ideas exist without us, their resea^lances in the
sphere of man's knowledge may be related and their absolute
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existences in the sphere outside of man may be related; but
there can be no relation between the ideas and their resem�
blances in the sjj^ere of man's knowledge may be related and
their absolute existences in the sphere outside of man may
be related; but there can be no relation between the ideas
and their resemblances, in other words, an absolute quality,
to be absolute, can never be related to a relative quality,
Plato had Pamenides use the figure of the master and the
slave, Gomperz explains Plato's usage in this way:
The two terms of a relation are always on the same plane.
To the master there corresponds the slave, to the slave
the master; but to mastership we oppose slaveship, and
vice versa. Thus the real correlate of truth in itself �
or the idea of truth, is the idea of knowledge, not
knowledge in a human mind, 2
The argument is carried on by the statement that only God
can have absolute knowledge, but that being so, he cannot
have knowledge of human things. Knowledge of the ideas is
therefore declared to be impossible. The rational Consider
ations had overcome the mystic contemplation.
Thus Plato has admitted the rational limitations* of
his systeffi�to-date. Parmenides* place in the dialogae is
one of propounder of these difficulties; Socrates has no
answer to them, and so they remain unsolved. However large
the difficulties may be to give a rationally air-tight expose
"~"
H Somperz. og, cit., p. 1S2. Cf. Plato, Parmenldes,
133b-134. (Jowett. og. clt. , pp. 94-95),
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of the doctrine of the ideas, Plato reveals what in this place
seems to be a pure faith-venture, according to the earlier
definition of faith in this paper. It is in the words of
Paraenides, not of Soorates, that the apology for the doc
trine has been placed! by Plato. These words are extremely
iAportants
These, Socrates, said Parmenldes, are a few, and only a
few of the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas
really are and we determine each one of them to be an
absolute unity. He who hears what may be said against them
will deny the very existence of them�and even if they
do exist, he will say that tdiey must of necessity b^
unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his
side, and as we were remarKing just now, will be very
difficult to convince. . . .
And yet, Socrates, said Parmenldes, if a man, fixing
his attention on these and the like difficulties, does
away with ideas of things and will not admit that every
individual thing has its own determinate idea which is
always one and the same, he will have nothing on which
his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the
power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particular
ly noted. 3
aitter seems to be correct in declaring what he thinks
is the real meaning of Plato �
The Ideas are fixed in nature like patterns or (what I
consider to be the same) the Ideas (Gattungseinheiten�
generic unities) give us a firm hold and points of direc
tion in the real world; whereas the individual sensible
objeets are patterned after these Ideas, and therefore
partaiee in the universal characteristics of the forms.. 4
Plato, og. cijt., 135a. Cf. also 129 ff. (Jowett.
eg. ext., p. 96 and 89 ff. respectively).
4 Hitter, og. cit., p. 154.
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Saximlliazi Beck goes even farther with this suggestion t
The suggestion I wish to make is that Plato set him
self the following problem in his dialogues The theory
of Methexis�the assertion that many particular things -
can partake of one idea�encounters great diffieulties ,
which cease as soon as the difference between an idea and
its realization in many species and individuals Is no
longer considered from the point of view of the numerical
differentiation of the one and the many* In other words,
ideas not only exist beyond space and time, rest and
motion, divisibility and indivisibility, mental subjec
tivity and physical objectivity, but they have an exis
tence of their own, ancCideal existence, which is also
beyond the number one. �
Yet reason has failed to establish this theory incontrover-
tibly. It is a faith-assumption which opens the way for reason
to work.
The second half of the dialogue does not carry the
importance for this study that the first half does. It is
primarily a group of dialectical ratiocinations which Plato
puts into the mouth of Parmenldes. This series of contra
dictions perhaps out-does Seno*s. The Eleatics made great
use of the dialectic, and therefore in this dialogue Par
menldes gives free rein to its use. As Gomperz sa^/s, the
conclusion reached is the rediscovery of the inner incompati
bility of unity and plurality, which is the greatest objec-
tion to Plato's doctrine. The objection does not seem to be
recoiieiled. The dialogue does not have a solution to these
'"^^
^ Mauciffiilian Beck. "Plato's Problem in the Parmen
ldes Journal of the History of Ideas, April, 194?, p. 233.
.6?, Eitter has an outline of this second part of the
dialogue, og. cii., pp. 162-164. Cf. also Gomperz. o�. cit.,
pp. 153-154S Flato. 22' cit.. 137 ff. (Jowett. ofi. cit., pp.
98 ff.).
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justification by Plato of his own doctrine, is the possible
impression that there are no greater difficulties with the
doctrine of ideas than with other doctrines, seven the Kleatic
1
doctrine. Even with thie conclusion there is the alleged
rational difficulties which have no solution in this dialogae.
More summarizes the content of the Sophist;
^� Sophist now shows the proper use of the reason,
controlled by the content of experience, when dealirig
with the questions raised by the metaphysical logician.
First it arrives at a physical definition of the sophist;
then passes to his character; then discusses the nature
of being and not*being (the relative), and sets down the
sophist as one who deals with the real of not-being.
Meanwhile the second argument of the Pamenides. the
necessity of maintaining the doctrine of Ideas as an
intuition superior to metaphysics, has been restated in
summarized form. IStMcally the Sophist shows cronnexions
with the Qorgias^ B
The Sophist carries on the discussion of the rational and
metaphysical status of the doctrine of ideas, which was
begun in the Parmenldes. The rational objections of the
Parmenldes remain unanswered, but the Sophist contains
some more or less definite conclusions regarding the meta
physical status of the doctrine of ideas.
It is interesting to note that Socrates has very
little to do .%'ith the discussions in this dialogue�even
less than in the Paimaenides. The main speal^^r is a sti^nger
^1 Ritter. og. ^it* � PP- i65-166. Cf. Wild 0�. ci^.,
pp. 206 ff. and Taylor. �2. cit.. Chapter XIV, pp. 349 ff.
This is also somewhat his opinion. Cf. especially pp. 350-361.
8 More. 0�. cit. . pp. 313-314.
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who, in his youth, was closely connected with the Eleatic
school. The general purpose of the stranger's questions
and discourses Is to find a precise definition of a sophist.
After a discussion of his many callings, the stranger sug
gests a chief characteristic of the sophist which unites these
callings. This characteristic is disputation and tne teachix^
9 '
of disputation. The sophist disputes about all things but
he cannot know all things; therefore, he muet make the ap
pearance of kiiow ledge. He is an imitator in that he uses
imitation arguments for imitation truth.
But the problem that now is apparent is, how such
falsehood can exist. This introduces the whole problem of
being and not-being. The unreal is not Itself real, yet it
is really unreal. If Being is a unity, as the Sieatics
mintain, then the problem lies in explainii>g the existence
of the particular, the reality of the unreal. As has been
seen before, this is the ^oblem which the Eleatics never
satisfactorally answered. The introduction of this problem
in this dialogue indicates also Plato's break with the Elea
tics. Gomperz feels that the entire positive content of the
Sophist was intended to show that very break.
"'9 Plato. Sophists- 232b. (Jowett. og. cit., p. 238).
l& Cf. Chapeter III.
ll*' Gomperz. 0�. cit-, p. 173.
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The stranger turns his argument against the mter-
ialists, who hold that the things grasped by the senses are
real but who do not have a place for the higher realities
of the mind. His argument is tamed next to the idealists,
who distinguish between the sensate objects which constantly
move and the Being which is always at rest. Both: rest aad
motion are necessary characteristics of reality.
The problem that now arises has to do with relation
ships which rest and motion sustain to each other. Heat and
motion both exist, but this does not mean that existence is
a tertium quid which includes rest and motion. If it were
a third thing it would be neither at rest nor in motion
and that is absurd. Therefore, the whole of existence must
be the participation of rest and motion. If there were no
participation, rest and motion would not bej this would be to
maintain a c(mtradiction. But the participation must not be
indiscrimiaate or else there would be times when rest would
move and movement would rest. This would be to aiaintain a
contradiction also. The only hypothesis left is participation
or communion of some with some, that is, that being is r^de
up of part motion and part rest. It is this thesis which
Plato attempted to work out in the rest of the dialogue.
The importance that this dialogue holds in a consider
ation of the Platonic theory of ideas and - their epistemological
ramifications Ilea at the point of this partial break-down
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of the middle partition betw een the ideas and the particulars.
The frame-work of each is basically the samti. The dualism
seems to break down in part into a hierarchy of being, which
exists from absolute Being through all Becorriing, aid which
permits a more fluid interpenetration and inteidependence of
things with each other.
Gc^perz indicates that the eplstemologieal problems
are not solved as yet, bat he says that Plato regarded
their solution as only obtainable in the area of ontology.
It is in this area that he has labored in this dialogue.
However, in the same way timt reality has lost its Eleatic
rigidity, so also have the concepts. Mutually exclusive
ideas are denied, but in between the extremes of exclusive-
ness there is much room for such things as opinion and con
jecture, which met with difficulty in the older rigidity of
alternatives of thought.
Brief mention should be made of the difference of
opinion which exists between scholars as to whether this
dialogue represents a change in Plato's thinking or not.
Gomperz, as has been seen, indicates that it does} and
that when the stranger levels his argument against the ideal
ists, it was Plato's way of indicating the inadequacies of
-^^2 Gomperz. 0�. cit., pp. 174-176, H'^^J^r-^T?;.^
cit. pp. 376-392. Arthur Kenyon liogers. A S^ident's Hist^ory
of Philosophy, pp. 96-97.
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his earlier thought. On the other hand, Ritter recognizes
this as a possibility, but he feels that it is more probable
that Plato was protesting against a misunderstanding of his
doctrine of ideas. The idealists or �friends of th� ideas"
in the dialogue are probably those who are in partial
sympathy with the doctrine but misunderstand it. These
14
were possibly the Megarics. In either case, the Platonic
doctrine is clearly indicated as it stood In the probable
1^
later life of Plato.
The Statesman actually foms another section which
could be fastened onto the Sophist. The stranger is again
the main speaker and the dialogue is another attempt at a
definition. This time a precise definition of the states
man is desired, but this definition is not the concern of
this stttd^. The minute process of defining by classifica
tion is Interrupted by a question as to whether there is no
short-cut method of defining. This leads to a philosophical
discussion concerning the art of measurement. It is this
discussion which is of importance in distinguishing Plato's
theory of knowledge. The art of measurement is divided into
^ Gomperz. 0�. cit. , p. 172.
14 Hitter. 0�. cit. . pp. 175 f.
Plato. 0�. cit., (Jowett. 02, <Sii� i PP^ 221 ff.).Cf.
also John Burnet. Greek Philosophy . Part IT Thales ^o Plato.
pp. 273 ff . The latter discusses the Platonic logic. Cf.
also Wild. op. cit., pp. 273 ff.
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two parts: the first has to do with the "relativity of
greatness and smallness to each other the second has to do
with the relativity of things to the mean or ideal standard.
Things can be masure by these two ways, Tne standards
involved are extrinsic and relative in the former instance
and intrinsic and absolute in the latter. Ilie stranger
notes that many feel that the art of measurement is aniversal,
but there is more to the problem than that. He shows that
these persons do not distinguish the two types of measurementi
But these persons, because they are not accustomed to
distinguish classes according to real forms . jumble
together two widely different things, relation to one
another, and to a 8tandai*d, under the idea that they are
the same, and also fall iiito the converse error of divid
ing other things not according to their real pai^s.
Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the
unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and not
desist until he has found all the differences contained
in it which form distinct classes; nor a^^ln should he
be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities
which are seen in a multitude of things until he has
comprehended all of them that have any affinity within
the" bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the
reality of a single kind. 17
this argument fastens logically with the argument re-
gardiig the doctrine of ideas in the iiophist. i'he ideas, which
had been the objects of contemplation above the world of sense
and appearing only to reason, have in these later dialogues
!E3S Plato. Statesman. 283c. (Jowett. og. cit., p. 311).
Cf. Taylor. 0�. cit. y p. 399.
12 Ibid. 285a. (Jowett. op. cit., pp. 312-313). Italics
are the author's.
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played a more prominent role in the world of becceiing. The
Sophist indicates that there are certain elements of Being in
Becoming; the Statesman indicates that the ideas give form to
the Becoming. There are certain constants whieh exist in
the objects of sense-experience and which make sense-exper
ience possible. Hitter says:
It can mean nothing else bat that in the process of Be
coming there is something permanent, something vshich does
not change, that a law pervades it and that Becoming,
therefore, has the characteristics which the iiophist
(and in a veiled manner already the Theaetetus ) considers
to be the fundamental features of reality. Xrt or applied
science observes tl.is necessity, or that which remains
the same in the chaining states, i.e., the law of change
or development (or if one prefers, the manifestatiui: of
its effects); the existence of art depends on this law.
For only the penaanent, the unchanging can be apprehended,
never the changing which disappears the moment it coaes
into Being, And in so far as we apprehend the unchanging
within the chstr^e and iiiake it the basis for a true con
ception, it appears as an Idea. ^7
Gomperz says that the concept of the participation of
things in ideas is left behind, and that the former ^self-
existeat archetypes" pass into the background. However,
Ritter maintains that the different status which the ideas
now have to the particular world of experience does not
change their archetypal position in the world of abstract
Being. It i3 clear however that ideas are no longer only
isolatedito the realm of pure Being and pure Season. There
i7 Aiitter. SiSL' SJ^� � P� Cf. Taylor, og. cit.,
pp. 393-407.
Gomperz. og. cit. . p. 181; i:4itter. og. cit.,
pp, 184 ff.
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is more of a one-ness to Plato's world with Beicg underlying
Becoming as well as existing in pure form, and by the way
the dialogue is carried on, it seems that reason and percep
tion work hand-in-hand, instead of in isolation. Indicating
the unity which underlies all diversity.
V. THS PHILSBUS ASB Tm tmmjs
As More indicates, the Philebus deals �ith the problem
of pleasure and pain, but the problem is set against a meta-
l^iysical background. It is this background that is the laost
Inportant t&r this study. Socrates maintains that wisdom
is the good; Philebus and Protar^^us maintain that pleasure
ie the good. In searching for the true position, Socrates
takes the lead in the dialogue and proposes that the pleasur
able life and the intellectual life should both be studied
in isolation from each other. The result in that neither is
th^ good by itself.
The conclusion at this point is that the pleasurable
life and the wise life mst be inter-mixed. As soon as the
questions, "How?" and *How much?", appear the problem becos^s
a metaphysical one. Four categories are proposed by 3ocrates
into which all existence fitss (1> the infinite or the un-
limited (<^'rr^J^O^)% (2> the finite or the unlimited O/g^^S);
(3) the union of the two ore the mixture U^iKl^'v/); and (4)
13S
wke cause of the mixing. Pleasure belongs to the first class,
the Infinite, because it can be more or less; ths same holds
for pain. But to what class does wisdom or mind belong?
Socratetj answers by asserting that the world is governad by
mind, not hy ciiange, that there is a universal principle which
is intelligent. Since one's body is dependent upon the uni
verse for the elements of its existence, so one's mind is
dependent upon and comes from the soul of the Universe, which
is the Supreme Cause. Therefore, mind belongs to the fourth
class, the cause. However, later on Socrates places pleasure
of the excessive type in the first class, but moderate plea
sure has a limit and so belongs to the second class, the
finite. Not only so, there are mixed pleasui-es�pleasure
mixed with pain. But the true pleasures are unmixed and
are given by beauty of form, of color, of sound, by sweet
smells and by imowledge. The purest sort of wisdom, on the
other hand, is dialectical knowledge. The grand conclusion
is that pleasure is not the first good. The order of goods
is J (1) measure, (2) symmetry* C3) mind and wisdom, {4) sci-
19
ences, arts, and true opinion, and (5) pure pleasure.
Goaperz suggest that this d^alggue is more inconsis
tent than it is dark and profound. Yet it shows Plato's
WJHto. Philebus. (Jowett. og. cit., pp. 343 ff.).
2D Gomperz. 0�. cit. . p. 198.
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grappling with the rational problema introduced in the Par-
menidea. with the metaphysical status of the doctrine of ideas,
and with the association between ideas and bet^jeen ideas and
concrete particulars. It seems that Plato is attempting to
give rational grounds for what was regarded as an ungrounded
philosophical necessity in the Parmenides. The Sophist
indicates his conclusion that there are certain eleaiants of
Being in Becoming; the Statesman indicates his conclusion
that the ideas give form to the Becoming; and the Philebu^
indicates his conclusion, in part at least, that ideas have
relationships among themselves and with perceptual things.
This plurality of ideas is so inter-connected that oiie idea
cannot be conceived in isSilation. As Hitter says?
Every conception, every ideational act of thought is a
mixture of unity and plurality; so we may say that to
be absorbed in and bound up with another thought-content
is also essential for the Idea, which is the basis for
every true conception in that the latter apprehends the
former. 2X:
Applying this to the four categories of existence, Ritter says:
The reality of the unlimited consists only in the fact
that it serves as the material for the forming activity
of tha limited s the reality of the limited consists in
the fact that it imposes form on the formless or un
limited; ths reality of the mixed consists in the fact
that these two classes which may be separated by abstrac
tion have been intimately united and are given in the
mixed; the reality of ths cause consists in the fact
that the process of development, through which this alone
could and can happen is not merely known as a logical
cause of an event, but is initiated by an impact, the
'21 Hitter. 0�. cit,, p. 197.
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actuality of whieh is put outside the whole action of
causally connected events at which we can arrive hy a
mere logical procedure and by tracing back the whole
process. 22
Thus, aitter maintains that the ideas must be classified
in tliese four waysj
If all reality is divided into these four classes, and if
in accordance with the earlier dialogues, the reality of
Being consists in the Ideas, then they mast be classifi
able into the four classes of the infinite (unlimited),
the finite (limited), the ��mixed'*, and the cause. And
even if through furtoer investigation it should be esta
blished that J as e.g., Zeller believes he can prove, the
Idea is not identical either with the unlimited or with
that which sets limits, it must nevertheless bf maintained
that there is an Idea of the one ae much as of the other
(and also of its various sub-types). Otherwise both
these Ideas (together with the Idea of the *�mixed� and
that of cause) would be wrong, incorrectly formed ab
stractions. Therefoi*e, there must not only be an Idea
of the eause but also of what is caused (or the mixed),
i.e., that which through Becoming has attained a final
form of Being. 23
Burnet maintains what he calls "the traditional view*, namely,
that the ideas refer to that ^hich limits. He also mentions
Jackson who regards the ideas as belonging to the mixed class.
Yet fitter's arguxi^ents seem to be the most convir^cing. if
the ideas are the things that limit, they have *io existent
status themselves. If the ideas belong to the i^ed class,
the continuity between this dialogue and Plato's earlier
23 Bitter, og. cit., p. 196.
24 John Burnet. Greek Philosophy. Fart I, Thales ^
Plato, p. 332.
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thought seems to be broken. The ideas, if Ritter is correct,
are ejcplained as existing io an logically adequate relation
with each other and with the particulars. This seems to have
been Plato's desire in these latter dialogues.
Taylor says that this four-fold division of reality is
80 devised to make the problem of the foms irrelevant. Mis
conclusion is that the foms have no place in this classifi
es
cation. Yet further on in his book, Taylor says:
As the Philebus had taught us, we may arrive at a "fom"*
in eith<�r of two ways; we start with several dif
ferent t.i^v} as many and seek to reduce them to unity
by showing that they are all special determinations of
a more general "form** and discover more specific "forms"
withiB Irt ^ --lihiehe^er route we 7 follow , we presuppose as
already familiar the notions of a foam and of forms in
the plural, *A" and "some" will be ultimate indefinables^
Thus the fonus are involved In this four-fold division.
A possible solution to tha problem of whether ths
forms or ideas can or cannot be associated with any or all
of the fcKir eategories may be found in Plato himself. The
four categories are not absolute but are relative to each
other, it is clear froiii Flato �3 treatment of these that
they are not four categories of existence but rather that
existence is made up of these fotir categories. One lacking
would make the whole system collapse. Therefore, it is safe
to say that the forms cannot exist in isolation.
Granted
25 Taylor, ojg. cit. � p. 417.
-26 Ibid. . pp. 508-510.
M2
the ideas behind these elements, there is an idea of the
existential restilt&nt of the union of these elements, .^s the
elements cannot exist onSiy as combined, so the ideas cannot
exist except in cohesi^m. Aristotle says in this connect ions
"Since the Forms ware the causes of all other things, he
(Plat^ thought their elements were the elements of all
things. As matter, the great and the small were principles;
as essential reality, the One. . . ."2?
The problem now is, Do these necessarily-integrated
ideas have an actual existence in nature or are they merely
the logically necessary concepts of mind? This question was
faced by Plato in the Timaeus. This dialogue contains oorae
of Plato's speculations in cosmogony, it is with caution
that Tinaeus, the main speaker, constructs his theory of the
uTiiverse. He warns of the lack of complete certainty which
must always attend such speculations and he can only hope for
probabilities. God formulated the world after an eternal
pattern. The world was made a sphere which was made to
revolve in a circle. At the center, God placed the soiii
which was created first. The soul is made of the indivisible
(the Same) and the divisible (the Other) mixed with Essence;
thus the soul utters the sameness or otherness of any essence
she comes in contact with. When she contemplates the ssn-
27 Aristotle. Metaphysics. 987bl9-21. (Richard McKeon.
The aaaic ^Qrk?i at ^iatQtlfty p. 701.).
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sible world, she attains true opinion; whsn she contemplates
the rational world, she attains knowledge. The creator
created gods who in turn form the mortal bodies of tsen and
the lower creatures; the creator furnished the irnraortal
principle of the soul so that men have the same elements as
the universal soul. Each (mn is placed on his st^r and shorn
his life on earth. Ths ones who live well will return to
their stars; those who do not, will be reborn in a lower form.
The soul in its infancy on earth in overcome by the body.
It can only regain its proper place by education. 'Vhe un
educated soul is not rational.
At the basis of this cosmogony there are three prin
ciples: (1) an intelligible pattern; (2) the copy which is
created; (3) and space which has no form but can receive
form. The last is the receptacle for created things. The
elements, out of which all things are made, are only the
changes in space which result from the impress of ideas.
These ideas must have objective existence, for knowledge and
true opinion differ and there must be a difference between
the objects apprehended by them.
Timaeus spends much time explaining the creation of
objects; later he turns attention to that which perceives
these objects. Th� first to be considered are the sensations
which the whole body feels, such as hot, cold, light, heavy,
etc. J the second to be considered are the sensatioas
of the
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particular organs of the body, such as the tongue, the nose,
etc. Sensation- arises when an object comes in contact with
an or^an of sense; the motion of the object is transmitted
to the soul and produces either pain cr pleasure. These
elements can be called necessary elements of creation, but
there is also a divine cause for which man should seek.
Timaeus continues by describing the functions of the body.
Toward the end of the dialogue, he turns to a discussion of
the soul and how it sliould be tended. The three parts of
the soul are the divine element, desire and ambition; these
should be exercised according to their proportionate value,
but this is especially true of the divine element, for .it
is by it that a man attains immortality. The saotions of
this divine element, the reason, have their counterparts in
the uhiverses
Kow there is only one way of taking care of things, and
this is to give to each the food and motion which are
natural to it. And the motions which are naturally
aklnjto the divine principle within us are the thougiits
and revolutions of the universe. These each man should
follow, and correct the courses of the head miich were
corrupted at our birth, arid by learning the harmonies
and revolutions of the universe, should assimilate the
thinking being to the thought, renewing his original
nature, and having asslmilatea them should attain to
that perfect life which the gods have set before man
kind, both for the present and ths future. 28
"Ismiito. Timaeus. 90 (in part) (Jowett. og. cit., p.
66). For a complete discussion j cf. the entire dialogue in
Jowett. og. cit., pp. 3 ff.
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In the fimaaus. there seems to be a synthesis of
29
Plato's Ci&rliar thoughts with uis later ones. Tlie term
"idea" is re -introduced. He introduced corporeal Necessity
as the aaterial upon which Mind or the iJisiu^ weris^ to
cause things to be. This necessity is often a hindrance,
but nothing would exist except for it. This seems to be a
renewed emphasis upon the dualism cf Plato's earlier dia
logues, but, as Birnet says, it is not so much an opposing
force, although it hinders the complete purposes of the
Divine Kino, as it is an inevitable concomitant of existence.
Thus the sensible world is not the oerfect copy of the orig-
30
inal but is at least an image of the intellij^ibie . There is
31
a hierarchy of being from the perfect original, which is
known by reason, down to the most changeable copy. The
universe is moi^ of one fabric in Plato *s later dialogues.
^ Ritter suggests this, Cf. cit. f. p. 223.
.30 Burnet, og* cit,, pp, 341-342 and 34S-349,
.31 The term "hierarchy" was adopted by the authoi' of
this paper. It was originally proposed with some hesitation
as a possible comprehensive term for Plato's siouitied doctrina
of ideas. However, in later study, the author discovered the
same term used by such an outstandi^ thir.k@r as Gregory
Vlastos in his critical discussion of Wild's book, Plato's
Theory of Man, Wild is an outstanding Aristotelian who seems
in this book to have departed to the Platonic camp in his
theory of politics. It is this departure which Vlastos de
cries: ''One could even go a step further and say that the
theory of forms was itself an effort to express the logicsd
unity of the 'scattered* particulars. The effort failed.
The concept of comatunity was submerged by the concept of
of hierarchy. The two are nonetheless distin- (continued)
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the ideas exist as pure foms but also ia all copies. This
is important for Plato's theory of knowledge, for the exis
tence of unchangeable realities fom the basis for correctly
formed concepts. The dialogue maintains a realistic relation
between the object and the perceivsr and likewise between
pare Being and the pure concept. The former may possibly
be in error at time and never carries co^lete certainty;
the latter is never in error and is completely certain.
Thus that which is the most truly real is the most truly
knowable. By the comparisons of sensible and individual
phenomena, one arrives at a concept. The objective basis for
this experience is the world whieh is so arraaged in a fixed
and orderly way so that ideas are in relationships.
But P3^to held a reservation as to the ?iomplete cer
tainty of this co^ological setup which coordioates w ith the
logical setup of the mind. He constantly maintained timt the
knowledge of the eternal pattern is certainty while the know
ledge of the copy can only be a probability and does not carry
the weight of absolute certainty. This itself is of the na-
^J. (continued) guishable. Had the author made the dis
tinction he would have furthered our qpest for a defflocr^tic
philosophy today. The aaswer to equiiitarlanatomism Is not
hierarchic community; it is equalitariaa. community. � (Gregory
Vlastos. "Plato �s Theory of iSan,* Philosophical Review, March,
1947, p. 193.)
^32 aitter. 0�. cit. , pp. 211 ff . and especially Plato.
og, cit. t 51b ff. wowHt. 0�, cit.. pp. 31 ff.)-
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33
tore of a faith-venture.
It has been asserted in this paper that the later dia
logues of Plato, as far as their ontological and episte-
fflological content is concerned, were attempts at solving some
of the problems raised in the Parmenides priaiarily regarding
the relation of ideas to particulars and to each other. Along
with thie effort was a possible partial amelioration of the
earlier doctrine in the softening of the dualistic aspects
of the earlier statements. However, this whcle thesis has
been challenged by Henry Jackson and R. D. Archer-Hind, who
try to account for differences between the Republic and the
Timaeus. for instance, on the basis of an interpretation
which regards the later dialogues as showing the f cwms, to
34
be "outside" of the realm bfusensible things entirely. It
can be readily seen that this theory would reverse the en
tire movement and regard the latter dialogues as hardening
rather than softening the dualism of the former dialogues.
This theory needs some critical investigation. This inves
tigation is reserved for this point because the issues in
volved are more apparent in the Timaeus as compared with
earlier dialogues. The earlier Platoiiic dialogues, according
Plate* 0�. cit. , 29. (Jowett. og. ei|., pp. 13-14).
13?^ Henry Cackson. "Plato's Later Theory of Ide�ks,'�
Journal of Philology, Volumes X-XII and a. D. ArcherrHpid.
wintroduction." Timaeus. Cited by A. E. Taylor. A Commentary
on Plato Vs Timaeus. pp. 27 ff .
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to the arguments of Jackson and Archer-Hind, mention the forma
as in or present to the things which the senses perceive�-that
is, the sensate objects partake of or participate in them.
In the Parmenides, Plato subjects his own theory to refutation.
And so in the Timaeus ncUiing is found concerning "partici-
35
pation" in but only "imitation'* of the forms.
However, Aristotle Insisted that the distinction be
tween participation and imitation was never made in the Aca-
demy. One may question Aristotle's conclusion that there
was no essential difference between Pythagoreanism and Pla-
tonism while accept^N^ his word on the use of these two terms.
He might be mistaken in his Judgment while he would hardly
misrepresent a fact. Taylor suggests two reasons why Aris
totle can be trusted in his statea�nt of this fact: (1) His
language agrees with the Parmenides itself where "iffiltation"
.32-
is used as a possible interpretation of "participation;'*
<2) Both terms were used in the Academy even down to the
time of the Keo-Platonists. Thus it seems that no actual sub
stitution of a theory of "imitation" for a theory of ??parti
cipation*' ever took place. The PaiiBenidea therefore indicates
problems to be dealt with, not a theory to be overthrown. If
m. Cf. loc. cit.
as Aristotle, ofi. �ii.| 987bl0-14. (McKeon. og. �i^.,
p. ?ai).
37 Cf. Plato. Parmenides. 132. (Jowett. oo.cit. . pp.
92-94).
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this differentiation between the use of these terms is false,
then the theory proposed by Jackson and Archer-Hind is in
adequate. The use of such terms as "copy" and �imitation"
In the Timaeus does not therefore mean the establishsient of
a theory of the universals as exterior and above the parti
culars, but it does mean that this theory of the external
universals (forms) was more-or-less Flato �a doctrine of ^e
ideas from the beginning. The relation of these universals
to the particulars whieh imitate or participate in them was
the problem which Plato worked on in these later dialogues.
It is doubtful whether this involved any critical change in
his theory. As has been noted, the changes necessitated were
such as to soften the dualism rather than obliterate it. The
universals still exist above the particulars but not in m
isolated and simple way. They are inevitably involved with
m
each other and with the particulars.
"
-^i^ cTT^iedrich Ueberweg. History of Philosophy.
Volume It PP� i3j5-116 aind Rogers, og. c|t., pp. 91 and 93.
CHAPTSa VII
COHCI^IKQ CCaJSIDSRATIOHS OS PLATO
Tha philosophy of Plato, though being distinctive in
Aany areas, is clearly at one mith the basic assertions of
the msLQor line of Greek thinkers as to the nature of knowledge.
He was rationalistic and his rationalise seems to have been
based on the thr�e�fol<3 faith-venture, as it has been called
in this study, which is evident in the cosmologists and So
crates, This three-fold assertion was (1) that there is a
unity to the universe; (2) that this unity is maintained by
fixed laws; and (3) that this unity can be known by the natur
al reasoning powers of man. These three postulates shine out
of the entire movement of Plato's philosophy.
The unity of the universe he found ia the forms or
ideas, "^e entire movement of his ontological thou^t seems
to have been in the asserting of the forms as primary to
p*'ilosophy, as in the Parmenides, and then in the later dia
logues in the attempt to solve the problems of the relation
ship of sensitlfe objects to the a priori forms and their
relation to each other. The forms are asserted to be con
stant though not absolute in the sense of existing aloof from
the world of experience.
The thiro basic assertion is that natural reason can
find this unity. This can be seen in Plato's oft-repeated
a sertion, perhaps best seen in the Republic, that the levels
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�f being have co-ordinate levels of knowing. That the forsss
are known with certainty by the mind while ths �copy� can only
be described as probable, as a�intained ia tlm Timaeus Itself,
indicates that the unity of the universe is knowable.
Thus Plato's basic assertions are at one with early
Greek critical thinking. Hot only so, there is a definite
linkage between Plato and Socrates; Aristotle also indicates
a close relationship between Plato and the Pythagorean�, and
even in certain areas with Cratylus and Heraclltus. Aris
totle says in the Metaphysics g
After the systems we have named came the philosophy
of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers,
but had peculiarities that distinguished it from the
philosophy of the Italians. For, having in his youth
first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Hera-
clitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in
a state of flux and there is no knowledg� about them),
these views he held even in later years. Socrates;, how
ever, nms busying himself about ethical matters and
neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking
the universal �n these ethical matters, and fixed thought
for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his
teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sen
sible things but to entities of anotluar klnd--for this
reason, that the coi^on definition eould not be a defin
ition of any sensiole things ^ as they were always changing.
Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and
sensible things, he said, were all nas^d after these, and
in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by
participation in the Ideas that have the same nm^ as they.
Only the name 'participation* was ftew; for the Pythagoreans
say that txiings exist by 'imitation' of numbers, ^d Plato
saya they exist by participation, chaiagin^ the name, Bixt
what the participation the iiaitation of the Forsis coald
be they left an c^n question. 1
1 Aristotle. 0�. ci^., 9S7a29-087bl3. (McKeon. og. cit
pp. 700-701).
1S2
As has been said before, the testimony of the student
Aristotle to i^hat the teacher Plato tau^t does not need
to be questioned, but it must be realized that Aristotle was
building his own case and therefore may not give a completely
2
fair picture of what Plato meant, fherefore, there may be and
certainly seems to be a wider divergence between Plato and
the I^thagoreans that Aristotle impliSc^. It is to be noted
that the Pythagorean categories of �the Limited and^e Uh-!-
lifflited differ from the Platonic categories of the One and
the Mmy* Of course, the Pythagoreans and Plato had tlie
category of the mixed, but there is a difference, as seen in
Plato's dialogues, between the mixture of two equivalent
prlnelple s in the Pyti:^gorean theory and the mixture of Being
in the changing objects of sense in the Platonic tlisoryi
this latter dualistic mixture is not the combiriation of equi
valents for Being alone is an eternal principle, it is true
that the categories ia the Philebus seem more Pythagorean
than Platonic, but even here there is the addition of the
category of the Cause as there is the addition of Space in
timaeus. Sot only so, the category of the unlimited
is not the same Unlimited as in Pythagorean thought. Plato's
tMiimited is not an eternal principle but a duality of great-
and-small, that is, it is the expandable or the eontractaoief
it can be made larger or smaller. It is culy in this sense
2 Taylor. Ofi. cit* , footnote 1, p. 31.
1^2
of freedom of construction that Plato uses the term *�ah-
3
limited. **
This brings up the question as to whether or not Plato
had a dualism. Albert Sehwegler ^^.rgues that Plato's theory-
includes two worlds, a world of sense and a world of ideas,
and that he does not give a consistent nor satisfactory
theory of the relation of the two worlds. This is a common
criticism from the Aristotelian standpoint. Sehwegler finds
a contradiction in the fact that Plato on one hand grants
the reality of becoming while on the other hand he declares
the ideas to be alone real. To argue his point he indicates
a passage in the tenth book of the aepublic where Plato pro
tests that the sensuous is not beent, while in the Timaeus he
conceives of matter exhibiting resistance to the creative pow
er of the Ideas. However, most of Sehwegler 's references to
this divergence from the statement in the Republic�he gives
several beside the fimaeus reference given here�appear in
the later dialogues. The whole weight of this study has been
in favor of some sort of modification of Plato's views in the
later dialogues. The problem, it has been seen, is different.
In the earlier dialogues, ths doctrine of ideas is developed.
3 Cf. Plato, Philebus, 23 ff. (Jowett. og. cit. ,
pp. 356 ff. ), and Taylor, op. cit.. p. 30. Taylor asserts
that Aristotle himself made this distinction between Plato
and the Pythagoreans.
4 Sehwegler. opt cit. , pp. 7S-80�. Fernand Van Steen
berghen agrees that PaatTTs too dualistic ilthotigh he does'
not point out any contradictions. Cf. his Spistemoloj?y , pp.
53-54.
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The. Fmwmnl&es is the tarning-point to ooxis iteration of
the ideas ia reiatioii to each other and to the world of
experience. The later dialogues reveal a softening of the
more strict dualism into what is !iere termed a '^hierarchy* of
existence,
"
The earlier dialogues � probably tended to giv� a
nonbesnt status to the world of sense, al^ough even in some of
them there was the assertion of the dialectical e^thod which
begins with the world' of 'experience and- moves upward to 'the'
world of ideas. Here already was a hint of what was "to become
more specific. In the later dialogues, an existent status
was given to matter or the thiii^s of sense but not in a
strict dualistic may as with, the, Pythagoreans, for that which
made the empirical worM existential was th� fact that there
were elements of Being in the world .of Becking. Eeturaing
to the fact- of the use of the dialectical method to toow the
world of ideas, John Wild. argues that no breach exists betwe^i
the world of Becoming and the world ef Being. He sayst"
The realm of forms cannot exist apart by Itself until
it becomes a complete and substahtial duplicate of oar
world. Hence we shall have two eoi^iete.and independent,
substantially existent worlds ona,�.cAiic.rets--.aaii^t@i*ial,
'
�t&e.:-btheiri.abstmcil-:'andfiu|?ghaggj^^ is,
to which' world -does human knowledge bel^oiig? Authentic
knowledg� ia clearly of the changeless form, but wf "are
obviously in the materia.l world,
'
'Sijrely if anyone is to
have knowledge of the pure forms, it will be Bom^ divine
being dwelling in th� perfect vforld. 'But in- this case,
^ shall be utterly deprlired of genuine knowledge, and
' 'ms^B to be men. But if we do have it, a ^shall be- god-s,
and cease to be men. The chasm or f^ujf^i(r/j o''3 between con
crete things and forms, which is involved in the present-
day pietui'e of -Platonism, is, according to Plato himself,
inc^patible with th� actual existence ot human know
ledge , 6
He continues in a footnote i
As Plato^ suggests ^ it is really knowledge which' makesth� '<*V<�^ Impossible, if we possess genuine knowieOge
as distinct from opinion, then we know the forms here in
this world, if we do not know them, then there is no
refuge from scepticism. All is flux and knowledge is
impossible. 6
fi.ld�s i&rgument helps to- substantiate the statfement that
Plato's world is more hierarchal tMn dualistic in the strict
sense .
The Heraclitean element in Plato's thought is seen in
the ^angeableness of the world of experience which Aristotle
7
stated that Plato maintained even in his later years.
However, Plato incorporated this concept of the world of
change and becoming into his philosophical system in an
entirely different way than did Heraclltus i fhe unity of
the universe is the principle of Cfc^uige it#elf for Hera
clltus, and though things appear to be permanent "^et rea
soned reflection shows them not to be so. Plato also dis
trusted the report of the senses alone and urged the necessity
of reasoned reflection, but he did not do aifay with ths sem
blance of permanence and affirm th� principle of Change. This
"~ ^
5 Wild, op. cit., pp. 316^217. Cf. Plata Paaaaenides ^
133-135. {Jowett. ojg. c^t. , pp. 14-97).
6 Ibid. t foothote 27, p. 217.
7 Cf . footnote 89 of this chapter.
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Is a limitation of the universal to the various particulars.
Thus, unlike Heraolitus, Plato asserted the universal above,
8
though not isolated from, the particular.
Socrates, according to Aristotle, found the universal
definition within the particular world of ethical experience.
Thus he was like Heraolitus in finding the universals xvithin
the particulars but unlike him in that he affirmed the exis-
9
tence ot the permanent, changeless basis for existence.
Sogers says: "Socrates had pointed out where this fixity is
to be looked for. It is present, not in the flux of sense-
10
experience, but in tiought," Socrates seems therefore to have
maintained a conceptual fixity. Plato with hib expanded
interests in the realm of cosmology and ontology thought this
to be inadequate. Thus, the ideas were conceptually constant
only because they were ontologically and objectively real,
not in the world of sense for that world is constantly in
11
flux, but above it.
When one comes to co-ordinate what has been distilled
from the earlier and later dialogues of Plato in such a way
as to see the full rationale of Plato's doctrine of ideas,
8 Cf. Rogers, og. cit., p. 88.
9 Cf. footnote 88 of this chapter.
10 Loc. cit. (Rogers).
11 Ibid. , pp. 88 ff . Cf . also Walter Pater, Plato and
Platonism,Tp7 163-164 and W. L. Stace. A Critical History
of Greek Philosophy > p. 183.
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one faces the problem of what Plato was really trying to do.
^ny of these ontological and epistsmological movements
of tbtought which one thinto he sees are often, though not
always, seemingly secondary considerations leitiiin ths mind
of the writer of these dialogues. For instance, the Philebus
deals with the problem of whether pleasure or wisdom is the
most important. It all seems to be playful banter, yet it
is set against .a definite bacKground of philosophical thought.
Were it 'not for recurring patterns and' extended thinking in
specific directions which is seen extending over several
dialogues, one could not be sux*s whether Plato was serious in
his attempts or whether he was merely exploiting the fsMous
dialectical form of writing and ai-gument.
Two men, at least, have serious questions as to
whether Plato really was metaphysical or only methodological
in his development of the doctrine of ideas. Paul ITatorp
and J, A. Stewart say that Plato's purpose was essentially
12
the latter,' However, as Douglas Clyde Macintosh, points out,
Flato lived in a day when the vindication of knowledge was a
pressing problem. Also it seems t^t Plato's faith was
pla�^ed in the dialogue, his methodology (actually the dia-
ectic), as the correct and adequate means of reaching the
truth, A correctly formed cmcept was the equivalent of an
'
12 Paul Fatorp. Platos Ideenlehre and J. A. Stewart,
Plato's Boetrine of Ideas, ^ited by Bouglas Clyde Macintosh.
Problem of Knowledge, pp, SI ff �
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objective faet tor Flato. The fact is, says Macintosh, that
Ifetorp and Stewart are both Sieo-Kantiaiis and are perhaps try
ing to read into Plato a purely conceptual world of idoas on
premi-ses such a� these: '*Thinga are ideas| ideas are predicates!
predicate� are thought-constructs., the conclusion in the neo-
13
Eantian doctrine i Thin^ ar-e thought-coiistracts*"
In this study, as well as in many other studies ox Plato
it is felt that no substantial evidence is found for making
Plato's ideas purely conceptual. Sense-objects as well as the
forms are not regarded as mental-constructs. What is said is
that concepts are true and accurate knowledge of objective
Being, while, percepts are liable to the errors of opinions
14
and can never have more than probable certainty. Taylor
in his book, Platonism. makes this very clean
The ideal, "figures,** '*patt�rn^," �' forms** of which we
read in Plato are in no sense ^states* or ^processes" of
minds, nor is their existence supposed to depend on the
existence of any mi||d whatever. The Forms are Just those
absolutely determinate objeets of thinking which, in
Plato's language, "are** and do not '^become-^" and which it
is the business of science to know completely- We may,
if we like^call them "concepts," provided that we re
member two things: (1) they are that which is known, not
the act or process of knowing it| (2) their existence
does not depend on that of a mind which '"conceives" them;
minds know them but do not make them. IS
13 Douglas Clyde Macintosh. The Problem of Knowledge,
p. 83.
14 Ibid. , pp. 84-85 and frank Thilly. A History of
Philosophy, pp. 62 ff.
15 Alfred Bdward !^ylor. Platonism and Its Influence^
p. 34.
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Pater njakes it even strongers
Hitherto, in the Socratic disputations, the ideas had
been creations, serviceable citations, of men's thought,
of our reason. Vvith Plato, they are the creators of our
reason. . , , For Plato, they are no longer, as with
Socrates, the ii^s truments by which we tabulate and class
ify and record our experience. . . but are themselves
rather the proper objects of ail true knowledge, and a
passage from all merely relative experience to the '^ab-
solute'*. ...
That, then, is the first stage, or plane, of Platonic
transcendentalism. Our common ideas, without which, in
fact, we none of us could think at aj.1, are not the
consequence, not the products, but the cause of our rea
son in us: we did not make them; but they make us what
we are, as reasonable beings. 16
To summarize, isieber lists three characteristics of the
ideas: (1) ti^y are real beings; (2) they ar*e more real than
sense-objects; and (3) they are the only true realities for
17
the objects of sense have a borrowed existence. Ueber?^eg
provides an excellent review of the theory of ideas;
The Platonic philosophy craters in the Theory of Ideas.
The Platonic Idea {'iS^o^ or Ciooh ) is the pure, archety
pal essence, in which those things which are together sub-
sumed under the same concept, participate. Aesthetically
and ethically, it is the perfect in its kind, to \ghich the
given reality remains perpetually inferior. Logically
and ontologically considered, it is the object of the
concept. As the objects cf the outer world are severally
known through corresponding 'Bsntal representations, so
ths idea is known through the concept. The Idea is not
the essence icaaanent in the various simiiai' individual
16 Pater, od. cit., pp. 167-168. Cf. also Zeller.
Greek Philosophy, pp.~141-144 and Wilhelm '7indelband. History
of PhiXosoohy , p. 118.
17 Alfred ^'ebsr. History oT Philosophy, p. 61.
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objects, as such, but rather this essence conceived as
perfect in its kind, immutable, unique, and independent,
or existing per se. The idea respects the universal.!
but it is also represented by Plato as a spaceless and
timeless archetype of individuals. The more Plato in
his speculation and in his language gives place to his
fancy, so much the more does he individualize his Ideas;
the more he confines himself to pure cogitation, so much
the more does he approach the apprehension of the idea
under the form of universality. Let the individuals which
share in the same essence or belong to the same class,
be conceived as freed from the limits of space and time,
from materiality and individual deficiency, and so re
duced to a unity, which is the ground of their existence,
and this unity (objective and real| not merely thought
by us through abstraction) will be the Platonic Idea.
To express the relation of individuals to their cor
responding ideas, Plato employs the term '?participation"
(/i^e^^e?*^ ), and also "imitation" (.j^y^ -t^ct^h, ^j^ol uj tr-i s, ),
The idea is the arche^type (-mxp^ 5'e,vy^<o), individual
objects are images {'no<^y^(^ o^onJ^ cl'T^)\ the ^ idea,
though existing independently icuurp Ku q^v-To)^ hae
also a certain community (koh^uj >^ ia.) with things; it is
in some sense present (rr<�. erf �-) in them; but the speci
fic nature of this coosmunity Plato has neglected more
precisely to define. 18
The method by which one knows the ideas is called the
dialectical method, or as Plato used it, the dialogue method.
Pater says that it is essentially "a long discourse or reason-
19
Mg of the mind with itself." Windelband argues that this
knowledge comes by reflection on what is a priori given in
20
the mind. Yet it is the movement of dialectic which attains
that reflection in the form of pure concepts. Plato is very
18 Ueberweg. o�. cit., pp. 115-116. Cf. B. F. Cocker.
Christianity and Greek PHIosophyt pp. 364 ff . for a scheme
or outline of the ideas themselves.
19 Pater, o^. cit. . p. 183. Cf, pp. 174 ff.
20 Windelband. og. cit. , pp. 118-119.
l6o
21
specific about that.
As to ths �pisteaologlcal ramificatl ons of Plato's
thought, one can sum up Plato's thought in the statement
that true knowledge is conceptual rather than perceptual.
The absolute certainty of the knowledge gained by conceptual
thinking Is firmly held throughout Plato's dialogues. Sense-
experience may be in error�he calls it "opinion**�and can
never become more than a probability* As Taylor says:
Sense and thought are radically disparate, yet everyahere
connected. Hature, the realm revealed by our senses, is
only half�real, but it suggests a further reality liiich
lies beyond Itself, It is a system of symbols, and we
ascend to truth by learning to pass from the symbols to
the non-sensuous realities symbolized*22
Thus Macintosh denominates Plato's theory of knowledge an
23
"absolute conceptual ia tic monism". It is monistic in that
there is a numerical identity between the object of knowledge
and tiie content or data of knowledge, but this is a limited
monism in that it is conceptualistic. In other words, this
monism is limited to the realm of concepts and does not ex
tend to the realm of sense-experience. Mot only is it mon
istic but it is realistic* This is important for the use
21 Cf. Thilly. o�� cit.� p. 6l| Johann Bduard Erdman.
A History of Philosophy. Volume I, pp. 10$ ff.| and Ben jaiadn
docker ' s excellent review of Plato's dialectics, o^* cit.,
PP-3$3 ff-
22 Taylor. o�. cit,. pp. i|.l-i^.
23 Macintosh, o�. cit., pp. 336-33 7 �
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of the terra "conceptualistic" by Macintosh might indicate that
Plato's ideas are merely subjective. It is clear that this
is not so, Plato, according to Pater, was the father of
realists in that his theories have no place for nominalism,
which makes the abstraction to be merely a name, or concep-
tualism (idealism), viiich makes the abstraction purely a sub-
Jective thing. With this in mind, it is thought that a better
denomination for Plato's theory of knowledge would be "rational
realistic monism". This is limited to the area of concepts
and extends to th� area of sense-experience only to th� extent
that the world of Becoming participates or imitates the world
of Being and thus has constant (knowable) eleraramts. This
latter knowledge is not pure arxi never exceeds the limits
of probability.
Hot only is the concept mad� supreme in knowing with
opinion no more than probable and perception liable to mis
take, Plato also recognisses certain irrational or extra-
rational �lements, Ludwig Edelstein, along with others,
feels that Plato's us� of th� myth in philosophy indicates
a reconciliation between the ratdonal and irrational elements
in huaffioi nature. In other words he does justice to the in
tellect without infringfng on the emotions smd vice-versa.
This was not an anti-rationalism but it had a real function
within his dialectics, Edelstein says:
~
2l| Pater. 0�. cit.. p. iSl-
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Th� myth, shaped in accordanc � wi th reason, brings to
the realm of the passions th� li^t of th� intellect;
it instigates man to act with hop� and confidence toward
-th� goal which reason has set before him, 25
This may be a carry-over of Socrates "daimon" principle if
it is a true interpretation. At any rat�, there seems to
be �xtra-ra tional �lements in man which Plato admits and
uses. These imginative and poetic elements are not found
and accounted for by means of a dialectic but are regarded
as pr�s�nt on tiie basis of experience. "Hiese elements do not
hav� anything to do with the acquiring of knowledg� but are
joyful stimulants to th� goal of acquiring knowledg�.
A final consideration is the role of faith in Plato's
philosophy. As has been pointed out, h� shared the basic
three-fold belief of the earlier Greek thinkers that there
is a unity to the universe, that it remains fixed, and that
It can b� known by the natural rational powers of man. There
is also a faith-venture which, according to tliis study, ap
pears in the dialogue which seeras to hav� marked the turning-
point toward the ontological problems involved in the theory
of ideas. Hiie Parmenides introduces rational problems with
which Plato in his later dialogues striiggled. Tb.e dialogue
reveals the attitude that though the ideas sesm involved in
rational inconsistencies, which must yet b� worked out, yet
25 Ludwig Edelstein. "The Function of Myth in Plato ^s
Philosophy", Journal of the History of Ideas. October, 1949*
p. I4.77. Cf. Republic. Book III, ij.13 and Phaedo lll^.. (Jowett.
02. cit., Voluins I, pp. 677-678 and pp. 1+97-1+98) �tc.
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the existence of tha ideas must be postulated before phil
osophy can become operative. This is a postulatory faith
of the type that Macintosh mentions in The Pin^blem of Re lip; ious
Knowled?r,e as "belief which is rationally necessary in the sense
of being logically involved in what may b� regarded, on ade
quately critical grounds, not only as theoretically permis-
26
sable but as practically necessary. ..." Another fact con
cerning faith is tint as Socrates mad� room for his daimonion
so Plato mad� room for the ultimate s^stery. Kroner says
that Plato not only used this expression but gave example to
the idea by his lack of f5_aal and ultimate conclusions:
Philosophy does not com� to an �nd: the nature of the
Ultimate as mystery forbids ultimate solutions* Th�
manner in which Plato leads the reader of the dialog\3�s
on and on without ever coming to a definite and final
d�stination is consequently more philosophic than is th�
happy ending of other systems. 27
Anothca:' facet of faith is seen in the Timaeus priraarllj
where Plato asserts a cosmic teleology. As Glenn R. iiorrow
points out, such a cosmic teleology meets som� logical dif
ficulties, but it is obvious that such a teleology exists in
Plato's aind and there is no trace of how it is established.
Morrow feels that it is not a teleology of necessity but a
teleology of persuasion #iere things are made friends by the
26 Doiiglas Clyde Macintosh. The Problem of Religious
Knowled;r.e� p� 7-
27 Richard Kroner. Th� Privacy of Faith, p. 21.
creator and led to their "best ends�a co-operative enterprise
with the universe, which is alive, responding to the per
suasion of a creator with each new thing progressing toward
28
cosmos.
It may be as Philip Merlan feels it is, after tracing
the difficulty of the content of Plato's message and of the
form in which he wrote, that Plato's purpose was not to
build a system so much as It was to investigate and cross-
examine, Th� conclusion of hia study is as follows:
But what is Indicated? What are, after all, the con
tents of Plato's philosophy? If we admit that Plato
was in earnest when h� said that all that can be given
is an indication, that he never cosLnunicated what was
essential to him, becaus� it cmmt be expressed in th�
usual way, if we admit that Plato was in �arnest when h�
chose his form of writing, we shall have to say: Plato's
philosophy dismisses us cross-examined rather tlian in
structed. It asks: V/hat kind of content is coimnunicable
only by speaking indirectly and under another's name. By
wltlajldlng all certitude and not betraying the author to
his readers? What kind of content can be �xprossed only
so that it remains unexpressed?29
As h� himself admits, this is hardly a satisfactory conclusion
to most historians, but it may well be that Plato never meant
for his philosophy to take on the solidity of a perfectly-
rounded system. It may be that he conceived of the universe
and man in it, as is intiaated in the Timaeus , as not so
"
28 Glenn R. Morrow. "Necessity and Persuasion in
Plato's i'laaeus" , Philosophical Review, April, 1950, pp.
lii.7 ff.
29 Philip Msrlan. "Form and Content in Plato's Phil
osophy", Journal of the History of Ideas. October, 19i4-7,429.
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much logically integrated as alive and growing and personal
as it moves toward its telQS'^-a philoeoph^ ifelch can grasp
that which may n@�d to be rational plus that which ia imgi�
native and believable, a personal approach to a personal
w<H�ld�
But above all, as John 1. Warbeke says,
he tPlatoJ had tl^ faith that our various aoments md
variegated �xperienees, tisa laame of evanescent aa5 con*
flic ting partloular s by which, w� a-r^, confronted, csin be
consistently ordered by tb� miad's o^ forms into a
im&ns of realizing the essential, th� comton, the per-
manent ia that �:Ep#ri�e�*30
30 John M. larbekB-, Th� Searching Mind of Q-vmrn.*
p, l8i+. For a diseussion of the "did icademy, cf . Appendix I.
PART FOUR
ARISTOTUu
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CHAPTSB VIII
ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC
Though he did not agree with his teacher in all things,
it can probably be said t�iat as Plato was the on� true dis
ciple of Soci^ates so Aristotl� was the on� true discipl� of
1
Plato. To this important and influential man in th� stream
of Greek, and thereby Western, thought this study now turns.
One of the problems facing a studfnt of Aristotle's
writings is the problem of th� Aristotelian canon and the
order of writing. The problem of th� camn is not our iimned-
iat� concern nor is it for this paper to de tern in�. M�n
lik� Zeller and Grot� hav� spent much tiiae on this problem
and tt^rofore the poliey of this study is to accept as
canonical those writings upon which there is g�n�ral agree
ment. It is with tills brief stateiaent that this particular
2
problem is dismissed.
The problem of the order of writing of Aristotle has
no direct influence upon this paper for there is no clear
division into earlier and later thought as in the works of
Plato. However, the works of Aristotle are easily grouped
1 Albert Sehwegler. History of Philosophy � p. 9k-
2 Cf . Eduard Zeller. Aristotle and th� Earlier
Peripatetics, Volume I, Ch^ter III, pp. 137 ff., George
6rote . Arls tot 1� , Volume I, Chs^ter II, pp, 38 ff.� and
Priedrlch Ueberweg. History of Philosophy, pp. 139 ff �
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into six classes. John Leofric Stocks suggests the following
grouping. This is not necessarily the order of writing, but
it does make an excellent grouping for the purpose of analy
sis. The first group is the writings of logic contained in
the collection called the Orgamn, These contain Aristotle's
theory of the demonstrative syllogism. The second group con*�
tains Aristotle's writings on the theory of laatter and motion
including Physics (Physica). On the Heaves (De Caelo), On
Generation and Corruption (De Generatione et Corruptione )
Meterolo^ ( Me teroloj^ica ) . Physics and On Generation
and Corruption are pi*obably the two most important writings
of this gzt>up� The third group contains Aristotle's theory
of life or the nature of the soul. On the Soul (De Anima)
and the shorter treatises grouped under th� heading Parva
Saturalia. In the fourth group there are four treatises
on the anisml world which are perhaps the least theoretical
of the works of Aristotle. The fifth group, according to
Stocks, includes Aristotle's writings on aian and his works.
This group includes the Sthies, �specially the iKicoaachean
Ethics {Etliioa ^llcoimchea) , th� Politics (Politlea) , th�
Rhe tor lev. (Rhetorica ) and the Poetics (De Poet lea) . The
long treatise, the Metaphysics CMetaphysics) � stands alone in
the six group and has for its purpose th� study of ^the ulti-
3
iMit� nature of being and the nature of the ultimate being."
3 John LeofrlB Stocks. Ariatotelianlsm. p. 10, cf.
pp. 8-10.
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The method eniployed in this study of Aristotle is an
analysis of th� Metaphysics, the Or^anon. On the Soul and two
of three treatises in the Parva Haturalia. namely On
Memory and Regdnisoence and On Dreams, However, for purposes
of clarity, the Metaphysics will be considered following a
consideration of the Organon. This provides a discussion of
Aristotle's methodology before the other facets of his work
are investigated*
There resjain for consideration some fragmentary
dialogues ascribed to Aristotle* These show more of an
attachment and partial, thous^ not coa^plete, agreeij^nt with
Flato. Plutarch calls these works Aristotle's "Platonic
works". They are important in that they show first, the
link between Aristotle and Plato, and then the gradual and
cautious breaking aws^ of Aristotle to a more independent,
k
though not co35>letely new, position.
I. m IHTRODUGTIOH TO THE OROAHQM
The Qrganon is a compilation of Aristotle's writings
on logic. Wallace says that logic is primarily the creation
of Aristotle.
If Socrates broke ground T:^on the subject of th� concept,
aM Plato laid the foundation of a theory of proposition,
Aristotl� in turn congsleted the analysis of knowledge by
adding on his theory of syllogism.5
Ij. Werner Jaeser. Aristotle, pp. ali-^lOl, cf. p. 36,
footnote 2.
5 Edwin Wallace. Outlines of the Philosophy of
Aristotle, p. xvi.
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But logic is tike science of thinking correctly and therefore
it mx&t be that Aristotle's logic gives, or at least should
give, an index to the asathod which he hiaself used in building
his philosophical extern*
Hichard McKeon suggests that Aristotle's logical works
are ccmeemed with two major problems, "the technique of
6
proof and the principles of proof In wca^kiag on i^ese
two major problms, Aristotle wa?ofee six treatises, or at
least six treatises husive been preserved, not entirely intact,
to the preset day. These treatises, given in the order
with if^ich they are dealt in this study, are: th� Catej^iories
(Categoriae ) � dealing with simple, uncombli^d terms under ten
heads or eategories; Interpr� tatio|i (De Internretatione) ,
having to do with "pairs of terais oo^lned in propoaiticns
and expressive of truM>s and falsities conceived the miM";
the Prior Analytics (Analytica Friora) ^ la concerned with
Infereme or, since all perfect inference my be stated as
a syllogism or a series of syllogisms, with coatoina tions of
three ter^ in an argument. HhB last three treatises of the
Qrt3:anon distinguishes between three kinds of syllogisms on
ths basis of their premisses or principles: the Posterioy
Ana lytica (Analytics Posterlora) has to do with th� selection
of true first principles on the basis of th� nature of ^ingsf
6 Hichard McKeon* "Introduction*. The i^sic ""ork� of
Aristotle > p* xvl*
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th� Yoplca (Topioa) discusses the selection or rejection of
principles which express opinion only�syllogism on these
premisses are dialectical and probable, not certain�}
and finally On Sophiatical Refutations (De Sophistic is
Elenchls ) deals with fallacio\jus arguments which are largely
7
due to ambiguities of language* One of the divergences
which appear between Aristotle and Plato exists at this
point for nfliat was for Plato the one scientific and phil
osophical method, namely the dialectical method, was for
Aristotle a secondary metiod without the certainty whieh
8
exists in tY^ method of science,
CATEGORIES AM) OH ;EHTEHPRETATIQH
Tim term "category* as used by Aristotle probably
Ewant what is meant In English by the term "predicate,** In
other words, ttoen Aristotle spoke of ten categories he n^ant
ten predicates which could be made of a single subject, Rosa,
for exai^le, says that "th� categories are a list of the
widest predicates which are predieabl� essentially of the
various namable entitles, i,e%� liiich tell us what kinds of
"
7 Ibid,, p. xvii.
8 Loc. cit. and Grote, o�, clt,, pp. 298 ff.
X72
9
entity at bottom they are." These ten predicates are dis
cussed in Aristotle's The Categories. Wallace lists them
thus: "Substance, Qiiantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time,
Situation, Condition, Action, Passion.'' This means that a
subject�Aristotl� was probably thinklJig of a man or an
animal as his subject�may be described as substance, quality,
10
etc. Qon^erz imagines Aristotle as having proceeded in
this way:
Aristotle imagines a man staMing before him, say in the
Lyceum, and passes in successive review the questions
which may be put and answered about him. All the pre
dicates T^ich an be attached to that subject fall under
one or other of th� ten heads, from the supreme question;
What is the object her� perceived? down to such a sub
ordinate question, dealing with mere externalities, e.g.
shoes or weapons? Other questions are caacemed with his
qualities and his size, . � under the head of relation. . ,
som� answers in Hfhich a term su<^ as Greater or Less,
Handsomer or Uglier, lngjlies a reference to an object
or objects of co^arison* The ^'Whem" is explained by
a Yesterday or To-SBorrow, the Doing and Suffering by the
sentences: "He ia cutting or biK'ning," "He is being
cut or burat." Th� �numeration is intended to comprise
ttae maximum of predicates w}iich can be assigned to any
thing or being, il
The categories themselves hiav� come into much disrepute as
being inadequate. Kant and Hegel and most especially J. S.
9 W. R. Ross. Aristotle, p. 23. Harold P. Cooke.
"Introduction.** The Categorie s ^nd On Ii^terprel^ation in
Aristotle . The Orsanon (Leob Classical Library) .
10 Edwin Wallace. Outlines of the Philosophy ^
Aristotl� � p. 2$.
11 llieodor Oon5)erz. Greek Thinkers. Volume , p, 39.
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12
Mill attacked Aristotle at this point, but it is not the
list of predicates itself which is of importance to t^s
study, lhat is ia5>ortant is th� insight into Aristotle's
method of thought whieh begins with a subject and moves to
the predicates which may exist of that subject, life that
in mind, the fact that die predicates are not necessarily
coiaplete lends welgjit to the fact that they are not the
primary postulaties but are rather theiaselves derived from
13
the presence of the subject. It must be pointed out, as
Zeller notes, that these concepts, th^ categories, are not
merely subjective forms of thought, ti'hey are, rather, th�
different foi^ which the Actual can take, the Subject being
14
th� Actual, {The philosophy of th� Actual must await the
discussion of Aristotle's Metaphysics. ) But to make tlie
subject as an isolated Actual is to misinterpret Aristotle,
aecordins^ to irrote. It is true that the Subject is prior in
the logical procedure and primary in the logical sum- total,
but this does not complete the picture:
It is a mistake to describe th� Subject as having a real
standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as
something afterwards tacked on to it. The Subject per
se is nothir^ but general potentiality or receptivity
for Predicates to coitie; a relative general conception,
in which th� two. Predicate and Subject, are jointly
"
12"rbidr. pp. 38-39.
13 Cf. 3. R. a. Mure. Aristotle, p. 179^
Jk Zeller* o�* cit*. pp, 27ii.-275. Cf. pp. 280-281,
X7k
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iopllcated as f-elatm and ^orrelatu:u.
Aristotla in referrins to tills �oiiibimtion of Subject and
Predicate saya:
Ho one of these tanas, in and Itself, involvea an
afrinsatlonj it ia by th� combination of such term that
positive or negative statecisnts arine* For �very asser
tion must, as is atoittad, be either tru� or false, where**
as expressions nhjU^h are not in any way eoii|>osite such
as �iasn�, Iwhite*, 'runs*, 'wins*, eam^t be eitaor true
or false,*"
However, It is clear that Aristotle was here speaking of 1;^
cosmbination of Subject and Predicate in a philological rather
t^ian in an onitological way*
The seemd treatise of th� Qr^^osi compilation ia en
titled, Og. Intaror� tation.> It seems to have received t^t
title because it shows Aristotle's assertion that language
Is the means of IrtterpretSiig tiKJtight, As the Gate^'iories
dtseusses tiie theory of propositions sad their analysis.
Aristotle defines a noun as **a sound significant by cmven-
tlon, which has no reference to time, aM of which no part is
15 Orote. cit.. p. 139* '^or a oo^rehensiv� study
of the CateRorie.s. of. arotc* ��. o it. . Chapter III, pp. 76-
iSk* Cf. also aoi'T^era. on. cit., pp. 36-1^3; 2�li�r. je*
pp. 27i|.�290.
16 Aristotle, the Oftteaioriffl. 2al4.*10. (Bichard McKeon.
Th� Basle Wrks of Aristotle, ]p� S.i 1?he Aristotl� references
are" ohiy eid5a� at5Pl*0Aliiiatiuiia as to page etc. because of
tacbaical difficulty in translating.
17 Cooke. SE. clt�. p. 7�
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significant apart from th� rest," A v�rb is ^that whicn, in
addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion
of time. Ho part of it has any independmt meaning, and it
Is a sign of sometiiing said of something else." A sentence
is "a significant pcw�tion of speech, saia� parts of which
have an independent meaning, that is to say, as an utterance,
18
though not as th� expression of any positive judgement."
Of tim types of sentences, Aristotl� selected the proposition
for discussion* Siapl� propositions are described as either
alB^jle affirmations or siriple denials. Tims it is seen
that the ground of distinction is truth and falsehood.
Wallace says:
A aimpl� proposition then is a signifiea^jb sound wuich
�jqpresses tAm iaherenc� or non^ii^isrence of something in
something else: for the truth or falsity of propositions
is determined by their asreeraent i&r disagreement with
the facts they represent, a false proposition combining
what is divided and dividing what la reaHly united. 'Shxia
propositions are either aiff irjaativ� {K*trra^ ^o^Ti KoX)
or negative (a^nofa^-rn^sAA), each of which again my be
either universal or particular or designate. 19
It is not neeesaary, tho^^h tempting, to discuss the
intricacies of the theory of propositions. Wallace gives
this short suimaary of the theory flgilch will suffice:
Propositions are said^^ be opposed as Contradictories
^\^7"| fl>o^ri <w a tfuvTi Ke.i<r �fl^i. ) when tlie one asserts or
denies of taie whole what the other denies or asserts of
" 18"Ari�totl�. On Internre tation. l6al9-20, l6b5�7�
I6b25�28, respectively (McKeon. op. cit.. pp, I4.0, Ul, l+l-liS,
respectively. V
19 Wallace, oe, cit., p. 28,
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the {sart, arid as ccsntrariea (C./a^ /��^s a/i/T( )
when an universal arfiraative stands against a universal
negative. Contradictories accordingly entirely exclude
one another and one proposition must be false another
true: ^contrary propoaiticois may both be false, i^ormally
{KojTo^ Tn^v X(f�iv) four kinds of opposition have to
be distinguished, but really only three, since th� op
position of a particular affirmative to a particiilar
negative ^ia merely verbal. Propositions admit of Con*
version ifx^y^T i<r-r po pij' ) into equivalent propositions
having th� order of th� terms reversed, but while th�
universal negative converts simply, the affiriaative does
so only x)artially,20
One lE^rtant thing is that Aristotle dellaited th�
use of language and its thought- eontent .to carefully wrought-^-
Ofut principles, so that �very proposition has only one opposite,
Th� importance of this is seen in the i^ophistical Refutatlona,
Another thing of iaiportance is ttoe fact that the univer
sal and individual begin to appear in a somewhat new setting,
Aristotl� defined these terms:
Sons� things are universal, others individual. By the .term
'universal* I mean that which is of suc^ a nature as to be
predicated of laany subjects, by 'individual* that #11 ch ia
not thus predicated, Thus <man' is a universal, *Calliaa*
an individual*21
This reveals his point of Interest to be tb& individual or
the particular to which the imiversal is related so that
whatever predicative thing can be said of one subject, if it
can be said of the many subjects, becojaes a universal. ThlB
'
20 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
aX Aristotl�. 0�. cit.. 17a37-l4-<^. C McKeon. 0�. cit,,
p. k3)*
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]^u:*tleular point will become clarified as th� stiaiy ccaitinues.
III. TSE FRXQR AMLXTIQS
According to Soi^rz, th� Prior Analytics contains
Aristotle's theory of Inference while the Posterior Analytics
23
c<Mi tains his theory of proof. It is to tiaes� two bulwarks
of Aristotle's logic that this study now turns. The former
treatise falls into two divisions, th� first containing the
announccEMnt , deaaonstration, and analysis of syllogistic
reasoning, and the second containing specific instructions
on the constructions of syllogisias pluss soa^ warnings and
practical directions, Exhaustive covering of ^'Aristotle's
principles of syllogistic theory, ia not of iiaportance to
this study, but tim iaiplications and Explications of
theory as a s�ans to knowing is of great isiportance.
As an introduction to his theory, Aristotle defined
a i�?emiss as
an affirmative or negative atateiasnt of soia� thing about
soioe subject, This stateiaent laay be iiniversal or j^rti-
cular or indefinite. By universal I mean a statement
which applies to all, or to none, of the subjectj by
particular, a stateaant which ai^lles to some of the
subject, or does not apply to some, or does not apply to
^ 22 For a coiaprehens 1ve discussion of the treatise. On
|i^tePpretation. cf. Grote. ��. cit,. Chapter IV, pp. l55-199f
�nd Mure, o�, cil�� PP� 205 ff�
23 GoKQjerz. o�, cit,. p, kk�
2k Hugh Tredennick. "IntiMuction^ to th� Prior
Analytics. Aristotle. Or.t^anon. (Loeb Librarj), p. I0i|,
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allj by indefinite, a stateiaent which applies or does not
Apply without reference to universality or particularity,
e.g., 'contraries are studied by the same science' or
�pleasur� is not good.* 25
The term he defined as the subject and predicate of a preMss
with the verb reojoved, and a syllogism is defined as
a form of words in whieh, when certain assuaiptiona are
made, scraething other timn what has been assumed necessar
ily follows from the fact that th� assumptions are sucli.
By *from the fact that they are such* I mean that it is
because of them that the conclusion follows; and by this
I mean that there is no need of any further term to render
th� conclusion nec�s�ary.2o
In other words, ^e syllogism is a coRthdl^tion of two pro
positions (premisses) which. If properly constructed, lead
to a third proposition whieh differs from th� two yet is true
27
If they are true. The chief rules of syllogism are (l) that
one premiss must be affirBative, (2) that one rmist be univer
sal, and (3) that one or both of the premisses must be of the
same mode as th� conclusion, that is, being apodictic (neces-
28
sary) or assertoric (actual) or problemtic (possible).
The use of the demonstrative syllogism by Aristotle,
ia largely deductive. The movement ia from th� whole to tii�
'
25 Aristotle. Prior Analytics. 2i|2l6-23. (Qr^anoa.
Volume I, boeb Library, p. 199 )�
26 Aristotle. o�. cit.. 2ij.bl9-23c, cf. also 2i|.bl6-l8,
(Loeb Library* og, eit�, pp. 201, 203, cf� P� 201).
27 Cf. arote. SR- clfe** P�
28 Aristotle, oa. cit.. I4.1b6 ff. (Loeb Library, 0�,
cit.. pp. 323 ff.) Of. also Wailaee* ojSL* &M*> P* k-Om
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part but tills movement can he reversed. The fact that the
syllogism in its larger meanlr^ is so set up to work both
ways indicates, firstly, that the imiversal is the basic
law while the process is largely one of the subsumptioc
of the many and varied particulars under larger class ifica**
tlons�in this he follows in the Socra tic-Platonic line�,
and secondly, ttoat l^e law exists amid the phenomena, the
universal in tJie particular. It Is true in the first In
stance that induction is th� raeans of establishing the pre
misses, yet Aristotle, while recognizing this, assumes th�
obviousness or the epistemological a priori-ness of the basic
29
propositions. The process is his main concern.
Aristotle distinguished between th� use of actual and
modal premisses in the syllogism� that is, th� assartoric on
on� hand and the apodictic and problematic on th� other. In
his discussion of modal propositions, Aristotle pr�sent�d
30
some difficult problems and some seeming inconsistencies.
The treatment of modal premisses does not seem to fit consis
tently into Aristotle's scheia� , according to iEradennick who
points up part of the difficulty in tiie following rmnner:
29 Aristotle. Topics. 108b7 ff. (McKeon. op. cit,.
pp. 205 f.)� Cf, Gomperz. 0�. cit. . pp. $0 ff. and Wallace.
op. clt. . pp. k2, k3*
30 Aristotle, Prior Analytics I, Chapters 11, ill,
and vlii-xxii. (Loeb Library. Orgianon. pp. 203 ff> and
237 ff.).
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A Judgement is ^odeictic if it rests on demonstrable
grounds, assertoric if the fact is apprehended but the
groimds are unknown, and problematic if the fact is re-
graded as capable of realization. But even so the di
viding line between the first two is hard to drawj and
the universal problematic judgement is more naturally
expressed as a particular assertoric.
Thus Tredennick implies that genuine distinctions do not
31
exist nfoen modals are introduced, Grote, in discussing
both Prior Aimlytlcs and On Interpretation� the modals are
really introduced in the latter-named treatise� , raises the
question, which he says has been raised before, whether the
modals actually lelong tothe realm of . logic. Logic, it is
maintained, as a science, is limited to a discussion of things
that are and exceeds its rights when it discueses things that
may be or must be. To try to solve this problem ia outside
the purpose of this paper, but it is significant that Aris
totle included the laodals in his own treatment. Hot only so,
they quite naturally come in for investigation. At first the
possible and the necessary are Joined, but in the Prior Analy
tics they become disjoined and equivalent. The Actiial and the
32
Potential become threefold with the addition of the lecessary.
Aristotle's whole endeavor was aimed at securing in
variably correct conclusions on th� basis of correct proposi
tions. Y�t he recognized that the fate of the conclusions
31 Tredennick. 0�, cit., pp. 192-193-
32 Cf. Grote ��, clt., pp. l82 ff. and 222 ff.
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is entirely dependent upon th� truth or falsehood of the
premisses and upon correct procedure in drawing the conclu
sions. These propositions are based upon the judgment (belief
or disbelief) �ntertainad in th� mind. With th� declaration
of an assertoric proposition, a statement of belief is made.
But wh�n the proposition is problematic ("may be" or "may not
b�") the statement indicates a state of mind which wavers
between belief and disbelief but never settl�s on one or th�
other. Furthemore, when th� proposition is apodictic, the
state of mind indicated is one of belief plua th� supposi
tion that the opposite of what is believed is contradictory.
However, to insure the infallibility of his system, Aristotl�
was forced to regard the mind's adequacy to grasp with cer
tainty the basic premisses, for such knowledge is prior to,
and the causing agent of, the knowledg� of the conclusion.
Thus to avoid regress they must b� known wi^ certainty and
33
ai|i|f-evidenc� ?
In the second section of Prior Analytics, Chapter
xxi, Aristotle pointed out th� possibility of error in
judgments but asserted that it arises from a failure to
~33rCf7~ibld � � PP* 2.8? ff. and G. R. G. Mure. Aris
totle . pp. 209-210. Aristotl� also introduced th� hypothe
tical syllogism and indicated plans to discuss it further.
H� never did or if he did his discussion is not extant.
Therefore, this type of syllogism is not worth attempting
a discussion. Cf. Grote. op. cit. . footnote "a**, p. 190
and Zeller. op., clt.. pp. 23I4. ff.
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relate knowledge of th� particular to knowledg� of th�
universal. Thus the error does not come at the point of
knowing but at th� point of relation between the two men
tioned areas of knowing. Similar to Plato's theory of re
collection in the Meno, he said:
For in no case do w� find that we have previous knowledge
of the individual, but we do find that in the process of
induction we acquire knowledge of particular things just
as though we could remember th&m.; for there are some
things which we know iBBsediately. ...
Thus whereas w� observe particular things by universal
knowledge, we do not know thas by the knowledge peculiar
to them. Hence it is possible to be mistaken about them,
not because we have contrary knowledge about them, but
because, although we have imiversal knowledge of them,
w� are mistaken in our particular knowledge.3i}'
Error may also arise in a mistaken conjunction of premisses.
However, real contrariety of thou^t must rest upon rals-
apprehension aiKi this to Aristotl� is Incredible,
The role of induction iias already been mentioned
briefly, but in Chapter xxiii of Prior Analytics II, Aristotl�
discussed it more specifically. It is in this chapter that
h� declared that all beliefs are formed either by syllogisms
36
or induction. As th� former moves from a major premiss, a
34 Aristotle. o�. cit,, 67a22-30 (Loeb Library. 0�,
clt,. p. 503).
35 Cf, Ibid., II, Chapter zxil (Loeb L|.brary. o�.
cit., p. 503).
36 It ia clear from bis discussion that Aristotle
regarded induction as a kind of ..syllogism so that when he
distinguished betxv��n syllogisms and induction h� was clearly
using the former term in a narrower sense, probably in th�
sense of a damonstrativ� syllogism. This us� of terminology
also holds for his discussion of example, reduction, objection
and probability inftiich in a
"
broader sons� are all syllogisms.
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premiss of the whole, to a minor premiss, a premiss of a part,
by the means of a middle term, the latter reverses the pro
cedure and moves from a minor to a smjor premiss, from th�
part to the Whole, Though Aristotle did not rule out induc
tion, he pointed out that tb� use of the middle term in such
a syllogism is not proper. Not only so, but Aristotl� regarded
th� IBajor premiss as always immediately not mediately known.
Therefore, induction is probably not a genuine syllogism, as
Grote and ot�L@rs suggest, but it serves the purpose of finding
the major proposition from Wnich syllogistic deductions can
be made. Thus induction-deduction is a necessary combination,
the latter being dependent vq^on the former. Grote phrases
It this way: .
Th� two processes are (as h� says) opposite in a certain
way; that is, they are ooEtplementary halvas of the same
whole; Induction being tiie establishment of those univer
sals which are essential for th� deductive march of the
Syllogism; while the two together mak� up i^ae entire pro
cess of scientific reasoning,37
With this in mind, it is only fair to say that Aristotle
probably did not give an adequate discussion in this chapter
of the role of induction in the forming of major premisses.
In th� remaining chapters of th� Prior Analytics.
Aristotle discussed exai^le�a part of induction�, reduction,
37 Grote, 02, cit,, p. 219* Cf, Aristotle. o�, cit. .
68b30 ff. (Loeb Library. o�. clt. , p. $1$) -
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objection, and probability* Only the last should receive
some coisaient. Probabilities are commonly accepted proposi
tions which are true in th� greater number of cases, Tiiis is
distinguished from th� term "signs" which -leans that an �vl-
d�nt fact is evidence for the existence of something not
so evident. The use of such propositions in syllogisms,
#iich are called enthymemea, makes it necessary for th�
oonclusions to b� regarded as not irrefutable.
It can therefore be said, in concluding the investiga
tion of the Prior Analytics, that the syllogism, which Aris
totl� largely invented, proceeds with certainty where the
premisses are certain but is also operative to a more or
less degree in areas where there is less certainty. Given
completely reliabl� premisses, Aristotle promised by tlie
38
me of his method to give cos^letely reliable conclusions,
IV. THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS
As has been seen, th� syllogism's validity ia con
tingent upon the validity of its premisses. The main move
ment in the Prior Analytics is the exposition and development
of the theory of syllogisms, but Aristotle was evidently
aware that his itool� system would collapse unless there were
38 Tl-iis stateuaent is open to question in the area of
modal propositions perhaps but can be taken as correct whsn
the premisses are assertoric.
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some adequate way of determining th� validity of the first
principles from which the syllogism works. This latter effort
appears in his Posterior Analytics and the Topics. The for
mer has to do with the selection of true first principles,
which result in a demonstrative use of syllogisms; the latter
has to do with the selection or rejection of principles ex
pressing opinion only, which result in a dialectical use of
syllogisias. Qrote gives an excellent five-fold list of
differences between Aristotle's demonstrative science and
th� dialectical reasoning wiileh Plato had so much fait^i in:
(l) Instead of a debat� between thesis and antithesis to find
the correct conclusion, demonstrative science Is a laying
down of premisses by one wtxo knows to one who does not know.
(2) Instead of having an unlimited variety of subjects, acienc�
is limited to a few subjects concerning ^Ich appropriate pre
misses can be made. (3) Instead of several authorities,
science has its own single authority, {i}.) Instead of con
flicting authorities and accidental premisses, science's
propositions are essential, imiversal, and true from the
beginning to the end. (5) The principles of demonstrative
science come only by Induction and thus originate in partl-
39
culars and culminate in universals. In both, however, the
syllogism is used, and therefor� th� conclusion is hypothe-
39 Grot�, oa. cit. , pp. 301-302.
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tically time if the preraisses are. The difference in con
clusions reached by science are universally, absolutely, and
ho
necessarily true.
Posterior Analytics begins with an assertion that
a person must begin the scientific procedure from the point
of pre-existing knowledge. Tliis knowledge is of two kinds i
"In some cases admission of the fact must be assumed, in
others comprehension of the meaning of the tesraa used, and
sometimes both assiimptions are necessary." But this know
ledge is somewhat different from Plato's theory of reminis
cence. An absolute and unqualified knowine'5 comes without
learning, but there is a knowing which is partial and in
complete. Learning, not rGminiscing, brings the latter type
of knowing to the status of the former type.
The question now arises. What Is absolute and un
qualified knowing? Aristotle answered in the following way:
We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific
knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the
accidental way in whk: h th� sophist knows, when we think
that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the
cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that
th� fact could not be other than it is. Now ttiat scien
tific knowing is something of this sort is evident�wit
ness both those who falsely claim it and those who actxially
possess it, since the former merely ixua^ine themselves
kO Ibid., pp. 302-303.
i|.l Aristotl�. Posterior Amlytlcs, 7lall-13. (McKeon.
op. cit. � p. 110).
i|2 Cf. Grot�* 0�. cit. . pp. 30i|. ff. and Aristotle, op.
clt.. pp. 110-111).
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to be, -while the latter are also actually. In the condi
tion described. Consequently the proper object of un
qualified scientiflCj knowledge Is something which cannot
be otiier than it is,'*-3
Zeller is therefore correct when he says, "The starting-point
of all demonstration is undemons treble --it is incapable of
being deduced from any other principle as from its cause,"
This undemons treble knowledge, as Grot� points out, must b�
joore than a mare understanding of the terms. It must be an
ability to affirm the truth of the proposition. Some of these
affirmed propositions are sucioms; som� are definitions; and
some are hypotheses. Specifically, these undemonatrabl�
premisses are necessary premisses. To be a necessary pre
miss, the subject must hav� a prsdicat� which can meet a
three-fold specification: (l) it must belong and belong at
all times to everything bearing the name of the subject
(de omni) ; (2) it must beloi^ to the subject essentially
(per so), not concomitantly or accidentally; and (3) it must
be attached to the subject "in the highest universality consis
tent with truth" or, in other words, it must be a First Univer-
sal, a primary, not a derived, predicate (quatenus Ipsum).
1|.3 Aristotle. o�, clt, . 71b8-l5. (McKeon. 0�. clt. .
p. 111).
ij4 Eduard Zeller. Arls to tie and the Earlier Perlpa-
petics. Volume I, p. 252. Cf, Aristotle, 0�. cit.. 72bl8 ff.
(McKeon. 0�. cijt., p. lli^.).
Grot�. 0�. cit., pp, 311-312. Quotation from p. 312.
Cf, Aristotle, op. cit. . I, Chapter iv and vi. (McKeon. o�.
clt.. pp. 115-117 and 119-121, respectively.
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So ii^ortant are these basic premisses that Aristotle
said with some urgency:
So since the primary premisses are the cause of our know
ledge� i.e. of our conviction�it follows that we know
them better--that is, are more convinced of them� than
their consequences, precisely because our knowledge of
the latter is the effect of our knowledge of the premisses.
How a man cannot believe in anything more than in the
thing he knows, unless he has either actual knowledge of
it or something better than actual knowledge. But we are
faced with this paradox if a student whose belief rests
on demonstration has not prior knowledge; a man must
believe in some, if not in all, of the basic truths more
than in the conclusion. Moreover, if a man sets out to
acquire the scientific knowledge that comes through
demonstration, he must not only have a better knowledge
of the basic truths and a firmer conviction of them than
of the connexion which is being demonstrated: more than
this, nothing must be more certain as contradicting the
fundamental premisses which lead to the opposed and
erroneous conclusion. For indeed the conviction of pure
science must be unahaken.H-o
Since these universal premisses are necessary, Aristotle
had to face the problem of how ignorance arises. He did so
by distinguishing between two forms of ignorance, negative and
positive ignorance. The latter is "error produced by inference"
and is actually error of conclusion becaus� of a faulty syl-
1+7
logism. The former is the actual negation of knowledge due
to a failure or defect in sensible perception. Here h� makes
clear his theory of induction which supplies the universal
I4.6 Aristotle. 0�. cit,, 72a25-72bl4., (McKeon. o�. cit,,
p. 113.
kJ Aristotle, 0�, cit. I, Chapters xvi-xvii (McKeon,
0�, cit., 132 ff.).
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premiases, for induction begins with sensation. Aristotl�
said:
It is clear that the loss of any on� of the senses
entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge,
and that, since we learn either by induction or by
demonstration, this knowledg� cannot b� acquired. Thus
demonstration develops from universals, induction from
particulars; but since it is possible to familiariz� th�
pupil witJi even the so-called mathematical abstractions
only through induction� i.e. only because each subject
genus possesses, in virtu� of a determinate mathematical
character, certain properties which can b� treated as
separata even though they do not exist in isolation� it
is consequently impossible to com� to grasp universals
except through Induction, But induction is in5)ossible
for those who have not sense-perception. For it is sense-
perception alone which is adequate for grasping the par
ticulars: they cannot be objects of scientific knowledge,
because neither can uniiversals give us knowledge of them
without induction, nor can we get it through induction
without s�nse-p�rc�ptlon*48
The term "induction" has been used to refer to the
process of establishing necessary universal propositions from
particulars known by sense-perception without the use of a
mediate process of Infcrencs. It should be noted, however,
that this is not th� scientific induction of Bacon. Science,
as demonstration, for Aristotle does not begin with perception;
indue tion^idoes. Science b�gln3 with th� necessary principles
from which syllogistic thinking precedes. It is this syl
logistic process, when it it demonstrative�which it must be
if th� starting-point is a universal, necessary premiss�
Which brings scientific knowledge. It is a process of group
ing particulars under universals. Tiiis is clearly seen in
L|.8 Aristotle, op. clt., I, Chapter xviii. (McKeon.
op. clt., pp. 135-1307^
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the way Aristotle carried on his own scientific investigation
k9
in the natural world. Concerning the point that science
does not begin with sense -percept ion, Aristotle said:
Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of
perception. Even if perception as a faculty Is of 'the
such* and not merely of a 'this somewhat*, yet one must at
any rate actually perceive a *this somewhat*, and at a
definite present place and time: but that which is commen-
surately universal and true in all cases one cannot per
ceive, since it is not 'this* and it is not 'now*; if it
were, it would not be commensurately universal� the term
we apply to What is always and everywhere. Seeing, there
fore, that, demonstrations are commensurately universal
and universals imperceptible , we clearly cannot obtain
scientific knowledge by th� act of perception; nay, it is
obvious that oven if it were possible to percciv� that a
triangl� has its angles equal to two right angles, we should
still b� looking for a demons tratl on�we should not (as
som� say) possess knowledge of it; for perception must be
of particular, afti�r�as scientific knowledge involves the
recognition of the commensurate universal.50
Aristotle began the second section of the Posterior
Analytics by indicating the four possible forms of inquiry:
(l) questions of fact {Ot t )j (2) questions of cause (XV/oT/);
(3) questions of �xlstenCe (fl and (1+) questions of
essence (1 � fi-*^^'). The meaning ia clarified by Aristotle's
own words:
The kinds of questions we ask are as many as the kinds
of things which w� know. They are in fact four:� (l) whe
ther the connexion of an attribute with a thing is a fact,
i^9 Cf. Aristotle. On the Parts of Animals . Book I.
(McKeon. og. cit. . pp. 6143 ff, ) , However, Aristotle occa
sionally calls the knowing of universal premisses pure science.
50 Aristotle. Posterior Analytics. 88b27-39. (McKeon.
op. clt. . p. 154) �
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(2) what is th� reason of th� connexion, (3) whether a
thing exists, what is the nature of the thing.51
It is clear that Aristotle referred here to the middle term.
Questions one and three ask whether there is a middle term.
of connection or not; questions two and four assume it is
present but ask what it is. Also the answers to questions
two and four are dependent upon the answers given to questions
one and three respectively, Aristotle also asserted that
the answers to questions two and four are identical. To ask
the reason for a thing and to ask the nature of it are the
same, H� illustrated this by sayings
For in all these examples it is clear that the nature of
the thing and the reason of the fact are ldentical|{ the
question 'What ia eclipse?* and its answer *The privation
of th� moon's light by th� interposition of th� �arth'
ar� identical with the question 'What is the reason of
the eclipse?' and the reply 'Because of the^j^failiare of
light through the earth's shutting it out ',5^
The point involved in ttie mentioning of the four types
of Inquiry is the raising of the next question which Aristotle
posed, namely. Are the answers to these inquiries found by
means of definition or by means of demonstration? Definition
has already been mentioned as a form or universal principle
which is undemons treble. Aristotle again maintained the
clear distinction between definition, the universal undemon-
strabl� principle, and th� demonstrable conclusion even to
t^l Ibid.. 89b22.26, (McKeon. o�. cit., p. l58).
52 Ibid., 90all|-l8, (McKeon. o^. cit., p. I60}.
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th� point of asserting that the conclusions of demonstration
can never be tiie conclusions of definition and vice*versa.
It is clear that th� conclusions of demonstration com�
b�caus� of immodiately known universal principles, here called
definitions, and the correct process of syllogistic inference,
but th� question now is. How is it possible for definition to
become known? In th� �arlier section of the Posterior Ana-
lytica, Aristotle laid out some necessary conditions for the
predicate of a universal proposition and also stated that
basically the knowing of a universal proposition ia the know
ing not of a fact but of the cause of a fact. With that in
mind, th� question as to how a universal proposition can be-
com� known r�duces to th� question. How can on� Imow the
cause or essence� they are identical problems in Aristotle's
thinking�of a thing? It must be noted, however, as a matter
of clarity before proceeding to a discussion of causes and
how they can be known, that Aristotle made way for the use
of th� term "definition" in three senses: (l) as an explan
ation of the meaning of a word� this is clearly merely a
nominal use of the term and has nothing to do with existence
and essence; (2) as enunciating the essence or cause of a
thing when the cause is actually extraneous or distinct from
the thing� this would logically demand a middle term and thus
raduccs to a damonstrativ� syllogism; and (3) as an immediate
and indemonstrabl� proposition wher� the cause is not extraneous.
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The third sense of the term is obviously the one under ques
tion* Aristotle aald:
How aaiile sonsG ttiings have a cause distinct from theat-
selves, others have not. Hence it is evident that there
are essential natures which are i;:; mediate � t?^uit la, are
basic premisses; and of these not only that they a re but
^Xbo whqit Jb�y are must be aaaumed or revealed in so ;ie
other way*^2
Aristotle delineated four varieties of causes: (l) the
formal cause {To Ti "'jr �iva.K} having to do with esaencei
(2) th� material cause (r� rf^cov' '<jy/T*^y^ <x^y/a.yKy ToSt^^OjO
having to do with nftiat Q-rot� oalla "the necessitating; condi-
tlona"; (3) the efficient cause C'�J"ri' 77p<oTo �^ e k-i^fl^ having
to do wltSi the proximate cause of change; and (4) the final
cause or �nd {To Ti^o!^ ei^CH<�^ having to do with tiie purpo-
sive cause. These causes operate in a time�>relation: th�
efficient cause ia prior to th� effect in a tliiie-aequenc� : the
final cause, though prior In the order of nature, is posterior
to th� effect in time; th� fora�l and material causes are si-
multaneoua with the effect. These four causes appear as
middle terras in the forming of deiaonstrativ� syllogisms , but
they ar� established by Inde ions trabl� definition in that in
syllogizing from th� cause to th� effect one already assumes
53 Ibid.. 93b21-2i4.. (Ibid,, p. 169)*
^ Grote, o�. clt. . p. 35I4. and Aristotle. o�. sJik*
Chapter 11. (McKeon. o�. clt, . pp, 170 ff.),
55 Aristotle, 0�. clt., 9l|.b21w26. (McKeon. op, cit,,
p, 172), See also Grote. og, pit,, p, 355,
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known effects. This is clearly an inductive process.
The process of induction begins with sense-perception
which compares and contrasts attributes. It is the process
of collating coinmon attributes of individuals which when as
sembled is called the essence of the individuals under sur
veillance and iftien announced is called definition. This ana
lysis results in synthesis,
Wallace defines Aristotle's use of induction in contrast
with his use of the syllogism}
Syllogism and Induction correspond to the two great
aspects of existence or ways in #iich things are known.
Things may be looked at either in themselves�as they
present themselves, so to speak, to the creative mind
er as they present themselves to us 5 thus in mathematics
it i^s the Doint �hich stands absolutely first {(pucr^ci�frpoT^^ov) the superficies or solid figure wfoicn is
first relatively to us fTTjOos Sy/./^ ^ -TT/WTi^oy') , Syl*
logism corresponds with the first of these aspects of
the objects of knowledge�it starts with the law or
cause, and reasons forward to the application or effect:
Induction begins with facts of personal experience and
reasons backward to the cause or principle. But know
ledge, properly so called, lies in explaining things by
reference to what is absolutely prior, and in seeing that
their causes lead necessarily to particular effects ,5o
Aristotle described t3ie process from sense-perception onward;
So out of sense-perception comes to be what w� call memory,
and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing
develops experience; for a number of memories constitute
a single experience. Prom experience again--i,e, from
the universal now stablized in its entirely within the
soul, the one beside the many m^ich is a single identity
56 Wallace, o^, clt. . p. ^6.
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within them all�originate th� skill of the craftsman
and the knowl�dg� of th� man of science, skill in th�
sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of
being, . , ,
lie t us now restate the account given already, though
with insufficient clearness, When one of a number of
logically indiscriminabl� particulars has made a stand,
th� earliest xiniversal is present in th� souli for
though the act of sense*perception is of th� particular,
its content is universal� is man, for example, not th�
man Galliaa, A fresh stand is mad� among th�s� rudi
mentary universals, and the process does not cease until
the indivisible concepts, the true universals, are es
tablished: e.g, such and such a species of animal is a
step towards th� genus animal, which by the same process
is a step towards a further generalization,^?
But, though the process of Induction is clear, th�
establishment of the basic truths, the universal propositions,
ia not. Induction, it is true, is the means to that end, but
it is not the end itself. By sense-perception th� analytical
side of induction Is accomplished, but by what means is a
synthesis reached which is the end product of induction, the
establishment of the universal premiss? Aristotle ruled out
the possibility of innate knowledge of universale and there
by broke ajain with Plato. His argument is: "How it is
Strang� if wo possess them from birth; for it means that w�
possoss apprehensions mor� accurate than demonstration and
58
fail to notice them." However, he sees the need for some
sort of pre-existent knowledge. His conclusion is that by
57 Aristotle. ��. cit., lOOai; ff,
p. 185).
58 Aristotl�. 02, cit., 99b26-28.
p. 181^.).
(McKcon. OP. cit. ,
(McKeon. 0�, cit.� ,
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Induction th� basic premisses are established but induction
begins with s�nse-perc�ption and �nds with intuition or mind
{/'OUS), His own words arc:
Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary
premisses by induction; for the metiiod by which even sense-
perception implants the universal is inductive. How of
the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are
unfailingly true, others adialt of error�opinion, for
instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing
and intuition are always true: further, no oth�r kind
of thought �xcept intuition is more accurate than scien
tific knowledge, whereas primary premisses are more
knowable than demons trationa, and all scientific know
ledge is discursive. Prom these considerations it
follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of th�
primary premlases, and since except intuition nothing
can be truer than scientific knowledg�, it will be
intuition that apprehends the primary premisses�a result
which also follows from the fact that demonstration can
not be the originative source of demonstration, nor,
consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.
If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking
except scientific knowing. Intuition will be the origin
ative source of scientific knowledge. And the origina
tive source of science grasps the original basic premiss,
whil� science as a iRhole is similarly related as orig
inative source to th� whole body of fact.59
V. THE TOPICS AID SQPu.lSTICAL REPUTATIONS
The basic structure of Aristotle's logic has been
discussed, i'hore remain for discussion two treatises, the
^
59 Ibid, , 100bii.-17. (Ibid., pp. l85-'l86). This use
of V(9os is exceedingly important for both Aristotle's theory
of knowledge and his metaphysics. It comes in for more
discussion later. On induction, cf. Gomperz. c it . ,
Chapters VI-VIII, pp. 56 ff. and Zeller, 0�. cit. , Volume I,
pp. 265 ff- ^ov a cone is� review of th� whole Aristotelian
theory of Inference, cf. Mure. o^. clt. , pp. 208 ff.
197
Topics and the Sophistical Hefutat lona . The last named
really fits as a ninth book following the Topics. Th�
Whole movement within these treatises is the application
of the syllogistic principles to th� area of opinion rather
than to the area of scientific demonstration. It will suf
fice to draw to attention a few things which ar� Involved in
the discussion without entering into the rather involved and
long treatment which Aristotle gave his subject.
It is cloar that the mod� of finding truths which
Plato seoms to hav� inherited from Socrates and theorized
for himself, namely, th� dialectical method, was mad� by
4rlstotl� into a secondary process. The scientific procedure
already discussed is primary for hlpi and is infallible pro
viding the conditions of induction and Inference are met.
However, he realized that such a method is llirdted to a small
number of select sciences #iich have their own salect primary
truths , and therefore, he finds it important to give place to
a method which can proceed from premisses which are based on
opinion or authority rather than on induction. The syllogism
drawn from such premisses would carry no more nor no less
validity than the premisses on which they are founded. He said:
How reasoning is an argument in which, certain things
being laid down, something other than these necessarily
comes about through them, (a) It is a 'demonstration',
when th� premiss� s from wSaich the reasoning starts are
true and primary, or suoh that our knowledge of them has
originally com� through premisses which ar�? primary and
true: (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical'.
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If it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted.
. . . Again (c), reasoning is 'contentious' if it starts
from opinions tiiat seem to be generally accepted, but
are not really such, or again if it merely seems to rea
son from opinions that are or seem to be generally ac
cepted. ...
Further (d), besides all the reasoning we have men
tioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from
th� premisses peculiar to the special sciences, as
happens (for example) in th� case of geopaetry and her
sister scl�nc�s.60
Th�r� are certain areas in which this type of dialectical
reasoning is operative:
There ar� thr��� int�llecti2al training, casual encounters,
and the philosophical sciences. That it is useful as a
training is obvious on the face of it. The possession
of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to argue
about the subject proposed. For purposes of casual en
counters, it is useful becaus� when we have counted up
the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on
the ground not of other people's convictions but on their
own, while we shift the groimd of any arg^oment that they
appear to us to state unsoundly. For th� study of th�
philoso|)hical sciences it Is useful, because the ability
to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a sub
ject will make us detect raore easily the truth and error
about the s�v�ral points that arise,6l
lhat has b��n said is sufficiently clear as to the area into
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which Aristotle was delving.
60 Aristotle. Topics. . 100a25 ff. (McKeon, 0�. cit,.
pp. 188-189).
61 Ibid,. 101a26-37. (Ibid., p. 189).
62 Cf , Aristotl�, Topics and On Sophistical Refuta
tions, (McKeon. o�, clt, . pp, 188 ff. and 208 ff . respec
tively). Also cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics. I, Chapter
xxxiil. (licKeon, op, cit.. pp. 3^56 ff . ) Cf, also Orote.
op. cit. . Chapter IX, pp, 378 ff, and Mure. og. clt. . pp.
215 ff.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In concluding this survey of Aristotle's lo^lc, it
8hou3.d be said that th� roots of this thought lie within the
Socratic-Pla tonic doctrine of Ideas. The t;iln-^ which truly
is, is the universal. Knowledge of this is the conception,
and it is regarded as being accurate knowledge of the
universal. To this extent, as Windelband says, Aristotle
63
always remained a Platonlst. H� differed at the point of
relation between the general and the particular. Th�
El�atic assumption had been that there was no such relation
ship; Plato working from that basis tried to modify It by
seeing the need for this relationship and attempting to find
It. It has been s��n that the closest he came to his goal
was a partial hierarchy of being. Aristotl� was far from
satisfied with t Is conclusion, Aristotle's own attempted
solution will become more evident in the discussion of the
Mstaphyslcs. It is enough to say now that Aristotle refused
to reduce the world to a unity, litiich seemed to be Plato's
final goal, but didlded actual existence into distinct and
separate classes with their respsctive sciences and respec
tive universal premisses. Even th� Metaphysics, which is a
science wh^ch takes as its limited data the universal prin
ciples of the other sciences, does not develop its subject-
matter out of a principle of being. Therefore, the primary
63 Wilhelm Windelband. A History of Fgllosophy.
p. 133.
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task of logic in Aristotle's mind was the recognizing of the
correct relation between th� universal and the particular.
Logic is thus built upon a fundamental basis of abstract
thought.
The role of Aristotle in th� history of logic is so
large that it is almost ii3f5)ossible to fully evaluate. iT^'arbeke
suggests that Plato contributed th� principl�s that correct
reasoning depends upon the degre� to which on� systematically
co-ordinates the facts of experienc�, but Aristotl� actually
investigatad the thought processes In order to find the con
ditions and laws of correct procedure:
For tnis p�rsist�nt, lm!n�ns�, and thoroughgoing labor,
he is justly called th� Father of Logic. He for the
first time specifically segregated the problem of reason
ableness (cogency of thought as such, and as controlled
by relation to the external world) from psychological
descriptions of how the mind acts, as well as from the
metaphysical problem of reason's, or the mind's, ultimate
t>k Zeller, op. cit. , pp, 271 ff.; and Windelband. op.
oit., p. 133� Windelband seems to disagree with the assertion
that Plato attempted to reduce th� world to a unity. Zeller,
however, agrees with th� conclusions of this study at this
point. It is th� assertion of this paper, on ^4iat Is felt
to be good and adequate grounds (Cf, Chapter V), that Plato,
while insisting upon the independent existence of the ideas
above the world of sense, especially In his �arlier dialogues,
yet in his later dialogues especially attempted to solve th�
problem of th� existence of th� particulars on th� basis of
Being within Becoming as well as above Becoming. The adeq^iacy
of this system is not defended, but that th� evident goal of
such an attempt is a unity of a hiararchal form is defined and
d�f�nded. Tasiing what seems to have been the earlier dialogues
alope would lead logically to the position that Windelband main
tains. A consideration of the latter dialogues also, makes it
less sur�. For th� particular logical divergences which Aris
totle- makes from Plato's thought, cf, Harold' Chemiss. Aris
totle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy. Volume I, pp. 1-82,
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nature. . . , Hia work also serves to put us on guard
against expecting from Logic more than lit can provide.
For Logic tests conclusions. It does not of itself
produce them, Aristotle, it is true, did not rro.u the
first make this aasumptionj but he came pa this convic
tion as th� result of long deliberation.'-^-'
xjot only is 'It difficult to estimate the place of
Aristotle in the history of logic, it is also difficult to
�stimate the place of logic in th� totality of Aristotle's
thought. It is obvious from his writings that analysis, for
the most part careful' and cautious, penetrates all he attempts.
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Jaeger says tiiat it determines every step h� takes. Therefore,
not only can one see in Aristotl� the first person to us�
real abstraction� "It was reserved for Aristotle's powers
of observation to grasp it wholly in itself, with its own
67
peculiar laws. "--but also the first person to use it so con
sistently tlirouf.h his. entire works.. It became his methodoj�
logo's the technique of his philosophical inquiries. In fact,
th� OrKanon is actually prolegomena to his other treatises
68
and their conclusions. But Oomperz does not hesitate to say
that the formal Aristotelian logic Is not only "a training-
ground for subtle thinking" but also "a means of promoting
65 John M. Warbeke. The Searching? Mind of Greece.
pp. 277-278,
66 JaeGer. o�. cit. . p, 370,
^7 Loc. cit.
68 Cf, Windelband, o�. cit. . p. 132; Friedrich Ueberweg,
History of Philosophy. Volume I, p. l5l; Albert Sehwegler.
history of Philosophy, p. 101; and Zeller. o^. cit,, p, lp>l.
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correct thinking
Aristotle's theory of knew ledge shines through his
logical treatises. These epis teiaolog leal explications and
li5)lica tlons are left for a review in a later section. How
ever, there is one place, at least, liiich should be pointed
out here, wher� Aristotle moves into or at least close to the
realm of faith, larbeke states it in this way:
Beginning thus with th� senses, and never leaving them
throiagh all the fonakl processes of his Logic, Aristotle
not only was abl� to plot the course of natural or cogent
reasoning, but also recognized that at the beginning and
at th� end of our endeavors we find ourselves in touch
with what defies analysis and cannot be argued about.
Here again h� was aware of th� limitations of Logic, 70
This is iuiportant for it is at th� . very foiindations of Aris
totl� 's analytical structures that it occurs. It is th�
pinnacle of induction Wher� intuition steps in and asserts a
basic truth, which in turn becomes th� basis for sylloGlstlc
inference. Not only so, it comes at th� foundation of sci
entific, not dialectical, thinking, Aristotl� asserted that
it is a knowledg� which is above demonstration and proof and
is more of th� form of intuition. Thus the mysterious ele
ment penetrated to the very foundation of th� thinking of the
master of analysis. H� was sur� that the content of the:
intuition is true and basic and even mor� important than the
69 OoiT^erz, 0�, clt, . p.
70 Warbeke. op., oit. . p. 292.
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ooncluaions of the ayllosism, but the source of the intul-
71
tion cannot be analysed.
71 For Wief reviews of Aristotle's logic, cf, Eduard
Zeller, Greek Philosophy, pp, i8l ff^j Fraiik Thilly. History
J2S Philosophy, pp. 79 ff.; Benjamin Cocker, Christianity and
Greek Philosophy.- pp. 39^4- ff.j Johanfi Eduard Erdmann. A His
tory ^f Hiilosophy. Volume I, pp, 136 ff,; Joseph A, Leigbton.
Ibe Field of Philpsqphy,, pp, 95 ff,. Windelband. op. clt.,
pp, 132 ff.J TJeberweg, 0�. cit,, pp. 151 ff,. etc.
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CHAPTER IX
ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS
Turning from the logical, treatises to the treatise
Metaphysics or First Philosophy, as Aristotl� called It,
one begins a study of th� science of first principles.
Zeller points out that as Aristotle limited th� sciences
to certain specific data which war� called primary truths,
*o Metaphysics is a science which is limited to the specific
1
data of all first principles themselves.
I. THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS lOTOLVED
Structural difficulties become apparent immediately
when one begins a study of th� Metaphysics. It does not
appear to b� a single finished work but is mor� of th�
nature of lecture*not�s. It lacks a continuity of thought
and has some sections which are possibly later additions
written by pupils of Aristotle ? There is not time to enter
into the critical problems. W. D. Ross in his two volume
work on the Metaphysics has discussed these problems quit�
thoroughly and his general conclusions are largely followed
1 Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and th� Earlier Peripa
tetics, Volua� I, p. 273.
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in this paper. Actually the MetanhYsics is made up of
several shorter treatises in book form. Book A is an
historical inquiry and since Aristotle often started his
works in this way, the validity of this book as a work of
Aristotle is not doubted. Book B introduces a list of about
fourteen problems which are discussed more fully in the
following books. With this as the main criterion, Ross feels
that the following books are validated as being Aristotelian:
A, B, r, E, Z, H,�, M, N, and I. These also give a fairly
continuous work. Four books are thus eliminated.
Attention is now focused upon these "Outlying Books,"
3
as Ross calls them. The books under scrutiny arecL/,A , K,
andA . The first seems to break the imity between A and Bj
there is also evidence that it consists of notes taken by
a pupil of Aristotle from one of the master's discourses.
The second seems to be Aristotelian but is evidently out of
place. The third is divided into two parts: the first part,
1059al8�1065a26, seems to be Aristotelian in thought ard for
t ie most part in langi^ge; the second part, 1065a26-1069ali4.,
is evidently made up of excerpts made either by Aristotle or
by a pupil from the Physics. The last book mentioned does
not seem to have any real connection with the rest of the
2 Cf. v.. D. Ross. Aristotle's Metaphysics. Volume I,
"The Structure of the Metaphysics", pp. xill-xxxlil.
3 Ibid., p. xxlv.
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Metaphysics; It must be considered to be an entirely inde-
k
pendent treatise probably by Aristotle,
nth this in mind, the plan of this section will in
clude: first, a discussion of the ten above-mentioned books
which seem to be cosntinuous in the Metaphysics { second, a
discussion of 21, the first part of K, andA with the above
considerations in mind, Jaeger mentions the possibility of
inserted fragments occasionally throughout the more certain
ly Aristotelian sections. These come most often at the ends
of the books 1*1ere there was supposedly room left on th� roll
or wher� a new length could easily be added. These will
be kept in mind also as th� various books are studied,
II. BOOKS A AKD B
Aristotle began in Book A with a chapter in which h�
delineated the advance from sensation to theoretical know
ledge. It is an advance from sensation, which he said is
correct knowledge of particulars; throxigh memory and exper
ience; and through art, which h� said is an advance over
�xp�ri�nce in that it knows causes of a thing as well as
that it is so; to theoretical knowledge, which he says is
Wisdom or knowledge of causes and principles, V�ladom is
ii. Ibid,, pp, xxlv ff,
5 Werner Jaeger, Studien zu Entstehungsgeschichte
der Metaphysik des Aristo teles. , pp. 161-162. Cited ibid. ,
pp. xxx-xxxi.
207
characterized by knowledge of thlrsgs as far as possible,
though not in detail, by knowledge of taings hard to know
because they are so far renioved from sensation, and by an
ability on the part of the wise man to expound the causes.
In short, it Is in Its fullest degree, something 1*1 ich God
alone can possess but which men can possess in part. There
fore, metaphysics is the study of causes Which determine
the nature of reality as a whole, or as Zeller states it:
"As Science in general has for its task the investigation of
til� grounds of things, so tJie highest Science must be that
which refers to the last and most universal of th� grounds
of things." Th� causes which determin� the nature of
reality as a #iole have been recognized by th� earliest
thinkers, according to Aristotle, but not with clarity.
They are matter, form, efficient cauSe, and final cause.
Rosa points out that matter is not, however, present through
out reality for Aristotle; the prime mover and subordinate
movers ar� pur� forms.
Most of th� rest of Book A contains a rather scepti
cal discussion of previous philosophical attempts from the
early thinkers through Flato. Ross suggests that Aristotle
felt here that he was looking fairly at the facts but that
6
7
8
Book A, Chapters 1 and
7 Zeller. o�. cit., p. 290.
8 Ross. o�. cit,, pp. Ixxvli-lxvlii.
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actually his thought was colored especially by Plato. These
earlier thinkers hav� been discussed previously in this paper
with some reference to Aristotle's tho i^ht, and it will not
be necessary to consult tMs material again.
Chapter Seven of Book A, along with Chapter Ten serves
as a summary of the relevant material of th� discussion of
history. Jaeger suggests that these two chap tars are alike
and that th� latter probably was an alternate chapter for the
10
former which was meant to be inserted at teiis poinb. However,
that they both ar� Aristotelian is not challenged at this
point. Therefore, both will b� discussed together.
Aristotle said that his predecessors were looking for
first principles and they thought they had found them in one
or more of th� causes ifaich have alraady b�en namad: th�
material cause, the efficient cause, and the final or pur
posive cause. The last three named causes are th� ones most
exploited by earlier thinkers, but even these ar� not complete.
The first-mentioned cause is not expressed distinctly but
only hinted at in th� doctrine of the Forma. Aristotle's
chief complaint against these philosophic attempts seems to
11
hav� seen that they neglected essential or formal cause.
9 Ross, op. cit, , p. Ixxvi.
10 Jaeger, 0�. clt. . pp, 24-21. Cited by ^^oss op.
cit. . p. XXX,
11 Aristotle. 0�. cit. . Book A, Chapters 7-10.
(McKeon. o�. cit., pp. 702ff.).
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This is especially clear in his criticism of the doctrine of
the Forms:
Above all one might discuss the question what on
earth the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to
those that are eternal or to those that come into being
and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor
any change in them. But again they help in no rslse
either towards the knowledge of the other things (for
they are not even the substance of these, else they
would have been in them), or towards their being, if
they are not in the particulars which share in them;
though if they were, they migjat be thought to be causes,
as �hite causes whiteness in a white object by entering
into its composition, 12
Book B discusses the whole series of problems i^ich
Aristotle planned to raise and to try to answer In the
remaining part of the treatise, A brief review of the prob
lems here is sufficient since they cotae up again in vpirlous
forms: (l) Is one science abl� to treat all basic principles
or causes? (2) Can such a science STirvey not only the
basic principles of substance but elso the com.mon beliefs
upon �feich all men base their proofs, including demonstra
tive proofs? (3) Can a single science be capable of dealing
with all substances? (ii) Does such a science deal not only
with substancas but also with attributes? (5) Are there
other than sensible substances; if so, how laoany kinds?
(6) Are the g�n�ra or the primary constituents of a thing
the first principles? (7) If the genera are th� first prin-
'
12 Ibid., 991a8-l5. (I-lcKeon, o�. cit,, pp. 707-708.
Cf, entire Book A. (McKeon. 0�. clt. . ppT389 ff.) and
Ross. o�. clt., pp. 114 ff.
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ciples, is it th� hi^est g�n�ra or th� lowest? (8) Is there
anything apart from the individual? (9) la each first prln-
cipl� one in kind or one in number? (10) Are th� principles
of perishabl� and imperishable things th� same or different?
(ll) Are being and unity substances or attributes? (12) Ar�
the objects of mathematics substances? (13) Do ideas exist
as well as perceptual objects and objects for mathemtics?
(l4) Do the first principles exist actually or potentially?
13
ilS) Are th� first principles \iniversals or individuals?
Ross says that for the most part these questions are
faithfully dealt with although some assume diffarent forms
than the way they ar� raisad in Book B. Therefore, the re
mainder of the Metaphysics, except for the four outlying
books, centers around the questions asked in Book B.
III. BOuK
In Book f", questions 1, 2, 3 (In part), and 4 (in part)
find their Aristotelian answers. H� asserted that there is
a science 'aftiich seeks to know Being (Ens ) in toto #iil� the
other sciences seek to know certain sections of Being. It
13 Ibid. Book B. (McKeon. o�. clt. . pp. 715-731
and Ross. 0�. cit� , pp. 221 ff . ) , "The numbering of the prob
lems does not co-ordinate con^letely with the numbering In
the book, '^e numbering her� has to do with the order of
the problems as tihey are raised in Chapters 2-6.
II4. Ross. �2. cit. . p, xxlv.
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is therefore of Being as Bein^ that one must grasp the first
causes. This would naturally eliminate any elements which
belong to Being by accident.
The question now is. In what way can a thing be said
to be? There are several ways in which a thing may bo said
to be, but these all have their starting-point at one point,
namely Substance (ooir-/ , After giving an lllustrat'on
of this in the realm of health, Aristotle said!
So, too tfoere are many senses in isflilch a thing is said
to be, but all refer to one starting-point; soh� things
are said to be because they are substances, others because
they ar� affections of substance, others because ttiey are
a process towards substance, or destruction or privations
or qualities of substance, or productive or generations
of substance, or of things whieh ar� relative to substance,
or nsgatlons of one of these things or of substance It-
s�lf. It Is for this reason that we say even of non-being
that it Is^ non-being. As, then, there is one science
Which deals with all healthy thir.;j;s, the same applies
in the other cases also. For not only in the case of
things which have one common notion does tb� investigation
belong to on� scl^ce, but also in the cas� of things
which are related to one common nature; for even these in
a sense have one comaon notion. It Is clear then that
it is the work of one sci�nc� also to study the things
that are, qua being,�But everywhere science deals chiefly
with that which is primary, and on which the other thii^3;s
depend, and In virtue of which they get their names. If,
then, this is substance, it will be of substances that 1$
the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes,
'^^her� ar� s�v�ral things \ftiich stand out in this
quotation. Firstly, the principle of Being is Substance.
Secondly, a thing is said to b� by the r�lation it sustains
to Substance. Thirdly, since there is this common relation-
15 Aristotl�. OP, clt.. Book r, 1003b6-l8, (McK�on.
S2.� c it, , p. 732) �
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ship to Substance Mi ich is found in all things that are, on�
science can deal with all the principles of Being. Fourthly,
yet the priiaary function of the science of total being is to
investigate Subs tone� from which all things derive and upon
flfrilch all things depend.
Being and Unity are the same thoii^. tbe words ar� not
completely the same in meaning. All varieties of each are
alike and is^licated together. Therefor�, both Belny and
Unity with tiieir varieties belong to First Philosophy and
th� principles of �ach are the data of that science. Thus
the problem of the On� and the Many are Inevitably involved
in the problem of Being.
Since the axioms of the raa thematic ian are, in their
highest generality, affirmations of Being as Being, these
can only b� talten for granted by th� mathematician but also
become tJie subjects of investigation by th� first philosopher.
This holds true for any natural philosopher as distinguished
from a fxrst philosopher. This is Aristotle's answer to
question two.
Another principle which comes in for investigation is
the Principle of "Contradiction. Grot� states this principle
in this way: "It is impossible for the same predicate at the
same tine and in th� same sanse to belong and not to belong
16
to the same subject." This principle Aristotle felt is
16 George G^rote. Aristotl�. Volume II, p. 30i4,.
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the most firmly established one of all, H� defends it in
Book 7", Chapter Foin� and following, but it is not neces
sary ior his arguments to be discussed here.
On� or th� important things is seen when he pointed
out that Protagoras* doctrine that what appears tru� is truth
comes from the sara� source as th� doctrine tiiat both sides
of a contradiction are true. This conclusion, Aristotle said,
coTies from observing tin� sensible world and at the same time
holding intelligence and sense-perception to be identical
and sens� -perception to be true, Therefoi*�, th� contradic
tions of sense-experience must be true. Others, like th� iera-
clitaans, saeing change, afflrm�d that nothing can be truly
known, Aristotle asserted that botii emphases^ tliat contra
dictories ar� both true, or that contradictories are both
false, are incorrect. Logically, on� contradictory .lust be
true and on� must be false when they have to do with the sub
stance of a thing, �'�'he views pr�sent�d destroy themselves by
their own inconsistency.
For he who says that everything is true makes even th�
statement contrary to his own true, and therefore his
own true (for the contrary statement denies that is
true), while he who says everything is false makes him-
s�lf also false, 17
17 Aristotle. o�, cit. . 1012bli4.-17. (McKeon. o�. cit,,
p. 751).
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There are ontological as well as logical difficulties
with these contradictions* Those who affirm everything to
be at rest and those who affirm all things to be in motion
are both wrong. If everything were at i^st, the same pro
positions would be both true and false. If everything were
in motionj^ all propositions would be false, Aristotle ex
plained thiss
Evidently, again, those who say all things are at rest
are not right, nor ar� those who say all things are in
movement. For if all things are at rest, the same state*
ments will always be true and the same always false�
but this obviously changes; for he who makes a statement,
himself at one time was not and again will not be. And
if all things are in motion, nothing will be true; �very-
thing therefor� will be false. But it has been shown
that this is impossible. Again, it must be that which is
that changes; for change is from something to something.
But again it is not th� case that all things ar� at
rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing for �ver; for
there is something ife. ich always moves the things that
are in motion, and th� first mover is Itself unmoved, l8
IV, BOOK E
Book B elucidates th� answer to question one and also
comments on question three. It has already been shown that
on� science can treat all th� basic principles becaus� they
19
all have their source in substance* It has also been shown
16 Ibid,. 1012b23-33. (McKeon. ^g. cit,, p. 751)-
Cf, Aristotle, op. clt, . &>ok in entirety (McKesbn. op.
cit,, pp. 731-75l)� Orote, Og� cit. . Appendix III, p. 301-
5l^ and Ross, c^,, pp, 250 i"f.
19 Aristotle, 0�. cit, . Chapters 1 and 2, (McKeon,
op, clt., pp. 731 ff.TT
2lS
20
that one science can deal with the totality of substance.
However, the problems raised in these t;wo questions were
further dealt with by Aristotle when he distinguished the
first philosophy from other sciences and showed the ad�
equate basis for being, xhese considerations find discussion
in the short Book E,
Aristotle began by noting that, whereas, every other
science deals with the properties which belong per se to
that particular portion of being which they are investi^s^tlng,
the science of being or first philosophy investigates the
entity of being. Ontology is called upon to do what other
sciences cannot do, namely investigate tiie essence of each
science's separate genus and/det'emine whether that genus
has any real existence. It has already been pointed out in
Analytics that no separate science is eitiier theoretical,
or practical, or constructive. I'here are caily two theo
retical separate sciences, physics and mathematics, and the
first science, ontology {called here theology), Th� rest
are practical or constructive. Physical science deals with
subjects which have within themselves the principle of change
or motion; this science Invest igatas for the most part the
Substance or Form thereof, but not Form to the exclusion of
Mattar. Mathematics, on the other hand, studies objects im
movable and separate Tro or separable from, matter, neither
20 Ibid., 1004.a2-9. (McKeon. o�. clt., p. 733).
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one of these theoretical sciences can investigate this, Aris
totle said:
There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies,
mathematics, physics, and tsftiat we may call theology,
since it is obvious that If the divine is present any-
itoere , it is present in things of this sort. And the
highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus,
while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired
than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than
the other theoretical sciences. For one might raise the
question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals
with one genus, i,e, some one kind of being; for not even
th� mathematical sciences ar� all alike in tals respect�
g�omet]?y and astronomy deal with a certain particular
kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike
to all. We answar that if there is no substance other
tlian litilch are formed by nature, natural science will be
the first science; but if th�r� is an immovable substance,
the science of this raust be prior and must be first
philosophy, and universal in this way, becaus� it is first.
And it will belong to this to consider being qua being�
both what it is and the attributes which belong to it
qua being. 21
It should b� noted that, though first philosophy is more
universal than th� rest, it does not comprehend th� rest.
Before proceeding to Chapter Two of Book E, it should
b� noted that Jaeger feels that Chapters Two to Four of tils
book ar� later additions which were ins�rt�d to bridge the
gap from th� introductory portions of the Metaphysics to its
mor� substantial portions. Ross suggests that this Xb not
improbable but cannot be proved. At least nothing is said
against the Aristotelian authorship of this section and,
22
therefore, the discussion includes this section,
21 Aristotle. 02. cit, . Book E, 1026al8-32. (McKeon.
op. clt., p, 779) �
22 Jaeger, 0�, cit.. pp, 49*53. Cited by Ross, o^, cit.
p, XXX, cf . p. 350 of Ross; Jaeger. Arls to tie, p. 209.
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Th� discussion begins with a dsscriptlon of the four
meanings of the term "being": (1) Being can mean accidental
no philosophical speculation concerning the first because
"that TB&iich is neither always nor for the most part, we call
accidental," There can, therefore, be no constant and un
varying cause of the accidental; these ar� amenable to the
principle of Ghance. (There must b� such principles els�
all things would be caused by locessity.) The second is also
unamenable to scientific investigation because truth and
falsehood lie not in the things themselves but in the act
or intellection, Aristotle said:
But since the combination and the separation are in
thou^t and not in the things, and that which is in this
sense is a different sort of *belng* from the things
that are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or
removes either th� subject's 'what' or its having a
certain quality or quantity or something else), ciiat
which is accidentally and that which is in the sense of
beinr: true must be dismissed. For the cause of the for
mer is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some
affection of the thought, and both are related to the
remaining genus of being, and do not indicate tlie ex
istence of any separate class of being. Therefore let
23 Aristotle, o^. cit,, 1026b31-32, (McKeon, op. clt, .
p. 7OO).
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these be dismissed, and let us consider the. causes and
the principles of being Itself, qua being***!.
V. BOOK Z
Book Z carries on the discussion of being in the two
remaining meanings of the term. The ten categories are called
Being because they are all related to an Essence. In an
abstract form these categories do not exist but only as they
ar� associated with a definite Essence or Individual Sub-
stance. Therefor�, the remaining nin� categories are appen
dages to the first category. Substance. In �very sense, this
is first:
Now there are several senses in which a thing is said
to be first; yet substance is first in ev^ry sense� (l)
in definition, (2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time.
For (3) of the otiier categories none can exist ind�p�n-
dently, but only substance. And (1) in definition also
this substance must be present. And (2) we think we know
each thing most fully, when w� know what it is, e.g. what
man is or what fire is, rather than when w� know its
quality, its quantity, or its place; since we know each
of these predicates also, only iftien we know what the
quantity or the quality is>^�
At least four things can be said to b� substmc�, th�
essence tfo Tl k �lv^a.^), the universal (To A"*** t>o Aou) ,
'
2k Ibid. . 1027b29*1028al|.* (McKeon. op. cit., pp. 782-
783) and Grot�. 0�. cit.. Appendix III, pp. 319^3.
2$ Of. tiie earlier discussions on th� treatise. The
Cate>^orie3.
26 Aristotle, op. cit.. Book Z, 1028231-1028b2.
(McKeon. o^t SA^* � p. 783)� Cf. Hoss. 0�. clt.. pp. xci-
xclil.
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the serxus {To yc'i/os) , and the substratum (TO utToIfc y�evo .
As Ross points out, Aristotle listed here the four claimants
to the title of substance in the sens� of �&� substantial
element in Individual things, not in th� sens� of individual
27
substance.
Aristotle discussed th� last first and in doing so
pointed out that the substratum Is that which can never be
predicated of anything else but is always the subject of
all predicates. (The use of l^e term "substratum" means in
28
Aristotle's own words, "that ifrilch underlies a thin-.")
In one sense, matter is the nature of substratum; in another
sense, form or shape ; and in still another sense, the com
pound of the two, Aristotle illustrated bis use of these
terms in this way, "By the matter I mean, for instance, the
bronze, by the shape th� pattern of its form, aiKi by th�
29
compound of these the statue, th� concrete whole," The
problem becomes one of finding the prior element from which
all els� can be stripped away. Matter seems best to fit
this picture, but matter is characterless and therefor� is
not capable of separate existence nor individuality, Ross
points out tiiat Aristotl� could hav� substantiated his posi-
27 Ross. OP, clt, . p, xclii,
28 Aristotle, op. cit. , 1029al, (McKeon, o^. clt. .
p. 785).
29 Ibid., 1029a3-5. (McKeon. 0�, cit., p. 785).
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tion here by the use of a more natural argument against matter,
naiaely that in trying to find the reality of which attributes
are predicated, matter leaves us with that of which nothing
30
can be predicated. The combination of form and matter can be
easily dismissed as substance in th� truest sens� sine� it is
obviously a posteriori to either of the two elements In the
3l
coii^ound,
Aristotl� had not discussed form as th� possible sub-
straturi, but he turned his attention to the first of th� four
meanings of substance, essence. In doing so, he did not set
form aside but regarded it as an essence rather than a
substrati^i. He first eliminated the elements of accident 1
since they are not always and unvariably attributable to a
bein,3. He also eliminated any elements which participate
in a thing but are not essential to its being as being. He
warned that the essence of a thing cannot be defined by the
use of the nrnie of the thing. The problem as to whether a
combination of a substance with another category can have an
essence arises, Th� answer is. Ho, in that essence is a term
used to describe substance alone. These conditions being met,
th� question arises. What can meet these conditions and t2ier�-
fore have an essence? Aristotl� answered that only the
species, th� individuals, have an essence which can be given
30 i^oss, OP, clt, . Volume II, p, l6$, (27).
31 Cf. ibid,. Volume I, pp, xciii-xciv.
221
a pure definition� that is> a definition wMch is raore than
32
a name or a description but is a "formula of its meaning;,"
This is becaus� only species or Individuals have elements
that are free from accident and participation in other tlvirgs.
However, there is, in a secondary sense, an essence of a
quantity or any other category, but In the primary sens�
true essence refers only to substance and such essence can
33
b� found only in the species*
Since it is the individuals which have an essence.
Is each particular t.ilng and its essence ttie same or ia such
an equation possible? The answer Aristotle gave is that all
things, whether ideas or noti if they are self-subslatent,
must be the same as their �ssenoes. This is clearly seen in
that to know a thing is the same as to know its essence. Al
so the definition of thing equals the definition 6f its es-
sencej its unity and its essence are one. If this were not
true, the result would be infinite regress in that if th�
essence of on� is different from the one, th� essence of the
essence of on� is differont from th� essence of one, ad in
finitum.
Clearly, then, �ach primary and self-subsistent thing
is one and the same as its essence. The sophistical
32 Aristotle. 0�. clt., 1030all4.-l5. (McKeon. op. cit*.
p, 787)* Cf, also Boss, o�. cit*. Volume II, pp. 166-I68.
33 Ibid. 1031al ff. (McKeon. 0�. ext., p. 789). Cf.
Ross. o�. cit., pp. 172*173 .
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objeotiona to this position, and the question whether
Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thin^j, are
obviously answered by the same solutioaj for there is
no difference either in the standpoint from which the
question woxad be asked, or in that from which one cquld
answer it successfully. We hjav� explained then, in what
sense �ach thing is the same as its essence and in what
sense it Is not�3i4-
Inserted at this point are three chapters which dis
cuss becoming instead of being, '^e latter is taken up again
in Chapter Ten, The purpose of this Insertion is not obvious
on the surface but is probably more evident later on in this
section.
Things com� to be things in one of tlire� ways: (l) by
nature J (2) by art; or (3) spontaneously. All things be
come things by ttie agency of things and from things. In
natural genesus, all tilings come from matter by the agency
of things already having natural existence, and become natur
al. All other genesis is called making, and it proceeds from
art, faculty, or thought. Spontaneous becoming is recognized
but investigation of it is set aside temporarily. Genesis
other than natural genesis, which, is now called "artistic
genesis,' presupposes the form of the product in the soul of
the artist. It begins with thinking and proceeds to making.
But though th� product begins with thinking, yti. ^^h� making
Involves the use of pre-existent elements. These elements
3k !rbid., 1032a5�ll# {:;cKeon. cit,. p. 791)*
Cf. Ross. o�� 2l^*' PP* 175-176,
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are matter, 'fhua in artistic production the source is matter,
the agent is the form in the soul, and the product is matter
formed.
It is clear in th� above discussion that neither matter
nor form com� to b� but only th� c<^bination of the two. Both
natter and form are the substratum which was already intro
duced In this discussion. If they were made, then they vi?ould
have to be made out of something else a^ infinitum. Therefore,
neither matter nor form are made, What is made Is the con
crete thing by the putting of form into matter.
It is obvious, then, from what has been said, that that
which is spoken of as form or substance is not produced,
but the concrete thing which gets its nam� from this is
produced, and that In everything which is generated
matter is present, and one part of the tiling is matter
and the other form.
Does this mean the necessary existence of forms In
the Platonic sense as apart from the individual things?
Aristotle answered in the negative! If that were th� case,
no individual thing {'this') would have come into being.
The form means a "such" and a "such" cannot make a "this,"
The causer of the product is th� agent not the fovm. That
being the cas� no ideal house, for instance, can fit into
th� process of making a particular house. Therefore, tli�
forms, in the Platonic sens�, have no self-subslstent sub
stance. Even in the case where th� form pre-exists actually
Ibid.', 1033bl6-l8. (McKeon. o�, clt,, p. 79k) �
22k
Instead of merely conceptually�-that Is, In natural genera*
tion. It does not exist apart from particular instances,
Ross says, "Form is eternal only by virtue of the never-
36
failing succession of its embodimenta," Chapter STine applies
this principle to spontaneous production and also points out
that as the fom of substance is not produced, so the form of
37
other categories are not produced.
The problem of being as essence is continued in Chapters
Ten through Twelve, The problem in these chapters centers
around the relution of the whole to its parts and vice -versa,
Th� first question is, Must th� definition of the v&iole con
tain the definition of the parts? The answer is, Some must
and some .mst not. The criterion is whether the parts are
parts of the form or of the matter. If the parts are parts
of the matter, no definition of essence, or a priori, hav�
anything to do witii these parts: the whole, being the form,
is alone definitive as to �ssence, (The illustration is a
circle which has its form in its #ioleness.) If, however,
the parts of a thing are parts of th� form, as in the cas� of
iterda which ar� mad� up of letters and are dependent on those
letters for their essence as words, a definition of �ssence
must consider those; the taftiole form is depended upon the for�
36 Ross, ��* cit, . Volume I, p, cxxiil,
37 Ibid. � Volume II, pp. 100 ff.
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of the parts. However, the concrete Individual, whether sen
sible like a bronze circle, or intelligible like a mathemati
cal circle, is mad� up of combination of formal and material
parts. Since true definition has to do with formal elements
only, the concrete individual� this particular circle for
instance� is not definable and ia therefore not knowable,
except by intuition or perception* This is due to the fact
that matter alone is unknowable while form is knowable because
definable; the combination in any particular thing makes it
only partly knowable, or knowable in an und�mQnstratlve form�.
As to whether the parts ar� prior or not to tii� whole,
Aristotl� regards timt which is substantial (essential) to
b� prior. Material sections ar� always posterior; formal
sections may be either prior or posterior to the whole, but
38
in either case tluiy ar� prior to th� material sections*
But all of this is dependent upon th� deteudnation
as to which parts are of ths form and which are of the con
crete individual, Sfeen the form is recognizably the same
form wh@n supervened upon different materials the materials
are evidently no part of the form. However, there are s<xm
forms which are so associated with specific matter that they
cannot be easily conceived apart from matter and therefore
remain at least partially undefinable, J^an himself is such
a thing, Th� form of man is always foimd in flesh and bone,
35 Ibid,, pp, 1914--196,
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and the form never la found in any other matter. Therefore,
It is a mistake to try to define to the extent of abstracting
form from matter when some things have this essential form
in this particular matter. However, Aristotle seems to have
vacillated at this point for he proceeded to show that the
soul of man is the prisary substance while body is matter,
A man my be identified with either his soul or the concrete
unity of soul in body.
In summry of Aristotl� *o discussion of Being as
Essence, the following parai^rase by Hoss of th� hijhll ;hts
of Aristotle's own summary is helpful,
'.V� hav� stated generally (l) what essence is and in
what sense it ia self-subs latent, (2) why the definition
of som� thirds contains tlie parts of the things while
that of others does not, (3) i^mt the material parts
ar� not present in the definition (for they are not parts
of the substance as defined but of the concrete substance,
wuioh in its union witJi matter cannot be defined but can
only be defined according to its priiaary substance, the
Indwelling form, e.g, hollowness as opposed to snutoess);
but in the concrete substance (e.g, the snub nose) there
is matter; ih) th&t primary substances (1,�, those which
do not imply t^ae presence of somel^lng else which is its
substratvra), e,g, crookedness, are the same as their
essence, wiiile concrete thing� involving matter, and
unities of substance vlth an accident, eg. Socrates
musical, are not th� same as their easences,39
Therefore, the ossonco of a tiling is the form and the form
Is defined by that #iioh is the essential form of the last
difforentla in the series of division under a genua. The
-^9 Ibid,, p* 202, Cf, Aristotle, gsL* Sit�� 1037a21
ff, (MciCeon, 302).
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genus is not the form.
It is clear from this discussion that Aristotle felt
that substance is essence primarily, but the question now
is. Is not the universal (or the genus, wiich is a form ox'
universal) substance? To this question, Aristotle answered
an emphatic. No. The substance of a thing is that which is
peculiar to it; the universal is common to many things.
Also, a universal is predicated of a subject, but a substance
can never be predicated of a subject. (This is opposed to
his own discussion in the Categories where substance is listed
as a predicate or category. However, it is clear that this
latter concept of substance is mor� truly Aristotelian. ^^ub-�
stance is not uSiat the subject possesses but som� thing which
it most truly is at the d�ep�st levels.) N� predicate can
indicate a "this" but only a "such." A composite substance
must be iriad� up of substances not qualities or else non�
substance will be prior to substance and this cannot occur
in definition or in practice. However, a substance caniiot
consist of other substances which actually exist, for what
is actually two is not actually one. This raises a problem
iftiich Aristotle indicated he would discuss later, namely if
2iO Ibid. , pp. 205-206. Cf. Aristotle. o�. clt. .
1037b7 ff, ?�cKeon* o^* clt. . pp, 803�30l|.), Taeger regards
Book Z, Chapter 12, as beln^ a fragmentary addition between
1-11 and 13-17 and a doublet of Book H, Chapter 6, Cf , Jaeger,
Studien au . nbs fcelaunrs^yeschlchte der Metaphysik des Arlstote-
les., pp, 5>3-02, Cited by hoss, 2�, clt,. pp, xxx�xxxi.
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substances cannot actually be compounded, how can they be
kl
defined?
Having already critized th� Platonic approach to be
ing, Aristotle became even more succinct in his denunciation
in Chapter Fourteen of Book 'Z. The ideas, h� declared, ar�
not substance. There is no need to discuss this chapter since
it is larg�ly an illustration of th� principles Aristotl�
talked of in the previous discussion of universals md substance.
Most so-called substances ar� really potentialities,
according to Aristotle, They are not true unities but act
ually aggregates which ar� f�lt to b� fused into one, but
since "being" and "unity" are one in that the substance of
one thing is one and the substance of several things is still
one. But even being and unity ar� not tru� substances (although
Aristotle said that they are more substantial than "principle,"
"el^ent," or "cause" are) for they are coiwaon while substance
is IMividual�one thing cmnot exist in many places at once,
#iile what is common can. i'herefore, no universal exists
apart from particulars. If the forms ar� substances, th�
believers in the fovms are right in sasying that they exist
apart from the particulars, but they are wrong in asserting
lil Ibid., pp. 208-209. Cf, Aristotle. o�. cit..
1038bl ff. [HcKeon, oj2. c it, . pp. i0ii.-806). He never seems
to ansirer this problem.
k2 Ibid.. 1039a23 ff, (KcKeon, 0�, oit., pp. 806-
807).
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that the one in the many is a form. They cannot say what
the eternal substances are without making them the same as
the perishable particulars plus the addition of th� term
"itself," that is, for instance, "horse itself," "man himself."
Xet there must be eternal substances which do not perish with
perishable particulars, but these ar� clearly not ths univer
sals. i^o universal is a substance, and no substance is com-
pomnded of substances.
In concluding Book Z, Aristotle indicated that the
tru� ^iew of substance is that it is primarily form and form
is essence, although it is an element of the substratura also,
for this statement answers the question why a thing is w/iat
it is .
Aristotle passed from th� consideration of static
reality in the form of substanc� to a consideration of
change. It is in this connection that the expressions
"potentiality" and "actuality" become used more often. In
sensible substances, �fliich constantly change, tb� substratum
is basic. Thus there is a sens� in which the substratum is
substance. Matter is included in substratum and matter is
regarded to be that which is potentially a "this," Form
is ah actual "this;" when the two, matter and form, are
Ibid.. pp� 221-222, Cf. ibid.. Volume I, pp.
cxi ff. Cf. Aristotle. o�. cit. , 10ij.la6 ff. (McKeon.
op, oit. , pp. 810-611). For an excellent discussion of
Dcolc Z, cf. Grote. op. cit., ikppendix III, pp, 323 ff.
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combined� that is, the potential and the actual�-the result
is that which is subject to generation and destruction.
There are many differentia of fonas ifliich can be united with
matter. Therefore, there is a difference between the con
crete substance and the abstract substance, th� essence, Th�
former is capable of being generated and destroyed but th�
form is �ternal.
Thus Aristotle clearly showed that essence as abstract
and �ternal substance or form is comblnable with the substra
tum of matter to produce a concrete substanc� which can b�
g�n�rated and destroysd, Th� problem is, however. How can
this concrete substance be defined? or How can cone ret�
substanc� be regarded as on�, as substanc� must be? Some
tiy to solve this unity by "participation" as Plato attempted;
som� try to explain it to be "intercours�," "composition," or
"connoction," Howover, the difficulty is that tliose who pro
pose these formula� look for a difference between potential
ity and concrete reality and try to find a unifying formula.
This is a mistake for there is no unity between potential
ity and concrete reality, because that which Is potential
is not real and that which is real is no more potential.
Therefore, there is no uniting of the two; What Is involved
is an efficient cause which makes potential things real.
Aristotle's own words may clarify this:
Owing to th� difficulty about unity some speak of
'participation, ' and raise the question, what is the
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cause of participation and what is it to participate;
and others speak of 'communion', as Lycophron says
knowledg� is communion of knowing with the soul; and
others say life is a 'composition' or 'connexion' of
soul with body. Yet the same account applies to all
cases; for being healthy, too, will on this shewing b�
�ith�r a 'communion' or a 'connaxion* or a 'composition'
of soiil and health, and the fact that the bronz� is a
triangle will b� a 'composition' of bronze and triangle,
and the fact that a thing is 'wftiite will be a 'composition'
of surface and whiteness, The reason is that people
look for a unifying formula, and a diff�r�nce, between
potency and coniplet� reality. But, as has been said,
th� proximate matter and the form are one and the same
thing, the one potentially, and the other actually.
Therefore it is like asking what in general is the cause
of unity and of a thing's being one; for each thing is
a unit^, and the potential and th� actual are somehow
one, -therefore there is no other cause her� imless
there is something irtiich caused the movement froa potency
into actuality. And all tiiin js which have no natter
igj thout qualification essentially unities,kn
it is also clear that Aristotle was here using th� term
"actual" not only to apply to forms themselves but to the
concrete reality which is a combination of both form and
matter.
VI. BOOK 0
Aristotle carried on th� discussion of potentiality
and actuality in Book O. PotancyjtTuW/u-is , may mean �ith�r
powor or potentiality. In the first sense, potency njeans
the originative source of change. "Kiis means that thing
which causes another thing to change. In a derived sense.
T3l _ _
pp, 8l9-o20). Cf. the entire Book H, (.icKeon, 0�, cit, .
pp, 811 ff.). Cf. Grot�. OP, cit,. pp, 3k9 ff- and Ross.
OP, cit,. Volume li, pp. 226 ff.
Aristotl�. 0�. cit. . 10i45b8-2l|. (McKoon. 0�. cit. .
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potency also means that which has the capability of being
changed. In th� former sense, there Is a potent agent; in
the latter sense, there is a potent patient. But there Is a
difference between an agent and a patient. Therafor� as far
as a thing is an organic unity it cannot be acted upon by
itself; a thing in its organic unity cannot be both agent and
patient, ^ome potencies are rational and some ar� irrational.
Th� former may result in contrary conJeq^i.^.i^ar, ; the latter
hav� on� r�sult only. This means that potencies which are
rationally originated can b� either for good or for evil.
Hie implication is, however, that the irrational power of
being abl� to do the thing in the first place underlies
kS
rational potencies.
There ar� some, notably the Megaric school, who say
that potency exists only when there is actuality. That would
be the same as saying, indicating Aristotle, that a man iftio
is not seeing and hearing at a given time is Incapable of
seeing and hearing, and that which is not happening is in
capable of happening. This would make change impossible.
To avoid these consequences, one must distinguish carefully
between potency and actuality. These views make potency and
actuality the same. Aristotle said:
1|5 Cf, Uoss. op. clt. , ^olume I, pp. cxxiv-cxxv.
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And a thing ia capable of doing something if there will
be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that
of which it is said to have the capacity, I mean, for
instance, if a thing is capable of sitting and it is
open to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible in
its actually sitting; and similarly if it is capable
of being moved or moving, or of standing or making to
stand, or of being or^coming to be, or of not being
or not coming to be,'+"
Thus actuality is associated with movement and is connected
with couplet� reality as well as with form. Therefor� non
existent things cannot move. Potential things are non-exis
tent (although not all non-existent things are potential)
and cannot move and are not real. It is only as these
potential things move and become actual that they are in the
realm of conQ)lete reality, ^ot only so, but the impossible
and th� false are not the sam�. To regard a non-existent
thing, which is capable of existence�that is, is poten
tially existent�, to exist is a falsehood; but nothing is
then said against the possibility that it may some time
kl
exist.
Potency is acquired and actualized when the agent
and the patient meet in the way ifriich is appropriate to
their potency. This holds only for irrational potencies;
rational potencies do not necessarily so result. Sine� the
l^jb Aristotle. ^E* 1047a2i<.-29. (McKeon, 0�. cit
p, 823).
kl Cf, Ross, o�. clt., p. cxxvi-cxxvii.
results of rational potencies are contraries, only one or
the other result* Therefore, there is involved inta ration
ally potent resultant th� presence of the ag�nt and the
patient as in irrationally potent resiiltants, but there is
the addition of choic� or will wMeh determines the direc
tion in which the resultant w ill be expressed*
For the rest of Book Q, �xcept for Chapter Ten, Aris
totle discussed actuality more completely* Actuality is to
potency as waking is to sleeping* It is rslated to potency
through movement; it is related to matter through substance*
(Th� inf Inlt� exists pot�ntlally only for knowladge for it
cannot ever hav� a separate existence*) How�v�r, all mov�-
ment is not actuality, for actuality in th� strict sens� is
moveiaent con5)let�d* In fact, actuality and movem�nt differ
in that the farmer has its end in itself� it is completed
moireinent not in the sense of cessation of ioovement but mov�-
ment which is an end in itself and does not move toward an
�nd. It therefore seems to be a correct conclusion to say
that Aristotle was indicating that potentiality becomes
actuality through movement (change). But actuality is not
devoid of movement Itself* This distinction is very im
portant as Ross indicates? "This distinction has important
applications both in theology (in the doctrine of the di
vine 'activity of immobility') and in ethics (in the doctrine
Cf, irioss. OP. cit*, pp. cxxwii-cxvlli.
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that neither happiness nor pleasure Is a process, but an
k9
activity or its accoHipaniment. )"
When does a thing exist potentially? When the source
of actualization is external, a liilng is potentially another
thing providing the agent desires, as an artist in an artis
tic production, and when no tiling in the patient hinders.
When the source of actualization is internal, a thing is
potentially another thing providing notiaing external hinders
and the nature of the thing is such as to cause it to change.
Thus when things are said to be of something else, as a
casket of wood, that which they are "of" are potentially
them. If there is something which is not of something else,
this is prim� matter� tlx� substratum matter which is not a
"this.'* This holds true for accidental attributes also in
that the substance underlies the accidental attributes.
Which is prior, actuality or potency? Aristotle
answered this question by showing the three-fold priority of
actuality. Actuality is prior to potency in definition, in
time, and In substance. It is prior in definition, for to
say a thing is capable of becoming a certain thing presup
poses a knowledge of what it is capable of becoming. Ac
tuality is prior in time becaus� an actual member of a
species must precede any potential member� that is, a po-
LlQ Ibid., p. cxxviii.
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tential individual is actualized by another individual of the
same type, such as man by man, etc. Actuality is also prior
to potency in substanc� in that that which is posterior In
genesis possesses the fca�m of that which is prior. Also the
end toward which the process of actualization moves is the
actuals for instance, animals hav� si^t in order to see,
instsad of seeing in order to have sight. Moreover, matter
exists potentially because it can come to fom; when it
exists actually it is in its form. Therefore actuality is
form or substance and exists prior to potency in th� sense
tfcat eternal thlqgs are prior to perishabl� things. Ho
�t�rnal things can exist potentially, but everything that
is capable of being is also capable of not*being, and thus
exists potentially. The forjser, eternal things ifdiich are
actual can exist without th� latter, but the latter cannot
exist without th� former. Therefor� tiie fomer is prior to
the latter*
The last chapter of Book 0 deals with tiie nature of
truth* This chapter has been questioned as to its authorship
and place in the metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle. Ross
indicates that some men, notably Sehwegler and Christ, treat
go Ibid*, pp. 258-259. Chapter line of Book ^ is
omitted for in it Aristotle added miscellaneous remarks re
garding actuality and potency which ar� not at th� cor� of his
thought. Cf, ibid. . pp. 266-267 for a discussion of this
chapter.
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the entire chapter as the work of an editorj other men like
Bonitz and Bulllnger regard it not only as Aristotelian but
as fitting into his metaphysical discussion in its rightful
place, Jaeger regards it as Aristotelian but tiiat it was in
serted her� out of context, becaus� there was some room at
tlie end of a roll. It is difficult to decide, but, as Ross
says, there is no reason for doubting that tli� chapter is
a work of Aristotle, Also, in Book K 1027b28, Aristotle
signified tliat he would discuss truth and falsity later.
With these considerations in mind, it seems legitimate to
regard this chapter as the work of Aristotle and to consider
it in this place, even ttiough it mi^t not tie in too well
with the context of Aristotle's discussion. (It does not
seem to be entirely out of place for it presupposes some
51
of the previous discussions.)
The terras "being" and "not-being" have been used with
reference to the categories, and with reference to potency
and actuality, now being and not-being with reference to
truth and falsity is discussed. This is actually a problem
in epistemology and the nature of thought. Truth is thinking
that to be united or divided wlilch is united �r divided,
respectively; error is a state contrary to the facts. But
^en is truth present? A person Is nOt white becaus� he is
thought to be white; he is white and ther�fore is thought
� ^1 Ibid.. Volume II, p. 27)+.
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to b� whit�, Clearly truth has to do with the co-ordination
of th� object and its attributes with the content of the con
cept of the object and its attributes, ^en two tnings are
united in thought as subject and attribute, th� resulting
composite is either true or false depending upon the way in
which they have been ccaabinsd. But If on� thinks of two
things united, must he not first thirik of thett separately?
(This seems to b� th� m�aning of what Aristot!!!� said, ac-
52
cording to Ross,) Aristotl� answered. No, for things
which are not composite cannot b� ifalse, Vihen one consi
ders subjects and attributes in combination, he thinks in
terms of truth and error, and his judgment is one of affirm
ation and negation; but when on� considsrs a subject by it
self or an attribute by itself, no such judgment can be made.
In the strict sense of th� term no judgment can b� mad� at
allj what is made is an assartion which results from contact.
The former cones within the area of opinion; the latter in
th� area of knowledge. Thus in th� latter ignorance oan
only mean aon�contact, and error is not possible except by
accident.
About th� things, then, nhich are essences and actualities,
It is not possible to be in error, but only to know them
or not to know them. But we do inquire what they ar�, viz,
#iether they are so such and such a nature or not, � � ,
-K2 lbid,> p. 275.
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And truth means knowing these objects, and falsity
does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance�and
not an ignorance which is like blindness j for blind*
ness is akin to a total absence of the faculty of
thinking.53
Books I, M, and H utoich go to make up the supposed
main stream of the metaphysics are regarded by Brandis,
according to G-rote, and most others as being somewhat
outside the discussion of the core of Aristotle's metaphy
sical doctrines. This would n^an that th� main metaphysical
discussion comes to an end with Book 6, iftiich has Just been
considered. Since this Is the recognized case, the dis-
cussion of Aristotle's Metaphysical is at an end. However,
there is an area which has not been accounted for entirely
yet, namely the outlyii^ books lilhieh do not seem to fit
into the main stream of Aristotle's Metaphysics . Book oJ
is questioned as to its Aristotelian authorship and there
fore no- attention Is given to its content. Book A is a
philosophical lexicon containing philosophical terms, which
Avi.B'cotl& used, With their definitions. This is not di�-
(Mciieon. o�, clt.. For th� entire Book O, cf .
McK�on.. o�. cit. , pp. 82O-O3I4- and also Koss. 0�. clt. ,
pp. 239 ff� and Grote. o�. cit.. pp. 358 ff,
51*. Grote. 22.. clt, . p. 301, Also Kqss in his intro
ductory discussion of the me taphysical doctrine of Aristotl�
stops with Book 6 .
VII. BOOK A
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cussed sinee the tei^ used in this paper seem to be suf
ficiently clesir from their contextual usages. Book K is
divided into two parts j the second part seoms to contain
extracts frora the Physics and the first part seems to contain
material that has been discussed before but in a shcrter form#
This leaves only Book A whieh Orote includes in his metaphysi-
cal discussion but which Ross regards as a theological work.
Since it comes within the bounds of th� Metaphysics and perhaps
clarifies sane of the �arlier discussions in the Metaphysics
as well as extending them, som� attention should he given to
56
it.
The discussion in Book A begins with a consideration
of substance in relation to the entire universe. If the
universe is a whole, then substanc� is its first part; if it
is a series, then substam� is prior to the other categories.
There ar� three kinds of substance: th� perishabl� sensible,
th� eternal sensible, and th� unchangeable. The first two
are the subject of physics; the last, of metaphysics, Chang�
is from on� contrary to another, or, in other words from some
thing which is to something which is not. But to have suoh
55 orote, o�, cit, . p, 301 and pp, 369 ff� and Boss,
t� clt,.
Volume I, pp, xxvii ff, and pp, cxxx ff. For a
sous s ion of the outlying books mentioned in this paragri^,
cf. Ross, op. c it. , pp, xxlv ff, and �arlier in this chapter,
56 For a discussion of the dating problem for Book A ,
cf, Jaeger, Aristotle, pp, 219 ff. and Rppl^, 0�, clt,.
Volume II, pp73P^7.
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a change, there must be a aubstratuM, matter, which remains
even through change. There are four kinds of changes (1) In
respect to the "what" or the "this" there is change by siir^)!�
generation and destriKstion, (2) In respect to quality there
is change by alteration, (3) In respect to quantity there is
change by growth and diminution, (I4.) In respect to place there
is change by locomotion. Change is from the potential to th�
actual and is governed by three principles: form, privation,
and matter. Neither matter nor form, in the final product,
is generated, for in all change something is changed by some-
thir^ into soras thing-�that Is, matter is changed by proxiiaat�
mover into form,
Bvery substance comes from anotirier of th� same kind
of substanc� whether th� change is by art, by nature, by
luck, or by spontaneity. In the first case, the causative
agent is in soa^thing else; in the second ttie causative
agent is within the thing itself; in the third, there is an
absence of art; and in the fourth, there Is an absence of
natural processes. At any rate, no ideas ar� n�eded, for the
individual produces th� individual of the same class and
each specific art is the cause of the specific result.
The causes of different things are different in that
the details of the existence of different things are dif
ferent, yet by analogy all sensible things have the same
basic olementss form, privation, and matter. These are the
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internal causes of change in all things that change, yet
there are external causes also, The immediate or moving
cause is an individual like the thing that is being caused.
This is the efficient cause; however, in art, the efficient
cause is also the formal cause in that the form is the im
mediate external cause of an artistic product. Beside these
causes t^here is th� first mover which makes change possible.
Sine� all things csn be reduced to substances which exist
apart, the causes of all things are the same; movement can
not exist without substances. Hot only so, all things have
the same principles of potentiality and actuality. The form
(if it is separable), th� concrete result, and tiie privation
exist actually; th� matter exists potentially, ^oma causes
can be stated universally; some cannot. But even if they
could, the universal does not exist, except in the mind of
man�man is the cause of man; there is no universal man.
Thus there are as many different causes as there are indivi
dual contraries, but th� causes are the same or analogous in
different categories, i.e., matter, form, privation, and mover.
Since, however, even substances ar� generated and des
troyed, all things are perishable; but movement itself and
time which is the same as motion or ah attribute of it, can
not be perishabla* Therefore, there must be eternal substance
which cannot be generated or destroyed. Such eternal sub
stanc� must be th� istourc� of change�unlike Plato's doctrine
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�or �la� there is no reascm for positing it. But such sub
stances must be actual, not potential, or else motion will
not be eternal, Th� seeming priority of the potential is
not correct, for the priority of actuality is necessary for
th� actualizing of the potentialities. Matter cannot set
Itself in motion; this is where th� early Greek think^s and
Plato failed, according to Aristotle, But there is a uniform
ity and a variety in motion, change� or cause. There are
certain motions for certain things and yet there is a cosmos
of motion. Therefore, there must be something whoso activity
varies and yet is uniform, in short, a prime mover.
What is th� nature and mode of operation of th� first
mover? It is clear that there must b� som� thing which is in
incessant motion. But behind all motion thei^ must be an
�ternal, unmoved mover which is eternal substance and ac
tuality. Since all things that move are potentials in that
they are capablo of being other than they are, they hav� a
contingency, a liability to spatial motion, though not to
change in substance, Th� unmoved mover has no contingency
and exists by necessity. On such a principle th� physical
univsrs� depends. But since life is the actixality of thou^t,
the unmoved mover must have life sine� he is pure actuality,
Aristotl� himself said in concluding this chapter:
It is clear then from what has been said that there
is a substanc� which is eternal and immovable and sep
arate from sensible things. It has been shown also that
this substance cannot have ar^ magnitude but is without
parts and indivisible (for it produces movement throu^
Infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power;
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and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite,
it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude,
and it cannot have infinite magnitude becaus� there is
no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been
shown that it is in^jassive and unalterable} for all th�
other changes ar� posterior to change of place.57
Th� next question which Aristotl� discussed was the
number of �ternal moving principles. Since every eternal
motion requires an eternal cause, each eternal motion must
have an unmoved mover. These unmoved movers must be sub*
stances since that which is moved is substance, i-iover is
prior to moved and only substance can be prior to substance.
These �ternal motions which require eternal unmoved movers
are the motions of the planets; therefore, there are as many
immovad movers as tiiere ar� planats. Astronomy must glw� the
exact number. However, there Is on� physical universe, for
if there were more than one universe, there would have to be
a cause of each. But all things which are many in number
have matter and are many because they have matter. They would
all hav� the same form since it is common to Individuals.
But prime essence has not matter for it is pure actuality;
therefor�, th� Prime Mover and the universe is one in num
ber and definition.
This Prime Mover is also Prime Intellect, and thus
the question of the mode of existence of this Intellect is
the next problem. I^ it thinks nothing, it is worthless;
if it thinks but its thinking depends upon something else,
"
57 Aristotle. 0�. cit. . 1073a2-12. (McKeon. 02.. cit. .
p. 881).
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it cannot b� of th� best substance� its substance would b�
potency. If it is a potency the continuity of its thought
will be laborious and better than th� thing itself; its
object will also be nobler than lt� Llere thinking is not th�
best since its potency might be actualized in the worst
possible object. Thus Intellect must think the best thing
in the universe and that is itself. But how can this be?
All apprehension whether knowledge, perception, or opinion
has something other than itself as its object. Also, Is it
thinking or being thought� the act or the object� that which
gives reason its goodness? Aristotl� answered by saying that
when the object is immaterial it is identical with the sub
ject, Th� obj�ct in this case is not composite either, for
everything immaterial is indivisible. The divine self-thought
throughout eternity possesses iiftiat human thought or thou^t
of composite beings possess over a period of time�that is,
th� highest good for Supreme Intellect is known moment by
moment throughout eternity and is not dependent upon a lapse
of time for its fruition since Supreme Intellect is Pure
58
Actuality, Good exists iiananently in the world because it
exists transcendently in th� Supreme Intellect, Ood, who
produces good by ordering all ttiinijs for the common �nd,
~
58 Ross, o�. Pit,. Voliime II, p. 399.
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Zeller says that this is the first atteagjt at a scientific
59
basis for Theism.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In reviewing the metaphysical doctrines of Aristotle,
Friedrich Ueberweg' s penetrating power of analysis sums up
the Aristotelian doctrine admirably:
In the "First Philosophy," or, as it was subsequently
termed, the Metaphysics of Arletotle, the principles
common to all spheres of reality are considered. The
number of these principles, as ;iven by Aristotle, is
fo\ar, vis.: Form or Essence, Matter or Substratum,
Moving or Efficient Cause, and Snd. Th� principle of
Form or Essence is th� Aristotelian substitute for the
Platonic Idea. Aristotle argues against th� Platonic
(or, at least, xiliat he held as the Platonic) view, that
the Ideas exist for themselves apart from th� concrete
objects which ar� copied from them, affirming, however,
on his own part, tiiat the logical, subjective concept
has a real, objective correlate, in th� essence Imj^ianent
in the objects of the concept. As the one apart from and
beside the many the Idea does not exist: none the less
must a unity be assumed as (obj�oj;;iv�ly) present In the
many. The word substance {.htJO"/ ^) in its pidmary
^nd proper signification belongs to the concrete and in
dividual: only in a secondary sens� can it b� applied to
the Genus. But although th� universal has no independent
existence apart from th� individual, it is yet first in
worth and rank, most significant, most knowable by nature
and the proper subject of knowledge. This, however, is
true, not of every common notion, but only of sui^ notions
as represent th� Essential in the Indivddualc objects.
Those universal notions combine in one whole all the
essential attributes of their objects, both the generic
59 Zeller. ��. ci^t., p. 399* Cf. Aristotle. 0�, cit..
Book /I. (McKeon. 0�. cit. . pp. 872 ff , ) and Ross. o�. clt. .
pp. 3^1.6 ff. Cf, also Ross. o�. cit. . Volum� I, pp. cxxx ff.
and Orote, 0�. clt., pp. 369 ff, The last part of the last
chfl^ter of Book A has not been discussed since it is a
defence more than a constructive statement.
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and the specific attributes; they represent th� essential
Form, to denote ifriich Aristotle, employs the expreasions
^2>0 s f A^oof-^f, ^iT^l ToV >*yo%/ *<rtf'/�/andTi> Ti Vi^^ i VInform, inteiligibl� or notional essence.�Tr,^ . Th� matter
in which form inheres is not absolutely non-existent;
it exists as possibility or capacity {ou^a^/5,
potentia) . Fom^n the^ contrary,^ is th� accomplishment,
the realization (CvT^AelY^^t co/��^�.py�iol, actus) of
this possibility, Rela'c^vely, however, matter may be
styled non-existent, in so far as It denoted the as yet
uneffectuated existence of th� finished shape or thing
(in which form and matter ar� imited). The opposite of
ent�l�c^ or actuality is deprivation, want, non-possess
ion (^"''cp''y^;?>) , Ho matter exists altogether deprived
of form; th� idea of mere matter is a pure abstraction.
But ther� do�s exist an immaterial form-principle, and
this principle is the form liiicb has "separable" or in
dependent existence \f^uj^%^T o y/)^ iri distinction from
the Inseparable forms which inhere in matter. Form, in
the organic creation, is at one� form, end, and moving
cause. Matter is the passive, determinable factor, and
is th� ultimate source of iEp�rfection in things. But
it is also the principle of individuation in things,
form being not (as Plato asserts) the ground of unity,
but^oisd^rof homogeneous plurality. Motion or change
(Ki V"i7cr�j s ) is the passage of potentiality into reality.
All motion inqalies an actual moving cause* f^ow, in the
sphere of existence we find included that which is per
petually moved and that which both moves and is moved;
there exists, therefore, a tertium quid, which is always
Imparting motion but is itself unmoved. This tertium Is
God, iijiraaterial and eternal Form, the pure Actuality in
which is no potentiality, the self-thiikfeing Reason or
absolute Spirit, who, as absolutely perfect, is loved by
all, and into^ie image of whose perfection all things
seek to come,60
Th� central point of this metaphysical system, and the
Ts^xiole philosophy of Aristotle, is what t^indelband calls, "this
new conception of the cosmic processes as the realization of
the essence In the phenomenon." This differs from the previous
philosophies, especially Platonism, which find eternal causes
60 Friedrich Ueberweg, A History of Philosophy. Volume I,
pp, I57*l58,
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iftiich differ from the phenomena themselves. For instance,
Democritus regarded atoms and their motion as causing pheno
mena and Plato regarded the ideas as doing so; in each case
61
the cause is something other than the phenomenon itself.
There is no point in a discussion of the criticisms
of these metaphysical views since the motive of this study
is largely descriptive and inductive. There is no point in
discussing the relation of Aristotle's thou^t to th� thought
of his teacher, Flato, Some hold Aristotle to be a modified
Platonlst because of his maintenance of th� forms; som� con
sider him to have had a radical break with the philosophy of
Plato because of his denial of taie doctrine of th� external
62
forms or ideas.
However, it is important to consider the relation the
Metaphysics has to Aris totle ' s concept of th� nature of know
ledge, %e specific contributions of the Metaphysics to the
theory of knowledge ar� discussed later on in this section,
but there is good ground for including a discussion of th�
metaphysical doctrines of Aristotl� in any study of his theory
of knowledge, ICnowledge and thinking had not assumed a
61 W. Windelband, A History of Philosophy, p, 1I4.O and
pp, 139 ff.
62 Cf , Theodor Goi^rz. Greek Thinkers . Volume IV, jjp,
88 ff,; Johann Ediiard Erdman, Hiatory of i^llosophy, yplufieil.
p, 153; Arthur Kenyon Rogers. A Student's History of Fn llosophy.
p. 109; and Harold Chernlss. Arls totle
' s Criticism of Plato and
and the Academy. Volume I, jja toto.
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separate position in Greek thought; only as the object of
knowledge is carefully delineated can the content of know
ledge be ascertained. This is probably a characteristic
63
of any rationalistic realistic theory of knowledge. So
true is this, that the highest form of reality and the
highest form of icnowing in Aristotle's thought are identi-
fled. Pure Thought and Pure Reality are the same thing.
63 v; inde1band* 02., clt, , p, 133*
6I4. Cf . W. T. Stace. A Critical History of Philosophy.
p, 288. For a discussion of Aristotle's Metaphysics, cf,
Frank ^hllly. History of Philosophy, pp. Q2 ff.; Albert
Sehwegler, Handbook gjl^e History of Philosophy, pp. 101 ff,;
William Turner. History of Philosophy, pp, 13Ii. ff , t Ueber
weg- 0�� cit, . pp. 157 ff�; John M. Warbeke, j;he Searching
Mind of Greece, pp, 293 ff�; etc.
CilAPTER X
ARISTOTLE'S PSYGHOLOOY
This chapter is set aside for a discussion of the
nature of knowledg� in Aristotle's thought as it appears in
On the Soul, On Memory and Reminiscence* and g>n. Dreams,
Special attention is given to On the Spul nflaer� Aristotle's
psychological studies center,
Aristotle spent some time in the treatise On the
Soul explaining what th� soul Is not. Brief loention of these
points lead up to his own theory of the soul, Firstly, tii�
soul is not movement nor Involved in raov�ta�nt. It has al
ready been pointed out, he said, tliat that which originates
movement need not be moved. If the soul partakes in irove-
ment, it must hav� a place and it must be mover which is
moved. Secondly, th� soul is not harmony, for to be so it
must be a composite thing. Moreover the power of originating
mov�m�nt�on� of the recognized pomrers of soul�cannot belong
to harmony. Thirdly, ikie soul can be moved only incidentally�
that is, as the vehicle in which it dwells moves, but tnere
is no non-local movemant. Being pained Or being pleased,
perceiving, thinking, �tc. ar� thought to be modes of movement
and the soul experiences these; however, th� movement rapant
is not in the soul, but starts in, or terminates in, the soul.
Fourthly, the soul cannot be a self-aoving number for what
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sort of movejnent can b� asserted of a unit� that is, to
that which has no parts or differences internally, for if
th� unit both originates movement and is capable of being
moved essentially it must contain difference. Fifthly, the
soul cannot be composed of elements. The persons #10 hold
th� doctrines that the soul is composed of elements assume
that like is known by lik� and thus must identify th� soul
with the things it apprehends. But even if the soul knows
or perceives tii� elements within conposites, by what means
would it know or perceive the composite whole? Ilierefore,
no adequate knowledg� is gained by placing elements within
the soul. Sixthly, th� soul is not present in all things.
He argued this way:
The opinion that the elements have in them seem to have
arisen from the doctrine tliat a whole raust be homog�n�ous
with its parts. If it is tru� that animals become ani
mate by drawing into th�mselv�s a portion of what sur
rounds them, th� partisans of this view are boimd to say
that the soul of th� Whole too is homogeneous with all
its parts. If the air sucked in is hcHiogeneous, but
soul heterogen�ous, clearly #ill� some part of soul will
exist in the inbreathed air, some other part will not.
Th� soul raust either be homogeneous, or such that there
are some parts of the whole in which it is not to be
found.1
Seventaily, the soul is not divisible. It is not correct to
say that on� part thinks, another desir�s, etc., for if its
nature b� divided what is that which holds it together? It
cannot be th� body for when tti� soul leaves th� body the
1 Aristotle. On the Spul. l4.11al6-22. (ivicKeon. _02. cit
p. 553).
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body dlsintogratjias.
Following this negative dlsousslon, Aristotle defined
the soul and discussed its faculties. To define the spul,
Aristotle returned to his theory of matter as potentiality
and form as actuality with the fusion of the two being con
crete reality. Natural bodies are substances; some have life
but seme do not. The soul is the form of a natural body
having life potentially in it, Soul is th� source of, and
is characterized by, the powers of self-nutrition, sensation,
thinking and moving. Thus it is clear, as Aristotl� point�d
out, that the earlier thinkers tried to define soul sep
arately, but for Aristotl� this cannot b�; mattar and form
ar� interrelated. Qrote says:
The real animated subject may be looked at either
from the point of view of the relattim or from that
of th� correlat�; but, thougb the two are thus logically
separable, in fact and reality they are inseparable im
plicated; and, if either of them be withdrawn, the an
imated subject disappears. . . .
The real animated subject is thus a form immersed or
ii^licated in inatter; and all its actions and passions
are so likewise. Each of these has its formal side, as
concerns th� soul, and its material side, as concerns
th� body. When a man or animal is angry, for �xarapl�,
this emotion is both a fact of the soul and a fact of
the body: in th� first of these two characters, it may
be defined as an appetite for hurting sane on� who has
hurt us; In the second of th� two, it may be d�fin�d as
an ebullition of the blOod and heat round the heart.2
Not only so, the soul is the ousla of the body in which all
2 George Grot�. Arls totle. Volume II, pp. l80-l39.
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bodily conditions receive meaning,
Th� faculties of the human soul are the nutritive,
the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power
of thinking. Plants and animals have only sortB of these
functions but not all of them, Grrote points out that the
psychological classification of fimctions proceeds In the
invers� direction from the psychological classification in
Plato's Timaeus, Plato began with the soul of the cosmos
and moved from there down to men, animals, and plants,
Aristotle, on th� oth�r hand, began with th� largest, most
numerous, and lowest groiq? of individuals. In other words,
til� nutritive function is the indispensable basis of all
things. It is common to all souls. Each successive stage
builds upon, and includes in itself, those things iiftilch
h
went before.
Nutrition, with its accompaniment, appetite, involves
three factors: (1) what is fedj (2) that with which it is
fed; and (3) that ^Ich. does the feeding. The first is the
body which has the soul in it; th� second is the food; and
the third is the first soul or the earliest type of soul,
Wext, Aristotle discussed the characteristics of the
sense function which is a function that presupposes the
3 Cf. Edwin Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of
Aris totle, , p, 35�
k Grote. 0�, cit,, pp, 192 ff.
2$k
nutritive function. The soul involved here is the animal
soul, which also includes the locomotive function, whereas
the soul wMch has only a nutritive function is a plant
soul. Sensation depends upon a movement without; it is a
ehax^e of cpiallty. The male parent transmits the sentient
soul and at birth the living subject has instantaneous
actuality of cognition of the sentient type. It is not
learned. However, reflection upon the cpn:nitum cornea later
and has to do with universals within individuals not the
apprehension of individuals themselves. The objects of
sense are of two direct t>pes: (l) that �friich is perceptible
by a single sense, and (2) that which is perceptible by any
and all of the senses.
After a discussion of th� various senses and their
operation, Aristotle formulated certain conclusions concern
ing the senses. Firstly, a "sense" has the power of receiving
the sensible forms of things without their matter. Like a
peice of wax takes on the form of a signet-ring without taking
on of the iron or gold of the ring, so th� senses apprehend
the essential form of things that are sentient, 'Thus there
is within the soul that which is potential and passive; this
inner stuff becomes actualized by the impress of the form of
the object in the process of sensatlonf "the percipiens is
not like the percipiblle originally, but becomes like it by
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being thus actualized." An organ of sense is that in which
such potential actuality resides. The senses are many and
varied in the lower animals but in men there are only five:
sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Each of these
has its particular type of object.
But not only does an individual see, hear, smell, taste,
and touch, he also distinguishes between ^at he sees and what
he hears, for instance. Hot only does he perceive things but
he perceives that they are different from other things. This
latter function cannot be performed by any of the senses alone
because both qualities v/aich are discriminated must be appre
hended by something which is one and single. This is also
substantiated hy the fact that this discrimination takes
place at a single� point of time; one sensation is not known
and then another and finally the discrimination made. It fs
one and the same mental act. This activity, though unnamed
�fcgr Aristotle, could probably be called "common sense,**
Prom a discussion of the senses, Aristotle moved on
by gradual steps to the doctrine of Noujs, the highest func
tion of th� soul. Thinking is compared with perceiving in
that in both cases the soul is cognizant of something that
is, but they differ in that perceiving is universal in the
animal world and is always free from error while thinking is
~"
g Ibid., p. 195-
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limited to a certain segment of the animal world and can pos*
sibly be in error. Thought is foimd only when there is a
discourse of reason and sensation: It is part imagination
and part Judgment, Imagination "is that in virtue of which
6
an image arises for us." Imagination is not sense, for
sense is either a faculty or an aetivity whil� imagination
takes place without either, as in drearaa. Also sense is al
ways present but imagination is not; sensations are always
true but phantasies are, for th� most part, false. Phantasies
often appear even when one's sensations ar� not working, as
in dreams. Imagination is not opinion for opinion involves
belief, persuasion and some explanation of th� persuasion;
no animal has these. However, Imagination is a movement and
has to be caused. Th� causative element is sensation, Grote
summarizes Aristotle's theory of imagination in this way:
Phantasy is an internal moveiaient of th� animated, being
(body and soul in one); belonging to the sentient soul,
not to th� cogjaitant or Intelligent; not identical with
the movement of s�nse, but continued from or produced
by that, and by that alone; accordingly, similar to the
moveuBnt of sense and relating to the same matters. Since
our sensible perceptions may be either tme or false.
CThat is, sensation of the couEBon sense variety, not sen
sation of the special senses which may not err ,3 so
also may b� our phantasms. And, since these phantasms
are not only like our sensations, but remain standing in
the soul long after the objects of sense have passed away,
they are to a great degree the determining causes both
of action and emotion. They are such habitually to
animals, ii^io are destitute of Nous; and often even to In-
6 Aristotle, op, cit, . l428al-2. (McKeon. 0�, cit,.
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telligent men, if the Nous be overclouded by disease or
drunlcennes s � 7
There are two treatises li^ich Aristotle wrote that
are akin to the discussion at hand. Therefore brief mention
is here made of On Memory and Reminiscence and On Dreams.
The latter is clearly a discussion of this particular form
of phantasm or imagination, Aristotle pointed out how a
dream is not the same as sense-perception nor opinion. How
ever, it does pertain to sense*perception as surely as sleep
itself does. The principle underlying this phenomenon %a
clearly state by Arls tot les
The objects of sense-^perception corresponding to each
sensory organ produce sense -percep tion in us, and the
affection due to their operation is present in the
organs of sense not only when the perceptions are ac
tualized, but even when they have departed."
Aristotle continued later ont
Prom this it is manifest that the stimulatory naove-
ments based upon sensory iiapressions, iriiether the latter
are derived from external objects or from causes within
the body, present themselves not only when persons are
awake, but also then, iBhen this affection which is called
sleep has com� upon them, with even greater ia5)ressiveness.
For by day, while the senses and the intellect are work
ing together, they (i.e. such movenients) are extruded
frora consciousness or obscured, just as a smaller is be
side a larger fire, or as small beside great pains or
pleasures, though, as soon as the latter have ceased,
even those which are trifling emerge Into notice. But
by night [i.e. in sleepjj owing to the inaction of tbe
particular senses, eind their powerl�s�ness to realize
7 Orote. 0�, cit. . p. 232.
8 Aristotle. On Dreams. ^$9^2$ ff, {HculQon, o�, cit
p. 620).
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theaiselves, which arises from the reflux of tfe� hot
from the eiterior parts to the interior, they fi-e. the
above movements 3 are borne in to the head quarters of
sense*perceptlon, and there display themselves as thB
disturbance (of waking life) subs ides #9
Memory is also Important in this connection since it
seems to be the only function of the soul wftiich approaches
so nearly that of imagination and dreams. In fact, Aristotle
stated that memory and imagination are is some cases so alike
that they c annot be distinguished clearly, i^emovj relates
always to the past and therefore is neither percfsition nor
conception. However, it relates to sense in much th� same
way as imagination and (Sreams in that it Involves a "presen**
tation," that is, a previous apprehension of sensible objects
by sensation, Aristotle saidJ
The process of moveiaent Xjaensory stimulation]! involved
in the act of perception stamps in, as it were, a sort
of impression of the percept, Just as persons do who
mak� an impression with a seal. This explains why in
those who ar� strongly moved owing to passion, or time
of life, no mnemonic ingjression is formed; Just as no
impression would be formed if l^ie movement of the seal
were to impinge on running water; while ther� are others
in whom, owing to the receiving surface frayed, as
happens to Cthe stucco on^ old i&hamberj walls, or owing.
to the hardness of th� receiving surface, the requisite
impression is not implanted at all*-*'*^
The question now is, lih&t does one remember, "ttie impression
or the object? If the former, then one does not remember
9 Ibid.T I(.60b27�l|.6la8, (McKeon, og, cit. , p. 622),
10 Aristotle. On Memory a^d Reminiscence. . i4.50a30*i^.50b6,
(McKeon, o�. clt . � ^�'oOST-
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anything that is absentj if the latter, on� might suppos� it
possible also to see or hear that which is not present.
Aristotle explained that in this way:
In so far as it is regarded In itself, it is only an ob
ject of contemplation, or a presentation; but ^�n con
sidered as relative to something else, e.g., as its like
ness, it is also a mnemonic token. 3.1
Recollection differs slightly from this in that it is the re
instatement into consciousness of something which was there
before. This is a characteristic of man above the animals
some of which have memory. Recollection or reminiscence is
a reviving rather than a retentive function. It is dependent
upon the capability for, and tii� use of, discursive reason or
inference. As Grote says:
Th� process is intentional end deliberate, instigated by
the desire t;o search for and recover som� lost phantasm
or cognition; its sue cess depends upon th� fact that
there exists by nature a regular observable order of se
quence among the movements of the system, physical as
well as psychical*3^
Thus the causative factor in the cas� of reminiscence seems
to be thinking rather than sensation*
In turning attention to the mind or Nous in Aristotle's
treatment, tiiis study returns to On the Soul. In th� cas� of
Kous the earlier �l�ments or nutrition, sensation, imagina
tion, memory, and recollection are presupposed. By means of
11 Ibid., l|.50b26-27. (BfoKeon. o�. cit.. p. 6l0).
12 Grote. ��, c it. . p. 2l5.
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the last three named t^e gap between sensation and cogitation
is bridged. (Aristotle's doctriiw of Nous is regarded by
commentators as being difficult to understand. Most of these
problems will have to be over-looked in this study for the
interest is not in location or source but rather in function.
Aristotle is quite clear in regards to the function of soul.)
Sense-perception is a separate source of knowledg� for
Aristotle, but through its five functions and its psychical
effects in the form of icaginatlon and memory, ther� is
stored up an experience of facts from which mind draws in
ferences to unknown facts and thus directs conduct and en
larges knowledge. This prior storing-up of experience goes
on from infancy even before the noetic function begins to
work. Thus though Hons is distinct from sens� yet it is
dependent upon sense, or mor� directly, upon imagination,
which is in turn dependent upon past movements or sens�.
Imagination is indispensable to cogitation: first, to the
carrying on of the process; and second, to the remembering
of it when it is past. This is vary important.
It thus appears clear that Aristotl� restricts the
'^ovls or ,noetic function in man to th� matters of sens�
and experience, physical or mental, end that he considers
the phantasm to be an essential accompaniment of the
cogitative act, Yet this does not at all detract from
13 For a discussion of those other problems, cf,
Orote, o�, cit,, pp. 219 ff*
ail Cf . Aristotle. On the Soul. i|.3lal4 ff. (McKeon.
2�. ci^., p. 59I4.) and Grote. o^. cit., pp. 225-22?.
261
his view of tb� grandeur, importance, and wide rang� of
survey, belonging to th� noetic function. It is the
portion of man's natur� that correlates with abstract
and xiniversa^tj but It is only a portion of his nature,
and must work in conjunction and harmony with the rest.
The abstract cannot be really separated from th� concrete,
nor the universal from on� or other of Its particulars,
nor the essence frora that whereof it is th� essence,
nor th� attribute from that of which it is the attribute,
nor the genus and species from the individuals compre
hended therein; nor, to speak in purely Aristotelian
language, the Form from some Matter, or the Matter from
Sense-perception alone, however, cannot apprehend th� first
principles of knowledge; reason or Mous can. The process, as
was seen in his logic, is inductive, from th� variety of
sense-experience by the way of imagirmtion or intuition to
16
complete certainty of basic principles.
15 Gl'ote, clt. , p, 22Q.
(McKeon, o�* cit,. pp. 53> ff � ) ; Orote. ��, �it., pp, 170 ff,;
Theodor Ciomperz. Oreek l^inker s . Volume II, Chapters XV-JCVII,
pp, 192 ff,; V*aiiac�. o�. cit,, pp. 85 ff.; Edxmrd Zeller.
Aristotle and the Early Peripatetics. Volume II, pp. 90-135.
6f, also' oTk. a. Mure. Arist{>t3^<B. PP. 102 ff. and pp, l66 ff.
OMP!I?ER XI
CONCLUDINa CONSIDERATIOHS OH ARISTOTIE
Any consideration of any phase of Aristotle's thought
^ould be set against his metaphysioal doctrine to understand
it completely, Zeller says in this connection:
Th� peculiar traits of the Aristotelian philosophy
are due to the fusion in it of the two elements to ifclch
attention was called at the outset, namely th� dialectic
or speculative, and tiie engjirical or realistic. On the
one hand the system finds the true essence of things to
consist in Immaterial form, tz*ue knowledge of them in
the apprehension of their concept; on iiSae other hand,
it insists that th� form should not be conceived of as a
transcendental 'idea' existing apart from things, and
that it is th� individual, and not th� universal notion
or genus, that is th� ultimate reality. 1
In Aristotle's theory of being, the substance� the
first of the categories� is th� only predicate which can
stand alone and prior to all other predicates. It is basic
in that it refers to th� essenc� of things. It does not
refer to universals or the ideas of Plato but it refsrs to
things themselves, individuals. Hhua Being is the essenc�
of any particular thing for only the particular is free from
accident and participation in other things. In other words,
tb� universal or the idea is really a coa^osite thing while
tru� essence is simple.
This seems to be a complete repudiation of Plato but
1 Eduard Zeller. Aris totle and the Earlier Peripatetics.
Volume II, pp. 336.
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it is not so complet� as it might seem, Aristotle in empha*
sizing the particular above the universal had to account for
the fact that things came to be and perish* If substanc� is
purely a particular thing and particulars are generated and
destroyed, the basic structure of the universe is not stable
and unmoved. The result of this would be a nihilism which
would probably be worse than the idealism of Plato in Aris
totle's mind. Thus, Aristotl� emphasized th� presence of
th� forms but not apart from the world of things. The forms
exist in the things rather than the things participating in
2
th� foms.
To explain the presence of the forms in perishable
things, Aristotle introduced the substratum which is pri
marily matter end the terms "potential" and "actual." The
essence of the things exists in th� form of the things which
is actuality, but matter which is potential and form which is
pure actuality are combined to make concrete reality, the
things themselves. Each thing is amenable to change, that
is, each thing is potentially something else, *ile at the
same time the form is the true essence and actuality of the
things. By this means, Aristotle accounted for change and
2~Werner Jaeger suggests something which might account
for Aristotle's insistence on this point. He says t^iat Aris
totle anchors metaphysics in physics because "it Is nottiing
but the conceptually necessary completion of th� experimentally
revealed system of moving nature." Cf. Jaeger. Aria totle.
p, 380 and cf. pp. 376-390.
yet made th� ground of change to be that whieh is changeless,
the forms, This was carried to th� point of Pxir� Form or
Pure Actuality irtiich is the source of all movement or change.
It lo against this ontological background that Aris
totle's theOTy of knowledge is cast. But there are two
otiier factors which figure into his theory of knowledge:
his logic and his psychology,
Logic for Aristotle was th� science of thou^t and
it was two-fold, inductive and deductive, (liven certain
premisses Aristotle promised certain deduced or Inferred
conclusions by the use of his syllogistic mettiod. This
method of deduction is purely a mental process and yet Aris
totle called it demonstrative science. He held this method
to be rationally inviolable althou^ validity of the con
clusions was dependent upon the validity of the basic
premiss. He made possible for other than assertoric, de
monstrative syllogisms to hav� the same validity of method.
Thus necessary (apodictic) and p5X)blematic syllogisms could
also, by this valid syllogistic process of inference, result
in necessary and problanatic conclusions, respectively.
Thus it is seen that Aristotle placed th� validity of
syllogistic conclusions on th� basis of the validity of his
basic premisses. It is to the establishment of adequate basic
premisses that his inductive method was introduced, H�
limited taie use of the demonstrative syllogism to special
sciences on the basis that the first principles of these
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could be ascertained. This placed any casual thinMng or
intellectual training or even philosophic reasoning outside
the realm of scientific inference, T� these were assigned
the use of dialectic method which was regarded as being a
secondary and less certain, thoi3gh not imimportant, process
of thought, Dialectical method, which had been the main
method of Plato, therefore lacks th� absolute authority of
scientific method though it does not suffer the limitations
3
that scientific method does.
The process of establishing first principles for
demonstrative science is the inductive method. It begins
with sense-perception and moves through memory, imaginative
experience to Nous, "Kh� highest fona of thought, where there
coiTies a synthesis of the elements as perceived by th� senses
into an intuitively ascertained whole, Tiieir resultant is
known with absolute certainty though it cannot be rationally
proved. It is the undemons treble basis of all demonstration.
Thus induction and deduction are really two sides of
the same general method,
3 For a discussion of Aristotle's scientific liietitod,
cf, Richard McKeon, "Aristotle's Conception of the Develop-
ir^nt and the Natiire of Scientific Metliod," Joxjrnal of the
History of Ideas . January, I9I4.7, pp. 3*M4-*
Cf , later for a more ^ftaij>lete discussion of Nous
as well as ttie episteraological'^implications of this theory.
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This inductive process of logic is similar to the
stages of souls in Aris totle ? s psychology. Sense-perception
is the lowest faculty of the soul except for the nutritive
function. Plants have only this latter fimction but animals
also hav� the former. Imagination is another phase with
memory and reminiscence. An of these phases form steps to
the last, the Nous , which is possessed by man only. Nous
seems to include both intuitive and rational functions for
it is Nous #iich a$)pr�hends first principles with certainty,
and it also seems to be Npus^^ which carries on the inferential
functions of th� syllogism. Not only so. Nous , is what is
engaged in any abstract mental function, including the dia
lectical function.
It should be noted also that Nous presupposes all
the other faculties of th� human soul. The senses perceive;
this is the passive function of the soul. But these elements
pass into insftgination in the form of memory, recollection,
dreams or phantases. Here they become part of th� experienc�
of the soul, Koua draws on this experience for its certain
ties and for its inferences, Tlais is th� active function of
the soul.
It has been pointed out that Aristotle's logic and
psychology as set against the background of his metaphysical
doctrines are factors in his theory of knowledge. From his
writing, it is evident that Aristotl� was a realist. Things
exist apart frcrni the mind that knows tfeeia. The priority
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of thingg to one's knowledge of them is clearly seen in
the fact that th� Metaphysics is th� background for his
theory of knowledge. He is a monist in that the mind is
at one with th� object. In sense-perception, there is an
la]|)ression of the actual form of the object upon the poten
tial of the soul. It should be noted, however, that Aris
totle's realistic monism is modified froia Plato's in that it
is not conceptionistic nor is the logical order made the
order of reality, 'fhe logical order is an analogy to the
real order*
Aristotle is also a rationalist but in a modified
sense because of en^lrical elements. Demonstration, which
stands next to the intuitive grasp of first principles in
iiffiportance, and has similar certainty as the first prin
ciples do, is a rationalistic function. But there ar� other
elements also. It is the data of experience, which origi
nates with the senses and becomes a phantasm, that is the
thing wiileh is the source-ground for the tho-oghts of Sous,,
It is empirically based.
In short, Aristotl� raaintali^d that simple sense-
experience was free from error as also was th� intuitive
grasp of first principles and tiie rationalistic'^ use of
5 Cf, Josei^ A. Leighton. fhe Fie Id of Philosophy.
p, 103 and Fernand Van Steenberghen, Kpistemolog^. pp. bii-'^'^.
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deductive inference. 3ense�experience, the passive funcjtlon
of mind, receives the impression of th� essence (form)
of real objects, These impressions become experience which
the reason uses In its inferential functions. As Turner
points out, there is a development from sense-knowledge to
rational knowledge. The latter is superior to the former
but the former is necessary to th� latter. The isenses
apprehend the actual concrete realities in which the forms
that are their essenc� lie; the mind apprehends the forms,
6
th� true substance of the tihings.
With these things in mind. It is as close as one can
come in defining and cataloging Aristotle's theory of know
ledge to call him a modified rational realistic monist.
In ccaiclusion, the place of extra-rational or faith
elements, is lifted up for brief consideration. Aristotle
shared th� three-fold faith assumption of th� Greek con
structive thinkers: (1) the universe exists; (2) it can
be known; and (3) it can be known by man alone without the
help of the gods. Usually this knowing of the universe is
6 Vi/ ill lam Turner. History of Philosophy, John Dewey
calls this knowledge which originates wife passive mind,
"spectator knowledge" in his guest for Certainty, p, 21l$
(Cited by John MacPartland, "Aristotle and the Spectator
Theory of Knowledge." Journal of PtiilosophY. May 2ij., 19h$,
p. 291) � MacPartland insists that that is not true for
the mind and the object ar� one in tiie knowledg� act for
Aristotle, This is evidently the Thomistic and Neo-Thomls-
tic view of Aristotle. It is, however, possible that Aris
totl� had a place for spectator knoiiledge in sense-perception
while h� certainly made mind active in its higher functions,
Cf, MacPartland, op, clt. . pp. 291-293. Also or, Zeller,
OP, clt,. Volume II, pp. 336-33Q.
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rationalistic and Aristotl� was no exception except for the
empirical basis for the rationalistic inferences which he
maintained. There is also a sens� in which the rational
certainty of the syllogistic process was a faith-ventiir�,
as was the postulating of the Prime �^veTm Opinion is a
belief in that its certain!*;^: is ^^"^ knowledge and thus is
not couple te certainty. But the locus classicua of the
extra-rational leap is at the very heart of Aristotle's
science, namely in th� establishing of first principles.
Induction gives way to an intuitive leap which Aristotle
7
maintained was the supreme point of certainty.
7 For a discussion of the Peripatetics, cf. Appen
dix B.
PART FIVE
aEKERAL CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER XII
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Before finishing this study, it is necessary to draw
together in one chapter the various conclusions found through
out this studj� A section is given over to the conclusions
on the nature of knowledge, and another section is given over
to the conclusions on the role of faith,
I. THE NATURE OP KNOILEDGE IK GREEK THOUGHT
In reviewing the period from Thales to Aristotle, an
increasing awareness of th� problem of knowledge can be seen.
The lonians, it was said, were not so much noted for their
theories so much as they were in the instigating a new think
ing trend which was to come to fruition in the later Greek
thinkers. They played an iiaportant i>art in the breaking
from superstition n^ich the Greek world xmderwent in the
sixth century before Christ. This break was what was im^
portant or is at least In^ortant to the history of western
thought, not their theories of being. This break was largely
an epistemological thing, for it was a substituting, on faith
grounds, of a rational realism, uncritical though it was,
for the naive eH^irical realism of an earlier period.
The Pythagoreans substituted a dualistic metaphysics
for the monistic metaphysics of their predecessors and
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conceived of it in terras of ninaber# This is a provocative
metaphysical problem, but what ia more important for this
study is the fact that th� real world was shifted to a dif
ferent level from the world of th� lonians. The outer world
as perceived by the senses and interpreted by reason, which
was, for the lonians, the real world, gave way to a realism
of relationships between the limited and the unlimited. Thus
a rational realism was maintained but of a more mathematical
nature.
With Heraclltus, metaphysical monism was re-established.
There is one basic principle in the universe, namely the
principle of change. But, iiaportant enough, it is not an
unassertainable change, as in Bergson, for instance. It is
a principle of change �foioh is a rational principle} it is
dependable and the only dependable thing; and it is permanent.
It would be supposed that such a philosophy would shift the
real world back to the world of sense, but that was not the
case with Heraclltus, Th� senses, he said, indicated that
^ere was such a thing as changeless permanence, only the
reason can show that that is not true. But he did not rule
out the senses or sense-data; he felt that Ifaey alone could
not give a correct picture of reality. Thus there was a clear
rational eaphasis, for only the mind or the reason has true
knowledge, Heraclltus can be called a modified rational
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Idealist�modified in the sense that there is more than rea-
son involved.
The grappling witti the problem of whether the world
is a world of being or a world of becoming continued throu^-
out the entirety of CJreek thought. One of the most influ
ential of the early atten5)ted solutions was the one proposed
by the Kieatics, They asserted that pure being is the basic
principle of the world. Becoming is illusion. As a result
there was a complete distrust of the senses. The senses
report change, but change does not exist} therefore, pure
reason is the only means of apprehending pure being. This is
clearly a metaphysical monism as well as being a pure rational
realism or a metaphysical rational realism.
The Plurallsts, including the Atomists, found basic
principles instead of a basic principle in the universe.
They also gave more time to the problem of knowledge,
Enipedocles' theory of kno^edge is linked with his theory
of the elements. Man is of the same elesaents as the rest
of the universe and thus can know the rest of the universe
since like knows like. This was perhaps a crude mechanical
e^hmsis on perceptual apprehension, but it clearly indicates
a realism} and it is also an indication of a beginning of an
Interest which Greek thought was to exploit more fully later,
namely a concern for the subjective factor, Eijqpedocles is
called a modified rational realist�modified in that knowledge
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does not come by reason alone, thou^ reason interprets sense-
data.
Leucippus and Democritus, the Atomists, made the par
ticulars themselves ultimately real* This feature clearly
effected the atomistic theory of knowledge. The soul is com
posed of atoms aM, therefore, sensation raust be the Impact of
the atoms from without upon the a toms within. However, the
phenomena produced by this impact laay not be exactly like the
object as it exists In itself. The air through which the
atOTiS pass can distort the image. Thus, one �annot know
anytiiing completely and surely by the senses. Here again
is an emphasis upon the subjective factor, and mechanical
tahough it be, the problem of error was given a new turn.
Error was not considered as the opposite of right and the
equal of wrong, but it was considered to be the contortion
of right. However, sense-experience is hopelessly obscure
because of the ever present margin of possible error. There
is a true knowledge�here the atomists reveal their faith in
rationalism� iftiich is distinct and genuine. Thus the atomists
are denominated modified rational realists.
Anaxagoras, a pluralist, marked a transition from
cosmologioal taiought and the thought of the later period
Which was anthropological or at least was largely so. In
epistemological terms, this transition was from a concern
with the outer world to a concern witii the subjective world.
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This transition came with Anaxagoras* emphasis on mind as
a significant factor in the order of nature. He maintained
a mechanical theory of sense-percepti on as his colleagues
did but clearly �^hasized the subjective factor. Mind,
and gave it a strong ontological status* Thus, he too was
a modified rational realist*
The subjective factor that came into prominence with
the plurallsts became almost an obsession with many of the
Sophists. Man as the measure of all things became the key
note of this movement. It has been discussed in Chapter IV
as to whether Protagoras meant the term "man" to be in an
individual or in a generic sense. The conclujdon on this
point is that Protagoras* real meahing is uncertain; however,
th� fact that "man* came to be used in an individual sense
in the Sophist movement is clearly indicated. This extrense
subjectivism led to a relativism of knowledge and finally
to a scepticism. There Is, however, probably no epistemo
logical idealism here. The outer world is real and can to a
certain extent be apprehended by the senses, but because on�
man is different frora another his sense-grasp may differ from
the other man's. This clearly headed toward scepticism, and
with Gorgias, fully arrived.
It took a strong man to pull the cause of philosophic
thou^t out of the fire. The tremendous role of Socrates
in doing just that is alnKJSt impossible to evaluate. He did
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it without underestimating the subjective element. Granting
that tmth is a subjective matter, Socrates maintained that
the subject is a rational being and that as a rational being
he can grasp truth. Since reason is a common element of
men (a imiversal element), there must be a universal truth
which is shared by all rational beings and is valid for all.
Basically, therefore, truth exists In the mind of a person
and when called forth is like the truth called forth from
the mind of any person* Socrates* dialectical or dialogue
method was an attempt to draw out such truth after a catharsis
of prejudices and lesser ideas had taken place. This was a
clear re-assertion of rationalism, since it was largely de
pendent on th� rational processes rather than on sense-data,
and a partial re-assertion of realism, at least�a complete
solving of the Socratic -Platonic pii^blem would help to decide
how much of a re-assertion�, since truth is eommon to all.
It should be said, however, that Socrates' limited, or seemed
to limit, the realm of truth to moral truth. In the light of
1
this discussion, Socrates is called a limited rational realist.
It is impossible to give a complete and adequate review
of Plato, partially because of his method, partially becaij^e
of his exhaustiveness, and partially because of his vagueness,
1 The Semi-Socratios shoiald have brief mention, Ttie
Megarians xised the eristic method almost to the point of
scepticism. The Cynics oraphasiajed the subjective factor
In much the same way as did the Sophists and nesrlj to the
point of scepticism. The Cyrenaics emphasized an idealism
Which was uncommon among the Greeks and thus despaired of
true knowledge.
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It seems, however, that Plato found the unity of th� real
world in th� r�alm of ideas, These ideas are constant but
not aloof from th� world of change. The relation of being
to becoming, the one to the many, was Plato's biggest prob
lem. At least, his emphasis on the realm of ideas as true
reality led to an emphasis on true knowledge as conceptual
knowledge. His early dualism seems to hav� cut off to a
great extent conceptual knowledge from perception. But in
an over-all view of his thought, this is not the case. Per
ception exists and can be true but it is merely a matter of
opinion for the possibility of error exists in th� apprehen
sion of a changing world. Only in the aji^rehension of
change lessness can true knowledge exist. This grasp is
conceptual and almost intuitional, Since the real world
exists outside the mind� this seems to be the correct
interpretation of Plato's thought, and since its most certain
apprehension is by reason, it is clear that Plato was a
rational realist,
Aristotle found th� basic principle of the universe,
not in an archetypal form, but in the world of particulars.
But though the form is never separated from the particular
except in the mind, it is the truly existing and changeless
essence of a thing. That being the case, knowledge begins
with perception, the grasp of the thing, but reason grasps
the ^ternkl form of the thing. This prior action of percep-
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tion as being basic to rational grasp is seen in bis psycho
logy where �ach fiancti on of soul from the appetitive and the
perceptual up to Nous is dependent upon the ac tion of every
previous function. Also in scientific knowledge, a process
of induction from sense-experlsic� up to th� intuitive grasp
by Nous of the universal and chmgeless premisses or prin
ciples is necessary before any rational deductive process
takes place. This distinctive use of sense-data along with
the rational grasp of truth of the outer world would label
Aristotle a modified rational realist. At least this seems
to be the best label that can be found for his thought*
Therefore, In conclusion, the Greek thinkers were
almost entirely rational realists* except for those who
were subjective to the point of scepticism and the Cyrenaics
who alozM introduced an idealism which resulted in practical
scepticism. Some were almost pure rational realists, such
as the Elwitics, and to some extent, Plato and the Pythagor
eans. One seems to have limited rational realism to the
realm of moral truth because his interests were there, namely
Socrates, iSome, such as Heraolitus, the Plurallsts, and
Aristotle, ar� better knom as modified rational realists
because there is an evident dependence upon sense-data in
their theories of knowledge. The lonians can be called
uncritical rational realists since there was indicated no
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great break between th� report of th� senses and the report
of reason. They did little more than distinguish between
th� two. In all of these thinkers, the world is regarded
realistically in that in all of them th� world exists outside
of mind. Most of them are also epistemological aonlsts in
that the mind is capable of giving a correct picture of the
real world, (The exceptions to the monistic view are pos
sibly the sceptics and the Cyrenaics,)
II, Tm mm of wait& m grkek thought
One of th� interesting things about th� present study
is the fact that it has been done before, ^e attempt was
not as extensive or as heavily documented as this study has
been, but it was don� in a day when the early Christian Church
was faced with Greek thought as a possible friend or a pos
sible foe. Perhaps the easiest thing for the chiu'ch to do
was to attack every idea aM thought-pattern of th� ancient
world, becuase of their seem#ig anti-revelation, and there
fore anti-Christian, character. It would have been most
easy to have been uncoBa^jromising when the Church and the pagan
world were in conflict, especially in th� realm of ideologies.
But interestingly enough the approach made by a substantial
thiidcing segment of the church was not villlfication but
careful and penetrating analysis of the best of pagan thought,
and dangerous though it was, it seems to have born fruit.
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An intolerant gospel of full revelation was paradoxically
established in several quarters by a broad and tolerant
method�a special Christian revelation planted solidly on a
natural revelation or even a special revelation of a different
type iftiich came to its fruition in Greek thought.
It was part of this last endeavor that Oiement of Alex
andria imdertook when he wrote fhe 3troasta. In Chapter IV
he discussed faith as the basis of all knowledge. This is a
most revealing chapter since it is an apologetic for the
Christian faith on the basis of JTalth.which. exists in the
2
concepts of knowledge in the Greek thinkers.
To a brief review of this role of faith, this sti?dy
turns in conclusion. It is laaintained that all oi the Greek
systematisers worked on a three-fold faith premiss. This
three-fold faith is maintained throughout Greek thoii^t
except �here sceptical elements appear. In fact, tbis faith-
ventitre is one of the most distinguishing features of Greek
thought. It is mad� up of th� following elements wlilch ar�
implicit but evident throughout: (1) that there is a basic
unity to th� universe, whetiier that unity b� conceived as
one principle or many; (2) that that unity is maintained by
fixed laws and therefore is oonstant| and (3) that lhat
unity, which is reality, is knowable by tiie native powers of
d Clement of Alexandria. The Stromata or the Miace^r-
lanies in the Ante^Nicean Fftthersf. Volume II (Alexander
Roberta andJames Donaldson"; editors), pp* 3l|.9*3Sl#
281
aan without th� help of t^i� gods.
Ih� early Or�^ thlnkera ar� iioted in this aroa for
establiahii^ tha a� lif^lioit faith*^rinoiplea� The brook
this in^lled from the early Greek aupersfeltlona is difficult
to appreciate fully. Th� role of t&ith other than this basic
venture is not too evident tn the pro-Socratlc thought} but
with the comii:^ of Soomtes and the re-establishing of the
prioDlple of ratiomlistie valid!tyf faith played a prominent
role not only as a basis or fowidation for knowledge but as
ej:tx^<�x�tional elements within the systems themselves. Soc
rates revealed such extra*rational el^enta as th� place of
Providence and th� rational limitations set by the daimoniQi|�
Also ii^lied in his moral thou^t is the capacity of valua
tion* Valuation ia^lies the possibility of choice which is
possibly an extra*rational function of will*
Plato revealed a faith��v�nturc prliaarily in the Par-
atenidea wher� he insisted upon the establishment of the aoc-
trine of ideas in spite of rational limitations* Hia inde
cisive method ar^i his use of the myth indicates a movement
Into an area wher� absolute certainty does not exist. His
astablishing of a cosmic teleology� that is, the placing of
the Good as th� highest idea, was also a faithf�v�nture.
Aristotle revealed an extra-rational leap at a
crucial point in his scientific thou; ji it, naiaely th� intui
tive grasp of first principles* *^1bo, the fact that he
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limited the scientific metliod so decidedly and yet mad� room
for possible knowledge outside of th� method was in some ways
a faith-venture. Also, in starting his theory of knowl�dg�
with sensation he assinaed something which he did not ana
lyze, namely sense-experlenc� itself and how it can be. This
also was a faith-venture. Induction begins and �nds in
mystery for Aristotle, and yet it was at th� heart of know
ledge which he regarded as the moat dependable.
In short, the Oreek movement frcaa '%ales to Aristotl�
was not so much a break from faith and the establishing of
knowledg� as it was a brejifccfrom superstition and the es
tablishing of a constructive faith broad enough to main
tain the varieties of Greek thought.
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APPEI?DICES
APPENDIX A
THE OIiD ACADEMY
Brief mention ahould be mde of the disciples of Plato,
other than Aristotle, in the scientific school mhich he founded,
the Acadei^. Most historians find five different schools of
disciples and list them as follows s Old Academor, first school!
Middle Academy, second and t^ird schools; and New Academy,
fourth and fifth schools �
The leadership of the Old Academy was given by Plato to
Speusippus* Other m�wibeva of this Academy were Xenocrates of
Chalcedon, who succeeded Speusipp'.is , Heraclides of Pontus,
Fhi]|.ip the Opuntian, Herraodorus, and Polemo, Crantor, and
Crates, Speusippus seems to have given the Platonic
ideas and replaced them with mathematical numbers. He main
tained a doctrine of a pantheistic ch8U>acter and in general
was much like the Pythagoreans. He seems also to have held a
broader theory of knowledge than Plato did for he gave more
1
place to knowledge by experience, according to Zeller, Xeno
crates divided philosophy into three dltiaions: dialectics,
physics, and ethics; and he divided essences into the sensible,
the intelligible, and th� intermediate� the objects of opinion.
He too was held by the magic of number, although he did not go
as far in his approach to Pythagoreanism as did Speusippus.
1 Eduard Zeller. Greek Philosophy, p. l66.
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Polemo, the successor to Xenocrates, turned his attention main
ly to ethics as more in5)ortant than dialectics.
These are three of the more important men of the Old
Academy, Thej point out clearly that the school extended
portions of Plato*s thought without the acumen and coir5)lete-
ness of their teacher, m^ch like the Cynics and Cyrenaics
extended the thought of Socrates, A certain amount of cor
ruption was to be expected and it is clearly found even in the
first successor to Plato, so that the general movement was
largely Pythagorean. But the Middle AcadetxQT epitomized that
corruption with the introduction of scepticism. The New
AcadeBQT marked a return to a more dogmatic position without
the inspiring genius of Plato and thus formed a transition
2
to Neo-Platonism.
William Turner, in sunMarizing th� historical posi
tion of th� Academics, sayss
The Academics, although they were the official repre
sentatives of Platonic philosophy, failed to grasp the
true meaning of the theory of Ideas. By introducing
Pythagorean and other elements they turned the tradition
of the Platonic school out of the line of its natural
development, and ended In adopting a scepticism or a
dogmatic eclecticism either of which is far from what
should have been the logical outcome of Plato *s teaching.
2 The Middle and New Academies do not come within
the bounds of this study since they form a liason away from
purely Greek philosophy up to the time of Aristotle, For
a review of the Old Academy, cf, Theodor Oomperz, Oreek
Thinkers, Volume V, pp, l-ltj Zeller, 0�, cit.. pp. 16^-
169} etc.j and for a review of all three Academies, cf,
Friedrich Ueberweg. 4 His tory of Philosophy. Volume I,
pp, 133 ff.
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They are to Plato i*iat the imperfectly Socratic schools
are to Socrates, The continuity, therefore, of Platonic
thought is not to be looked for in these schools but
rather in the school founded by Aristotle,3
f William Turner, Hiatorsr of Philosophy, p, I2J4., Cf
121-*^."'4*
APPENDIX B
THE PERIPATETICS
Ueberweg divides the Peripatetics into an earlier group
and a later group, Theophrastus of Lesbos undertook to guide
the Petipatetic school after Aristotle's d eath. He seems to
have been in charge of the school for about thirty-five years.
With Theophrastus, there was an atteixrpt to suppliment and ex
tend the thought of Aristotle especially in the field of
physics and ethics. He wrote many woiics covering the whole
field of philosophy, but he is especially noted for his two
woztes on botany and his Ethical Characters. Not only was
there an extension of Aristotle's thought with Theophrastus,
but there were some m>difications especially of Aristotle's
doctrine of movement.
As to the nature of knowleiige, he deviated from
Aristotle in regarding human thought as movement of the scul,
and he removed soma of the difficulties in the way of active
and passive reason without removing the distinction between
1
the two.
Beside Theophrastus stood Eudemus of Rhodes. He
1 Cf , Friedrich Ueberweg, 4 History of Phllosoiphy.
Volume I, pp. I8O-I8I} William Turner, History of Philosophy.
pp. 158-160 5 Eduard Zeller. Oreek Philosophy, pp. 222 ff ,
and Johann Erdmann, A History of Philosophy. Vol^lme I, pp,
177-178.
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showed little originality and stayed close to his master's
teachings. His contribution is largely in the field of ethics
and his work, the Eudemian Ethics is included among Aristotle's
2
works as a suppliment to the Hicoiaachean Ethics,
Aristojcenus of Tarentura, the Musician, introduced
some Pythagorean elements into the Aristotelian school with
3
his emphasis on the harmony of the soul,
Strato of bampsacus, the Physicist, was the important
successor to Theophrastus, He served for eighteen years as
the head of the Peripatetic school. In his study of nature,
he manifested a tendency to discard the idea of the incor*
poreal. He placed the diety on the same level as the un
conscious activity of nature. In short, he was opposed to
the dualism which arose in Aristotle's natural philosophy,
Thare were several other men of this school whose
names and Contributions are less important. However^
there were a few men in the later Peripatetic school who
were important. The most outstanding man of this gr>up
was Andronicus of Rhodes, wl-io edited the works of Aristotle,
2 Loc, cit,
3 Loc, cit,
h boc , cit.
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With this group there seeits to hav� been a return to ortho
dox Aristotelian thought but with no important original
5
contributions, except for th� exegesis of Aristotle's works.
In short, no distinctive contributions to the theory
of knowledge appeared among the Peripatetics with the possible
exception of Theophrastus, His ideas are slight xariationm
epistemologically thou^ they ar� probably more significant
psychologically and ontologically.
�"
5 Cf, Turner, 0�, cit, . p, 159; Oeberweg, 0�, cit,,
pp, 180, 181,
